Justices in the jury box: video evidence and summary judgment in Scott v. Harris.

• Author: Kessler, David K.

Some scholars have expressed concern that judges are encroaching on the fact-finding role of the jury through the use of summary judgment. (1) This concern is more acute in cases that turn on fact-specific inquiries, such as lawsuits where the defense claims qualified immunity. (2) Last term, in Scott v. Harris, (3) the Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the district and appellate courts, which had denied summary judgment to a defendant who claimed qualified immunity. (4) In Harris, the plaintiff argued that he had been unreasonably seized by a police officer who had rammed the plaintiff's car off the road to end a high speed car chase, leaving the plaintiff paralyzed. (5) After reviewing video footage of the chase, (6) the Court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff posed a danger to the community, making the officer's seizure of the plaintiff objectively reasonable. (7) Because an objectively reasonable seizure does not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, the officer enjoyed qualified immunity from the suit. This Comment argues that the Court's decision in Harris encroached on the jury's role. Indeed, the number of judges who disagreed with the Court and the nature of the video evidence on which the Court relied suggest that a genuine issue of material fact did exist. Moreover, the Court's reliance on video evidence raises the concern that use of such evidence in summary judgment proceedings will lead judges to assume the jury's fact-finding role.

On the night of March 29, 2001, a Georgia police officer clocked nineteen-year-old Victor Harris's car speeding at 73 miles-per-hour in a zone with a 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. (8) The officer turned on his flashing blue lights as he followed Harris's car, but Harris refused to slow down. (9) Other police officers, including Deputy Timothy Scott, joined in the pursuit. (10) At one point in the chase, Harris pulled his car into a parking lot and was nearly trapped by police cars. (11) He managed to get his car back on the highway, colliding with Scott's car in the process. (12) Scott, leading the pursuit at that point, then requested and received permission to disable Harris's car, and proceeded to push his bumper into Harris's vehicle. (13) Harris lost control of his car, ran off the road, crashed, and suffered injuries that left him a quadriplegic. (14) Harris filed suit, alleging, among other things, that Scott used excessive force to end the chase and thereby unreasonably seized Harris in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (15) Scott responded by filing a motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity. (16)

The District Court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment because it believed that the case presented "material issues of fact" that a jury would have to resolve. (17) The court first decided that Harris had been seized. (18) Drawing all disputed facts in favor of Harris, the court next determined that a jury could find the seizure to be objectively unreasonable. According to the court, a jury could find that Harris's initial speeding did not pose an immediate threat to others, and that his subsequent conduct during the chase, in which he "did not use his vehicle in an aggressive manner," did not create such a threat. (19) Finally, the court considered whether Scott was protected by qualified immunity for his alleged violation of Harris's Fourth Amendment right. Scott would not be entitled to such immunity if a jury determined that "it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that Scott's conduct was unlawful." (20) The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Scott did not know Harris's underlying crime, and that the evidence suggested that Harris posed little danger to officers or civilians. (21) Because these findings created a genuine issue of material fact, the court denied summary judgment. (22)

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to deny Scott summary judgment against Harris. (23) With Judge Rosemary Barkett writing, a unanimous panel (24) agreed with the District Court that Scott had seized Harris. (25) The panel also concluded that the question whether Harris's conduct "pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others" (26) was "a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury." (27) A jury could find that Harris

remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road.... Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed Harris, the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of the nearby intersections. (28) Because a jury could find that Harris posed no immediate threat, the Eleventh Circuit panel agreed with the District Court that the jury could find Scott's use of deadly force to seize Harris to be unreasonable. (29)

The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia (30) explained that the Court, when reviewing a summary judgment motion, "view[s] the facts and draw[s] reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.'" (31) But where the opposing party's story is "blatantly contradicted by the record," (32) there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment is appropriate. (33) In this case, the videotape of the chase created an "added wrinkle" because it "quite clearly contradict[ed]" the respondent's story and the findings of the district and appellate courts. (34) The Court found that Harris moved "shockingly fast" down narrow roads, "force[d] cars" to the shoulder, and engaged in "hazardous maneuvers" as he led the police in a "Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury." (35) In light of the video evidence, "[r]espondent's version of events [was] so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him." (36)

The Court next held that, given the facts of the chase, Scott's seizure of Harris was objectively reasonable and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (37) The Court balanced Scott's goal, elimination of the "imminent" threat to pedestrians and motorists, with his method, the use of deadly force against Harris. (38) Given Harris's dangerous driving, the Court found Scott's actions to be reasonable. (39) Finally, Justice Scalia dismissed the argument that the police should have let Harris go and tracked him down later, explaining that such an approach would create a perverse incentive for lawbreakers to initiate high-speed chases. (40)

Justices Ginsburg and Breyer both concurred. Justice Ginsburg asserted that the Court's decision did not create a per se rule that the use of deadly force by police officers to prevent harm to civilians during a high speed chase was always reasonable. (41) She explained that each situation requires a factual inquiry into such questions as "[w]ere the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedestrians, police officers) at risk?" (42) Justice Breyer observed that the "video footage of the car chase made a difference to my own view of the case" and encouraged readers of the opinion to view the video. (43) He also agreed with Justice Ginsburg that the Court had not...