Jihadism in Pakistan: the expanding frontier.

• Author: Siddiqa, Ayesha
• Position: Report

Winning the war on terror will depend as much on the resilience and willingness of Afghanistan and Pakistan as it will on the capability and stamina of American and NATO militaries. In the case of Pakistan, many believe the government now has a renewed will to aid the fight. This optimism is based on the military's initiation of anti-Taliban operations in the Swat Valley and Waziristan and on growing civilian resentment of the Taliban. This article argues, however, that there is no direct linkage between these factors and Pakistan's desire or capacity to fight the war on terror. (1) In order to sustain its achievements in the Swat Valley, much depends on the country's internal political dynamics. These include the retention of a civilian government in power, the status of Pakistan-U.S. relations and the impact of American strategy in Afghanistan on Islamabad's strategic interests. More importantly, the continued trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States and the divergence in strategic policy between the two countries will continue to pose a major challenge to winning the war on terror.

THE WAR ON TERROR AFTER SWAT

There is an emerging perception that Pakistan's state and society have become better prepared to fight the Taliban and, more broadly, terrorism. This shift in opinion seems to have occurred after the army's allegedly successful operation against Taliban forces in Swat. Alternatively, other observers, such as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, believe that success in Swat was achieved in part due to preexisting public support for the operations throughout Pakistan. (2) International perception of a change in Pakistani attitudes may also be influenced by reading the results of Pakistani opinion polls, such as the one conducted by the American organization International Republican Institute (IRI) showing increasing support of Pakistan-U.S. military cooperation leading up to the operations in Swat. (3) The attitude of many Pakistanis toward Taliban forces underwent further change after war broke out between the latter and the state. (4) Following major bombings in the country's urban centers and increasingly frequent suicide bombings, many Pakistanis lost any sympathy they once had with the Taliban. This also served to exacerbate the long-standing ethnic conflict between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, who saw Pashtuns as the main perpetrators of violence. (5)

Such apparent shifts in attitude, however, need careful interpretation, as they do not necessarily indicate a substantive change either in Pakistan's general policy or in public attitude toward the war on terror. It is therefore important to ask: has public opinion on the war on terror truly changed, resulting in a greater willingness of the state to root out extremism in all shapes and forms?

Analysis of Pakistan's attitude and state policy toward terrorism must look beyond the Taliban. While the Taliban may have been pushed back in Pakistan, there are other religious warriors that persist. Furthermore, shifts in public attitude toward the Taliban do not necessarily depict the state of mind of both the state and society toward the war on terror or terrorism. It can even be argued that there has been no major shift in public attitudes since the military operation in Swat as the bulk of people in the direct line of fire, especially in Swat, were always against the Taliban. Consequently, it can be argued that the local population rendered support to state forces as soon as they appeared ready to fight the terrorists.

According to political artist-activist Fauzia Minallah, people have not vociferously opposed the Taliban until now due to the high personal cost of such opposition. (6) Similarly, human rights activist Samar Minallah notes that there were many people who were constantly trying to bring to light the plight of ordinary people, even prior to Swat, especially women in Taliban strongholds. (7) Most of the time those who spoke out against the Taliban were ultimately killed, instilling fear amongst citizens in Taliban strongholds. (8) Thus people exposed their disenchantment with the Taliban once they felt safe enough to do so; this occurred only after the army carried out an operation against the jihadis in the Swat Valley.

Support for military operations against the Taliban, however, does not necessarily translate into sympathy for the war on terror. In addition, abhorrence of the Taliban does not necessarily mean rejection of the conservative or puritanical religious values that often provide moral justification for terrorism. In fact, responses to a recent survey from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) show that many students who shunned the Taliban did not actually abandon their suspicions against the West or fondness for Shariah law. (9) A basic attitudinal shift has not taken place.

Though resentful of the Taliban, Pakistanis can be equally skeptical toward American activities in the country. According to the New York Times, roughly 25 percent of Pakistanis believe that Washington's only interest in Pakistan is to find Osama bin Laden, with little afterthought to the cost in civilian Pakistani lives it might incur. (10) Mistrust of the United States has only increased since its intrusion into Iraq. As long as the war on terror is seen as an American war, there is little possibility for it to become popular with the ordinary people. For this reason, it is believed by some that Taliban forces or those sympathetic to the Swati Taliban will likely resurface after the situation has calmed down in Swat. (11) Sources claim that some of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have returned to Swat continue to be sympathetic to the Taliban, and that the area has not been completely cleaned of religious warriors. (12) The deep-rooted popularity of the Taliban's ideology among some segments of the population will continue to contribute to its strength.

Regardless of whether attitudes toward the Taliban have shifted, the news of a successful military operation in Swat is no guarantee of a permanent change in the situation on the ground. (13) The jihadis have not been completely rooted out. For example, many senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Fazlullah, have managed to escape and hide in the hills. (14) Given this incomplete removal of the Taliban, highlighted by the killing of sixteen police cadets in a suicide attack in Swat on 30 August 2009, the local Swati population may not maintain its confidence to speak out against them. (15) Residents in Peshawar, the capital city of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), complain that the covert presence of the Taliban in the city makes life difficult and threatening. (16) The current situation in Swat, the NWFP and the tribal areas has not changed as much as the military would suppose; there has been no end to Talibanization in the region. Despite the military successes, many Taliban leaders such as Mullah Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Sirajuddin Haqqani not only survive but continue to fight U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. These three leaders operate in Pakistan's tribal areas and cooperate with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar whom they recognize as their Ameer-ul-Momineen (chief religious and military leader).

Tariq Pervez, Chairman of Pakistan's National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NCA), however, does not believe that remaining groups such as the Taliban Movement of Pakistan, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), will be a long-term problem given emerging friction amongst the TTP leadership that could seriously weaken the terrorist network. (17) Even so, weakening leadership does not ensure victory without a sustained willingness by the military to fight. Pressure from Western leadership may help, given concerns by countries such as the UK that terrorists operating inside Pakistan's tribal belt will target them. There is no guarantee, however, that the army will keep its commitment to its Western allies. (18)

Matters have been further complicated by worsening friction between President Asif All Zardari and army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. (19) Journalist Afzal Khan believes that one of the major issues between these two men is...