A Justification for Stops of Moving Vehicles

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

A. Justification for Stops of Moving Vehicles

General Rule: An automobile stop is not justified unless there exists probable cause or an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that motorist unlicensed, automobile is not registered or "occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random stop violates Fourth Amendment). See also People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003) (traffic stop governed by Terry's reasonable suspicion standard); People v. Greco, 336 Ill. App. 3d 253, 783 N.E.2d 201 (2d Dist. 2003) ("A traffic stop requires a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of the law").

Basis of "Articulable Suspicion": A forcible stop of motorist is permitted only when officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant suspicion of a violation of law. People v. James, 44 Ill. App. 3d 300, 358 N.E.2d 88 (2d Dist. 1976) (vehicle stop invalid where officer lacked suspicion of wrongdoing. "[W]here, police officers are objectively doing what they are legally authorized to do...the results of their investigation are not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective intent with which they acted"). See also People v. Thompson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 796, 670 N.E.2d 1129 (5th Dist. 1996) (officer's ulterior motive behind traffic stop does not invalidate stop as long as basis for stop exists); People v. Flores, 231 Ill. App. 3d 813, 596 N.E.2d 1204 (4th Dist. 1992) (search under hood of defendant's automobile, following stop for speeding, carried out for vehicle ownership identification purposes was reasonable police action and, as such, discovery of drugs under hood was proper even if police officer had motives beyond investigating possible motor vehicle code violations).

1. "Articulable and Reasonable Suspicion" of Criminal Wrongdoing Existed

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (An agent was working an unpaved checkpoint near the U.S.-Mexico border, where there were also sensors that detected traffic moving in directions likely to indicate smuggling. When a sensor was set off during a guard shift change (and therefore unpatrolled), agents believed that someone might be attempting to smuggle drugs out of the area. An agent proceeded to a location where he could intercept the vehicle that was setting off the sensors. After he pulled to the side of the road, he saw an approaching van driving alone and concluded that this was the vehicle that set off the sensor. The speeding van slowed quickly upon seeing the officer, and a male driver, a woman passenger, and 3 children were inside. The driver pretended to ignore the officer as it passed by. The agent noticed the children's knees were very high as if they were propped on something. When he followed the van, the children began waving in an odd manner without looking back, as if they were being instructed to do so. Also, the vehicle was traveling in an area where there were no recreational or camping activities. Moreover, the vehicle was proceeding on back-roads where more easily-traveled routes were available. Upon the van's quick signal and turn on to a road that would avoid the checkpoint, the officer pulled it over. He asked the driver if he could search the van, to which he agreed. The agent found $100,000 in marijuana inside. HELD: Examining each fact individually, the events would not create a reasonable suspicion. However, the "totality of the circumstances" created a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct).

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (holding that in a Terry stop the officer must have a particularized and objective basis for determining that such a stop is necessary, and is entitled to consider the "whole picture" in making such a determination. Inferences of trained officer may be considered. Stop of camper held justified on facts gained by border patrol of human footprints in desert and other physical signs suggesting transportation of illegal aliens).

People v. Ledesma, 2016 Ill. 2d 571, 795 N.E.2d 253 (2003) (An anonymous informant inadvertently intercepted a cellular conversation with a scanner, which revealed a planned meeting between a drug supplier and purchaser. Specifically, the anonymous 911 caller stated a drug deal was about to occur in the parking lot of an Aldi store on a particular road in Tilton, Illinois, which deal involved a teal-colored automobile. Several officers positioned themselves in another parking lot with a view of the Aldi lot, saw a teal-colored auto drive into the empty Aldi parking lot and another purple-colored vehicle drive into the lot, while parking along side the teal auto. Both vehicles turned off their headlights momentarily, then back on, and then drove off. HELD: Given the factual corroboration of its content, the tip provided a basis for the reasonable suspicion that warranted the stop). See also People v. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d 18, 762 N.E.2d 553 (1st Dist. 2001) (police tip from known informant that at 8 p.m., a male Latin named Victor, about 180 pounds, 5 foot, ten inches, would drive a Ford to 31st and Kostner to pick up two kilos of cocaine provided reasonable suspicion for vehicle stop where officers confirmed informant's prediction of defendant's future behavior). Compare People v. Brown, 343 Ill. App. 3d 617, 798 N.E.2d 800 (2d Dist. 2003) (anonymous tip of impending drug transaction did not provide reasonable suspicion for vehicle stop where tip uncorroborated and lacking any indicia of reliability).

People v. Abram, 2016 IL App (1st) 132785, 50 N.E.3d 1197 (According to police testimony offered at a suppression hearing following defendant's arrest for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the following occurred. Two police officers patrolling the West Woodlawn neighborhood of Chicago responded to a call that three males with rifles had been spotted in that area. Upon noticing defendant, sitting alone inside a vehicle in an alley, the officers exited their squad car and started walking toward him. Upon their arrival, police immediately noticed the vehicle was missing a front license plate and was obstructing the alley. According to one of the officers, defendant started "making some movements" and immediately drove his car, in reverse, out of the alley and sped away. "The officers then pursued defendant, with lights and sirens on, for approximately 11 minutes. During this time, defendant disobeyed traffic signals, drove 'erratically,' and drove 'down numerous alleys, side streets, through vacant lots, over sidewalks and major thoroughfares.'" Although the officer acknowledged in his testimony that at no time did he see a weapon in defendant's possession or any other occupant in the vehicle, he "stated that, at several points during the car chase, he observed defendant move as if he was reaching under his seat and then throw something out through the driver-side window. Although he was not present when the discarded items were recovered by other officers, he later saw the items and testified that, based on his experience and training, he believed them to be crack cocaine." The police chase ended when defendant pulled his vehicle into a police station parking lot, where he was taken into custody. The officer in pursuit testified he initially issued defendant tickets for fleeing and eluding officers and missing a front license plate, but not for obstructing the alley. In the meantime, other officers involved in the chase, who also saw defendant toss items from his vehicle, retrieved at least several, which was later determined to be rock crack cocaine. Defendant presented witness evidence that the vehicle he had been in at the time of the police approach of him was parked behind a home owned by his family and was not blocking the alley. The trial court judge at the suppression hearing "denied the motion to suppress and granted the State's motion for a directed finding that probable cause had existed for defendant's arrest. Because the testimony presented established that defendant fled from the police and tossed items from his vehicle, the court concluded '[t]here [wa]s before [it] no possible other explanation as to how it happened.'" Defendant appealed asserting the trial court "erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because, at the time he fled from the police, they had neither reasonable suspicion to detain him nor probable cause to arrest him. Defendant point[ed] out that the officers arrived on the scene looking for a group of three men with rifles but instead found defendant seated alone in his car in the alley behind a home owned by his family with nothing in his hands. Although he disputes that his car was blocking the alley, defendant further contend[ed] that, even if it was, the officers could not have reasonably inferred from this violation of a civil parking ordinance that he was committing, about to commit, or had committed a criminal offense. Finally, defendant argue[d] that flight, by itself, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion." Meanwhile, the State countered "that defendant's claim of a fourth amendment violation 'rests on the false premise that there ever was a stop in the alley' when '[i]n fact, defendant fled before police stopped him.' According to the State, 'defendant was not seized until the police arrested him in the parking lot of the police station,' by which time he had committed numerous traffic violations and tossed suspected cocaine from his vehicle. Even if the officers approaching defendant in the alley constituted a stop, the State alternatively argue[ed] that probable cause existed where defendant had no front license plate and was obstructing the alley." HELD: "Not every encounter between a police officer and a private citizen, however, involves a seizure or restraint of liberty...