Judicial intervention and juvenile corrections reform: a case study of Jerry M. v. District of Columbia.

• Author: Singer, Will
• Position: Introduction through III. The Ideas in the Background, p. 901-922 - Symposium on Overcriminalization

1. INTRODUCTION

   In January 2007, Vincent N. Schiraldi was the head of the District of Columbia's juvenile corrections agency. (1) By that time, the agency had struggled for decades to comply with a comprehensive consent decree aimed at remedying constitutionally deficient conditions of juvenile confinement. (2) In a meeting with the city administrator, Schiraldi was asked to describe his top three management problems.

   "My three biggest management problems right now," Schiraldi said, emphasizing right now as if the list might change by the end of the day, "are keeping the staff from beating up my kids, figuring out how to cut down on the sex-for-overtime trade between managers and the line staff, and keeping the court off my back long enough so I can fix this damn place." (3)

   To unpack that statement is to understand the challenges facing the would-be reformer of a juvenile corrections agency subject to a lawsuit. Keeping children safe is easier to say than to do. (4) The difficulty exists because public sector management demands a great deal of skill (5) and because the political system introduces considerations--such as the imperatives of patronage politics (6) and the popular appeal of promises to get tough on new generations of "radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters" (7)--that sometimes take priority over maintaining safe conditions inside a juvenile correctional facility. (8) Further, any far-reaching reform effort will challenge the entrenched institutional culture that created these unacceptable conditions. (9)

   At their best, juvenile corrections lawsuits require public officials to honor their responsibilities to the troubled children placed in their custody. (10) At their worst, the lawsuits become an interfering distraction, prioritizing technical compliance ahead of true reform. (11) Yet these suits, and calls for major reform, exist because the conditions inside juvenile institutions often fail to reflect the ideals that are the basis of a separate juvenile corrections system. (12)

   This Comment seeks to inform the participants in a lawsuit aimed at reforming a juvenile justice system so that they may define a constructive role for the court. To that end, this Comment examines the District of Columbia's juvenile corrections lawsuit over its lifespan--twenty-seven years and counting. (13)

   From the outset of this type of suit, the plaintiffs may be entirely correct that conditions of confinement deprive youths of their rights. But the court and parties must continue the inquiry to assess the real problems that make conditions what they are. This is so because the litigation seeks not merely to determine whether conditions fall below constitutional and statutory standards, but more importantly to change the agency's operations so it will meet those standards. (14) Conceivably, the judge or plaintiffs might believe that operational issues present problems only for the government defendant; this view is correct only if they do not care to implement an effective remedy. The goal of successful implementation introduces a vast universe of practical operational problems that merit the attention of the court and the parties. (15) Yet this Comment will argue that the court's interest in operational problems does not justify judicial micromanagement.

   This Comment begins, in Part II, with an overview of the lawsuit and consent decree seeking to reform the secure facilities in the District of Columbia's juvenile justice system. Part III reviews the theoretical framework of "institutional reform litigation," focusing on lawsuits challenging conditions of juvenile and criminal confinement. Much of this literature supposes that litigation can solve problems indirectly, by arousing a "political will" that in turn solves the problem. Political will may be a necessary condition, but it is far from sufficient.

   Part IV shows that other considerations are important, too. A wide variety of institutional actors react to lawsuits in ways that create barriers to and opportunities for reform. Institutional actors of particular relevance to this case include agency management, line staff, judges, the media, the legislature, and the chief executive. Part IV considers each of these groups separately. An epilogue to Part IV emphasizes the potential for political considerations to shift in rapid and unexpected ways, testing the durability of hard-earned progress after it has been made. In conclusion, Part V develops the implications for how courts and parties should see their own roles and the purposes of institutional reform litigation.

2. JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

   In 1985, plaintiffs representing the District's detained and committed youths filed a class action, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia. (16) The plaintiffs alleged that practices inside the District's secure juvenile correctional facilities violated their constitutional and statutory rights. (17) Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, (18) their Fifth Amendment due process rights, (19) and their statutory rights to appropriate care (20) and educational services. (21) Somewhat unusually, Jerry M. was filed and has remained in D.C. Superior Court. (22)

   After extensive discovery and briefing, the parties agreed to a consent decree based on three general principles: (1) youths should be housed in the least restrictive setting consistent with public safety, their individual needs, and constitutional and statutory requirements; (2) youths should not be held in secure confinement when a community-based placement is suitable; and (3) detained youths placed in secure confinement while awaiting trial should remain there for the shortest possible time. (23) Like the complaint, (24) these principles recognize the dangers of overconfinement (25) and overcrowding (26) in juvenile correctional facilities.

   The consent decree's core provisions followed from its principles. The consent decree empowered a panel of three experts to set a binding cap on the number of youths confined to locked...