De Jure Equates to De Facto: the Unconstitutionality of Life-without-parole Sentencing for Non-homicidal Juvenile Offenders

• Publication year: 2022

52 Creighton L. Rev. 169. DE JURE EQUATES TO DE FACTO: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCING FOR NON-HOMICIDAL JUVENILE OFFENDERS

DE JURE EQUATES TO DE FACTO: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCING FOR NON-HOMICIDAL JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Maggie Brokaw-'20

I. INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that the government shall not inflict cruel and unusual punishment. ^[1] The United States Supreme Court addressed juvenile sentencing in relation to the Eighth Amendment repeatedly from 2005 to 2012. ^[2] The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits followed suit, expanding the findings of the Supreme Court. ^[3] However, not all circuits agree on de jure versus de facto life sentencing for non-homicidal juvenile offenders. ^[4] Regarding juvenile punishment, circuit courts' opinions vary as to what constitutes a de facto life sentence and to what degree the Supreme Court's decisions bind the lower courts. ^[5]

In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that sentencing a non-homicidal juvenile offender to eighty-four years' imprisonment did not violate the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court precedent. ^[6] In Goins v. Smith, ^[7] the Sixth Circuit reasoned that because the defendant was eligible for parole after forty-two years, this did not create a life sentence for the sixteen-year-old defendant. ^[8] The Sixth Circuit also found that Supreme Court precedent did not apply to Goins' case, as Goins was given a meaningful opportunity for parole. ^[9]

First, this Note will present the facts and holdings of Goins. ^[10] Then, this Note will explain the judicial history of juvenile sentencing leading to Goins. ^[11] Finally, this Note will argue that the Sixth Circuit erred in upholding the lower court's de facto life sentence for a nonhomicidal juvenile offender, which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. ^[12]

II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In Goins v. Smith, ^[13] juvenile offenders James Goins and Chad Barnette attacked eighty-four-year-old William Sovak at Sovak's home in Youngstown, Ohio. ^[14] Goins and Barnette forced Sovak inside, hit and kicked him repeatedly, shoved him downstairs to the basement, and took a set of keys from the house. ^[15] They then locked Sovak in his fruit cellar, where he was later discovered by a neigh-bor. ^[16] The attack on Sovak by Goins and Barnette left Sovak severely injured. ^[17]

Later that same day, Goins and Barnette broke into the house of Louis and Elizabeth Luchisan. ^[18] The assailants carried a sawed-off shotgun and threatened to kill the Luchisans if the married couple did not give the perpetrators money. ^[19] The assailants hit Mr. Luchisan on the head with a plate and Mrs. Luchisan on the head with a telephone. ^[20] They stole the keys to Mr. Luchisan's Chevy Malibu, the car itself, and a television from the home. ^[21]

As a result of these incidents, an Ohio state court convicted Goins of attempted murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, felonious assault, and receiving stolen property. ^[22] The Ma-honing County Court sentenced Goins to consecutive prison terms for the various offenses, totaling eighty-five years and six months. ^[23]

Goins filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas did not have jurisdiction over him and therefore unlawfully detained Goins. ^[24] The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Mahoning County denied Goins' petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Goins was not unlawfully or wrongfully detained in the Mahoning County Jail. ^[25]

The Ohio Court of Appeals modified the Mahoning County Court's decision regarding sentencing. ^[26] The court modified two of Goins' sentences, aggravated robbery and receiving stolen property, to run concurrently with the remaining sentences. ^[27] Due to these sentencing modifications, Goins' prison sentence was reduced to seventy-fouryears. ^[28]

The Ohio Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower courts' decisions for resentencing under State v. Foster ^[29] upon appellate review. ^[30] In Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court found judges' abilities to act as factfinders to permit harsher sentencing in jury trials was un-constitutional. ^[31] Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that Ohio's felon-sentencing practices violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ^[32] As such, any pending cases on direct review at the time of the Foster decision and subsequent cases required resentencing in conjunction with Foster. ^[33]

On remand, the trial court resentenced Goins to an aggregate term of eighty-four-years' imprisonment. ^[34] The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sentence. ^[35] The court stated that the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as defined by case law or as outlined by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ^[36] Goins argued his sentence was effectively life-with-out-parole and that Ohio reserved such sentences solely for murderers and rapists of victims younger than age thirteen. ^[37] The court rejected Goins' proportionality argument, stating that the punishment's harshness fit the severity of the crime. ^[38] Goins also argued the court burdened Ohio's resources by sentencing Goins to the equivalent of a life sentence. ^[39] The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the public benefited from having a violent offender incarcerated, despite the depletion of the state's resources. ^[40]

Thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court denied Goins leave to appeal. ^[41] Subsequently, on July 7, 2009, Goins filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from his convictions. ^[42]

Upon filing a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Goins claimed his lengthy sentence violated his constitutional right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment. ^[43] The magistrate judge reiterated the Ohio Court of Appeals' analysis, stating that Goins' argument ignored the severity of his crime, which was matched fairly by the harshness of the court's punishment. ^[44] The magistrate judge recommended Goins' petition be dismissed without further review because no valid constitutional claims existed. ^[45]

Goins filed an objection to the magistrate judge's imprisonment recommendation, arguing that the judge's eighty-four-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. ^[46] Goins also asserted the recommendation did not follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, ^[47] where the Court held life imprisonment for non-homicidal juvenile offenders unconstitutional. ^[48] Goins arguedthat an eighty-four-year imprisonment denied him any worthwhile release since he would be 100-years-old when he completed his sentence. ^[49] Nonetheless, upon reviewing Goins' habeas corpus petition, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations. ^[50] The district court stated that Goins was not actually sentenced to life imprisonment, so Graham did not apply to his case. ^[51] The court explained that Goins could pursue release after forty-two to forty-five years, thereby desynchronizing his case from Graham. ^[52] Since Goins could not rely on Graham and could not prove his sentence defied any case law, the court found his argument was without merit and that his petition must be denied. ^[53]

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence of eighty-four years for the crimes Goins committed when he was sixteen-years-old. ^[54] The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Graham did not apply because Goins' sentence was not life imprisonment without parole. ^[55] Finally, the court stated that Goins' ability to gain parole stopped the court from determining his sentence in alignment with Graham. ^[56] Goins subsequently filed a writ of certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court denied. ^[57]

III. BACKGROUND

A. Roper v. Simmons: Creating the Standard of Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Juveniles

In State v. Simmons, ^[58] the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the sentence seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons received following his murder of Shirley Crook on September 9, 1993, in Jefferson County, Missouri. ^[59] Simmons and two friends broke into Crook's home, bound and kidnapped Crook, and threw her off a bridge into the Meramec River to drown. ^[60] The State charged Simmons with first-degree murder, kidnapping, burglary, and stealing, but the latter three charges were severed for the trial. ^[61] The jury of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County convicted Simmons of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death, which Simmons subsequently appealed. ^[62] The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. ^[63] In considering the aggravating circumstances of the situation, the supreme court found the circuit court's decision to implement the death penalty proportional to similar cases. ^[64]

Simmons filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. ^[65] Simmons argued that a national consensus existed in barring juveniles from receiving the death penalty. ^[66] An international consensus against executing juveniles evolved as well. ^[67] The Missouri Supreme Court also...