Judicial review and the policy of federal abstention: a juvenile's right to ensure the existence of a 'substantial federal interest'.

• Author: Drexler, Matthew

INTRODUCTION

"The problem of juvenile delinquency must be dealt with in an effective and meaningful manner if we are to reduce the ever increasing levels of crime and improve the quality of life in America."(1) With these words, the United States Senate opened its report in support of the first major federal juvenile delinquency statute in almost forty years.(2) The goal of the statute and of federal involvement in juvenile delinquency proceedings was to give the highest attention to preventing juvenile crime and to minimizing the involvement of juveniles in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.(3)

Until 1974, the federal government played a relatively minor role in the juvenile delinquency system. In that year, Congress, in accordance with a general trend toward federalizing crime, greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the federal government over juvenile crime.(4) Historically, crime, and particularly juvenile crime, was the responsibility of state governments with very little involvement by the federal government.(5) In fact, the only major statute that dealt with juvenile crime was the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938 ("FJDA").(6) The FJDA offered the United States Attorney General discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a juvenile under the age of eighteen who had not been surrendered to state officials or had been charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death.(7) The federal government rarely employed this statute, and therefore federal involvement in juvenile delinquency proceedings remained virtually nonexistent until 1974. In that year, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ("JJDPA")(8) because it felt that federal intervention was necessary to stem rising juvenile crime rates, specifically, violent juvenile crime.(9)

Congress's enactment of the JJDPA was also motivated in part by the haphazard way in which the federal government had previously been attempting to alleviate the problem of juvenile delinquency. The Senate, in 1974, stated that there was "[l]ittle coherent national planning or established priority structure among the major programs dealing with the problems of youth development and delinquency prevention.... The present array of programs demonstrates the lack of priorities, emphasis and direction in the Federal Government's efforts to combat delinquency."(10)

The JJDPA drastically changed federal involvement in the field of juvenile delinquency. Congress created a broad federal approach that addressed both treatment and prosecution of juvenile offenders. The major focus of the legislation was to provide funding for research and programs to assist the states in their efforts to address the delinquency problem.(11) In addition to these programs, Congress vastly expanded the basis for assuming federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders.(12) As currently amended,(13) the JJDPA provides for prosecution of a juvenile in federal court when:

[T]he Attorney General,(14) after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile ..., (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or [one of a specified number of drug or gang-related crimes], and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.(15) Accordingly, a United States Attorney who desires to proceed against a juvenile in federal court must certify the existence of one of the three factors listed above and that a substantial federal interest exists in the prosecution.(16) In practice, this requirement is often met by a certification simply stating that these elements exist, without further explanation or support.(17)

In response to the federalization of juvenile delinquency and the increasing focus on federal jurisdiction, some juveniles have questioned whether a substantial federal interest exists in their case and have sought judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.(18) The circuit courts are split over the appropriateness of judicial review in this context. The Fourth Circuit has held that the certification should be reviewable by courts.(19) In so holding, it relied on the legislative history of the JJDPA, which stresses the importance of states' control over juvenile delinquency, and Supreme Court precedent stating that certain certifications regarding jurisdiction over juveniles made by prosecutors should be subject to judicial review.(20) Many circuits, however, have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's approach.(21) With slight variation, these courts have argued that the plain language of the JJDPA precludes judicial review.(22) Furthermore, their holdings state that when the certification is based upon a judgment call by a prosecutor, the certification belongs to a category of unreviewable prosecutorial decisions.(23)

The Supreme Court established the ability of a lower court to substantively review a certification by a federal prosecutor in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno.(24) The Fourth Circuit relied on this case in United States v. Juvenile Male #1(25) to permit review of a federal prosecutor's certification under the JJDPA. In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Supreme Court upheld review of a prosecutor's certification under the Westfall Act that a federal employee was acting in the "scope-of-employment."(26) In Westfall Act certifications, the prosecutor certifies that a federal government employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment when an incident, usually a tort, occurred.(27) Once the certification is made, the United States is substituted as the defendant in the litigation.(28) In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Court first noted that because "federal judges traditionally proceed from the `strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review,'"(29) review will not be precluded unless there is a "persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."(30)

Based upon this presumption, the Gutierrez de Martinez Court relied on three primary elements of the Westfall Act in permitting review. First, the Court examined the statutory language and concluded that Congress made no mention of a court's inability to review a prosecutor's certification.(31) Second, the Court found it significant that the legislative history of the Westfall Act showed that Congress did not "commit ... `scope-of-employment' [decisions] ... to the unreviewable judgment of the Attorney General."(32) Based on these textual examinations, the Court held that it did not find any persuasive basis "discernible from the statutory fog" to conclude that Congress intended to restrict judicial review.(33) Instead, the Court found just the opposite -- that evidence existed indicating Congress may have favored review.(34) The third element in the Court's consideration involved important policy considerations that militated against precluding review. The Court found that the United States has a strong financial incentive in the certification of the employee as acting within the scope of his employment.(35) Additionally, the substitution of the United States for the employee defendant upon certification under the Westfall Act could result in the dismissal of the suit by the court under sovereign immunity principles.(36) The Court concluded that the combination of these two policy considerations and the lack of a statutory bar to judicial review supported the notion that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.(37) Thus, the Court held that review of the certification should be permitted.

Following the Gutierrez de Martinez framework, this Note argues that the review of certifications under the JJDPA should be permitted. In the limited area of juvenile delinquency law, traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion should yield to the unique circumstances surrounding the prosecution of children. Children should not be treated as if they are simply young adults. They have unique needs and require special treatment by the legal system.(38) As a result, courts should scrupulously review the certification for compliance with terms of the JJDPA to ensure that federal jurisdiction is assumed only when a substantial federal interest exists.(39) Part I of this Note analyzes the plain language and legislative history of the JJDPA to show that Congress intended to limit the bases for federal jurisdiction and to provide for judicial review over certification of juvenile cases to federal courts. Part II argues that the policy of federal abstention and the law's special treatment of children support judicial review of certifications in the juvenile delinquency arena. The historical difference in treatment of juvenile offenders is sufficient to overcome the traditional deference given to prosecutorial decisionmaking. Courts should review the certifications providing for federal jurisdiction over a child to ensure that a substantial federal interest is present in the prosecution of a child in the federal courts.

1. ANALYZING THE JJDPA: THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE, HISTORY OF THE JJDPA SUPPORT JUDICIAL REVIEW

   In enacting the JJDPA and its subsequent amendments, Congress has gradually expanded the bases for federal jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency.(40) At the same time, Congress has retained substantive limitations on federal jurisdiction.(41) These jurisdictional limitations must be viewed in light of the history and philosophy of the JJDPA. When federal jurisdiction is sought, it becomes clear that judicial review of prosecutorial certifications, to ensure that juveniles are tried in the most appropriate forum, is a central component of federal...