Why justice? Which justice? Impartiality or objectivity?

• Author: Rasmussen, Douglas B.
• Position: Amartya Sen's 'The Idea of Justice' - Critical essay

Objectivity ... is now conceived as inter-subjectivity. Inter-subjective norms are not agreed to by the members of a society because they are objective, but, in effect, become objective because they are jointly accepted.

--Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology

On its book jacket, we find Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice (2009) described by Hilary Putnam as "the most important contribution to the subject since John Rawls' A Theory of Justice." We also learn there that Kenneth Arrow regards it as "a major critical analysis and synthesis." And although it may be news to some that a Nobel Laureate in economics is dealing with a basic issue of philosophy, it is no surprise to those who have followed the vast array of articles and books that Sen has produced over the years. He has dealt with questions of justice, inequality, and freedom for a long time.

Although we cannot provide here a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of this work, we ask three probing questions about it. First, why is justice among the necessary principles for organizing society? Indeed, there is much evidence that social cooperation and coordination can be based on advantage-based reasoning and relationships of mutual benefit without having to use the scarce resource of justice.

Second, if in response to the first question, it is claimed that the issue is neither one of merely organizing society or invoking personal morality but instead of determining if the structure of society is just overall, this claim seems to raise questions regarding the multiple senses of "justice." In particular, it raises the question of whether the norms of justice are all of the same type and have the same function. For example, are the norms that determine a just political-legal order the same as those for personal and social life? Which justice? Finally, these questions raise the issue of determining philosophy's role in "social choice" and so-called public reasoning. Can Sen's account of "public reasoning," which he links closely with deliberative democracy, supply answers to these questions? Is impartiality the central determinant of reasonableness? Does Sen confuse impartiality with objectivity, and does he therefore fail to come to grips with the problem of finding a just structural order for a regime of integrated political diversity?

In part I, we consider our first two questions. Our consideration begins with an examination of the difference between two forms of responsibility--relationships of effective power and those of mutual benefit--and we then move to an examination of how Sen conceives of both human rights and social choice. We argue that neither of these two forms of responsibility is suited to providing structural norms on which a political-legal order depends. Nor do we find Sen's conception of human rights or his appeal to public reasoning in making basic choices between alternative states of the world adequate to this task. In fact, his entire approach to public reasoning begs the question in regard to social choice because it assumes without justification the need for a centralized comprehensive vision and intricate system of regulating obligations in making such a choice.

In part II, we consider our third question and thus examine Sen's views of public reasoning, impartiality, and philosophy's place in such reasoning. We argue that public reasoning is inadequate to the task of determining basic structural norms because it is based on an unjustified impersonalist view of impartiality--a view that is also incompatible with the individualist and personal features of human flourishing. We conclude that Sen's account of public reasoning fails overall to incorporate all perspectives. Thus, it either misrepresents other opposing positions or begs the question as to why public reasoning should be accepted as the way to determine justice.

I

Effective Power, Mutual Benefit, and Human Rights

In the closing paragraph of chapter 9 of The Idea of Justice, Sen writes: "Mutual benefit, based on symmetry and reciprocity, is not the only foundation for thinking about reasonable behavior towards others. Having effective power and the obligations that can follow unidirectionally from it can also be an important basis for impartial reasoning, going well beyond the motivation of mutual benefit" (2009, 207). In one respect, the point is obvious. Not all our behavior toward others is a form of securing mutual benefits. As Sen observes earlier in the chapter, we sometimes might use our "effective power" to fight a wrong or simply to help out. We might also keep a promise even if we do not benefit by doing so, or we might respect a right no matter what our immediate interests. Sen mentions each of these forms of reasoning as part of the plurality of reasons that might be proffered in the name of impartiality and that might constitute part of a discourse about the nature and meaning of justice. Later in this article we examine the notion of objectivity in Sen's conception of reason and reasonableness, but our immediate point here is to show that "unidirectional" obligations that flow from "effective power" must be understood as having a form that need not be adopted at the structural level and that they stand in opposition to relations of mutual benefit that are more readily implied in the actions protected by the norms that constitute the structural level. By "structural level," we mean the level at which the basic parameters for interpersonal relations will be defined and enforced by the political-legal order or state--in this respect, the basic rules of political justice. As it turns out for us, mutual benefit is also not the structurally preferred format either, but its character more closely reflects the moral purpose of the structural level of interpersonal relationships than does effective power and is thus superior to effective power as a form of social organization. As we shall see, the appropriate structural form allows for both effective power and mutual benefit, but there is a strong tendency away from mutual benefit if effective power dominates structural thinking.

Effective power has a connection with the discussion of capabilities and freedom that dominates a number of Sen's works (1982, 1985, 1999b). In simplest terms, having effective power to accomplish one's ends, either directly or indirectly through the aid of others, is for Sen a form of freedom. If one is in a position to use one's own effective power to affect the life of another, ceteris paribus, then the responsibility to do so would be present in a way that would seek to enhance the other's effective power and thus increases the other's capabilities and hence freedom. Sen gives the example of the responsibility we have toward animals because of our power over them, but parent to child, boss to employee, rich to poor would do as well. The discussion of effective power and of capabilities and empowerment in general is meant to contrast with the mutual-benefit approach that individuals may take to one another. Sen believes that both approaches are important to a full conception of freedom and a full conception of justice and that one cannot simply replace the other in public discourse. They do, however, contrast in form. (1) In the case of effective power and capabilities, we can describe the responsibilities Sen portrays as he defines them. In the case of relations of mutual benefit, we might say that the responsibilities are open. What it means for a responsibility to be defined is that the power or capability at issue must be exercised in accordance with a determinate description of a projected action that serves as the sole standard for measuring the appropriateness or success of the action. Thus, if A is an action that purports to be responsible under effective power, then A is successful if it accords with some rule R or some end E that defines the character of A prior to its execution. As a consequence, if W is well off and P is poor, and the relationship between W and P is one of effective power (perhaps because W is in proximity to help P), then either some R or some E will define A for W. (2) By contrast, if mutual benefit governs the relationship between W and P, then the success of A will be determined by neither R nor E, but rather by another factor, C--namely, that the action accords with an agreement between W and P on the nature of action A.

Notice that although effective power and mutual benefit have rather different standards of success--respectively, following the rule (or achieving the end) or being based on agreement--it is conceivable that a given A might satisfy both. For example, if W offers P a job that P accepts, it may be that effective power is satisfied as well through mutual benefit. It is equally important to notice, however, that the reverse does not exactly hold. If W hires P under effective power, it may not matter whether C is present or not. In other words, in this case, A might satisfy R or E (1) if only P agrees, (2) if only W agrees, (3) if both agree, or (4) if neither agrees. What matters here is whether A accords with R or achieves E. Standard forms of coerced transfers of wealth might serve as examples here of a case of defined responsibility in an effective-power mode. And for the sake of completeness, it should also be noted that in the usual cases of mutual benefit, any given R or E might be ignored as well. Some might therefore argue that, as a consequence, A cannot ever satisfy both mutual benefit and effective power at the same time under mutual benefit because a relevant R or E has not been considered or factored into the agents' motivations (that is, the agents made the agreement with no thought of the appropriate rule or end). Although this point is important, it does not show that under conditions of mutual benefit A does not satisfy both mutual benefit and effective power unless one is also willing to require that certain...