From June 1967 to June 1997: learning from our mistakes.

• Author: Maksoud, Clovis

The thirtieth anniversary of the June 1967 debacle has been an occasion to evoke painful memories, draw lessons, assess the causes of Arab defeat and produce a host of written analytical articles and historical essays, reminiscences and recollections. While it will still take time to grasp the profound significance of this traumatic experience in the lives of the Arab peoples, the dreams, rights and aspirations of the Arab nation remain the guiding force to sustain our commitment and empower us to achieve the legitimate goals that have eluded us, and which the June 1967 tragedy nearly dealt a fatal blow. The consequences of that dramatic setback are still being felt today.

For the continuing yearnings of the Arab peoples to be realized, what is required is a process of self-criticism and a reassessment of the intellectual premises, the behavioral patterns and the policies adopted in the pursuit of this goal. A serious inquiry questioning and scrutinizing many of the assumptions that have underpinned contemporary Arab nationalism is needed. This necessarily embodies a plan of action to prevent Arab nationalism from becoming a major and perhaps the only fallout of the June 1967 collapse. It is an act of conscience in order to shield Arab nationalism from the flaws and failures of its leaders, parties, and institutions, which at one time or another, claimed, or in reality were, the repository of our confidence and trust, and to whom we Arabs, voluntarily and even enthusiastically entrusted our national destiny.

This is particularly true of the Arab peoples' relationship with Gamal Abdul Nasser, whose articulation of our deepest yearnings, ennobling defiance of dominance, charismatic personality and sincere commitment rendered the Arab masses uncritical and totally identified with every decision he made and with every policy he sought to pursue. The identification was of such intimacy that when he resigned in the aftermath of the disastrous defeat of 1967 the instant and stunning popular reaction calling on him to stay on was tantamount to a restorative act. While this reaction may in part have been an expression of fear of the unknown, it revealed an institutional vacuum that the masses instinctively sought to fill by an unprecedented demonstration of loyalty and affection. This was the same phenomenon that manifested itself when President Nasser died on 28 September 1970.

What happened in between June 1967 and September 1970 was that Nasser was transformed from being the unchallenged leader of the Arab people to being a President of Egypt supported and respected by the same Arab people. In other words, the following Nasser had from the mid-Fifties changed from one of unquestioning loyalty to one of sympathetic support for his leadership and policies. At the Khartoum Summit on 1 September 1967, he was success-ful in spelling out for the Arab World the famous three NOs: No to recognition of Israel, No to negotiations with Israel, and No to peace with Israel. As a result of his leadership, a state of belligerency with Israel persisted and a war of attrition, albeit limited, was ushered in to render Israeli occupation and aggression costly. The political and diplomatic damage of the military setback was successfully controlled. UN Security Council Resolution 242 drew the parameters of a peace settlement. The outcome, as envisioned in 242, was an Israel confined to the 4 June 1967 borders that would be grudgingly accepted as part of a new and emerging state system in the region.

Another result of the June 1967 war was that the Arab state system replaced the Arab nationalist project of independence, freedom and unity. This state system acknowledged the de facto legality of an Israeli state, but not necessarily its legitimacy. If the operative parts of UN Security Council Resolution 242 were to be complied with by Israel, then the Arab state system would accommodate Israel and co-exist with it. In essence, the consequence of the June 1967 war planted the seeds of an imagined new "Middle East" state system, replacing Pan-Arab nationalist aspirations. As is often the case, the Arab leaders and intellectuals admitted the unpleasant and discomforting realities but at the same time refused to submit to their inevitable permanence. The war of attrition was one aspect. Bringing the issues arising from the conflict to the UN was another and the debate about the causes of the debacle and how to address them was a further demonstration of refusal to succumb to defeat.

THE RISE OF THE PLO

Amidst the gloom that pervaded the Arab political landscape after the war, the battle of Karameh took place in March 1968 in the Ghor Valley of Jordan, where Palestinian guerrillas and Jordanian soldiers successfully engaged the Israeli army. This development galvanized Arab opinion and allowed Fateh to assume the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO ceased to be the protege of the Arab state system and became the rallying force of an invigorated Palestinian and Arab body politic. In retrospect, the Palestinian situation was transformed - revolutionized would be an exaggerated description - and the PLO became for the Arabs the embodiment of a hope restored and a sense of purpose rediscovered. The leaderless Arab masses were disappointed if not disillusioned by the June 1967 defeat. They entrusted (once again without questioning) the PLO with the functions of setting policies, providing leadership and devising strategies for a resumed struggle. The delegation of leadership to the PLO was premature, and given in a hurried rather than a studied way, even by the official Arab leadership, impressed by the tide of popular support for the organization.

The PLO leadership assumed that the popularity and support it had acquired gave it a license to intervene in the affairs of the Arab states, especially those where a significant Palestinian constituency resided, as a partner with the right to shape their policies. While the PLO received varying degrees of tolerance and support from the Arab states, the PLO leadership tended at times to exaggerate its own power, thus falling into the trap of those elements, regional and local, that sought to deny legitimacy to its presence, struggle, and fruits. Over the years, a series of miscalculations and mishandling of popular support dissipated the frail leverage the PLO had with the Arab governing establishments. Black September in Jordan, the alienation of Syria's leadership, and the lengthy and, in many ways, unwarranted conflicts in Lebanon could have been avoided, or at least, contained.

In essence, Fateh, the pivotal and dominant faction in the PLO coalition, was often outmaneuvered by the disparate groups within its framework. The more radical groups, themselves divided, often took measures, adopted policies, and spelled out slogans, without prior consultation or coordination with the other coalition partners of the PLO. Competition to find supporters among the various groups - e.g., Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front, PFLP-General Command, etc. - severely damaged the effectiveness of the PLO on the ground as well as its credibility amongst Arab and international supporters and sympathizers. Other groups had vertical links to Arab governments - Saiqa with Syria, the Arab Liberation Front with Iraq, etc. - that were much firmer, binding and constraining on them than the horizontal bonds necessary for national Palestinian cohesion and effectiveness in the pursuit of goals.

During the Seventies, the PLO was perceived as basically fragmented with factions trying to outbid each other for support. It assumed the character of an associational framework rather than the vanguard of a liberation struggle. The PLO, nevertheless, extracted from the League of Arab States recognition that it was "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." All regional and international organizations followed suit. Thus, its legal and diplomatic status was further enhanced. This enabled the PLO to enjoy an international status and acceptability that turned out not to be matched by its status or stature within the Arab...