Jeffersonian Attitudes Toward Executive Leadership and Committee Development in the House of Representatives, 1789-1829

• Date: 01 March 1965
• Published date: 01 March 1965
• Author: Joseph Cooper
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296501800105
• Subject Matter: Articles

JEFFERSONIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD EXECUTIVE
LEADERSHIP AND COMMITTEE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1829
JOSEPH COOPER
Harvard University
RULES
HE adopted by the House of Representatives when it convened for
N
the first time in the spring of 1789 were quite different in nature from those
which govern the conduct of business in the House today.’ The initiation of
business began not with the introduction of bills, but rather with the introduction
of subjects. Within the rules subjects could be introduced either through resolu-
tions, memorials, or petitions brought forward by individual legislators or through
communications received from members of the Executive Branch. As for bills, it
was not assumed, as it is today, that members ought to be free to introduce bills
whenever they chose. Rather, the power to introduce bills was closely guarded on
the theory that a bill was inchoate law and therefore not properly introducible on
the responsibility of a single member.2 The rules provided that bills could be intro-
duced only through forms of action which involved agreement on the part of the
House as a whole - by permission of the House on the request of an individual
member or by permission of the House after a subject had been referred to and re-
ported on by a committee.3 Moreover, once permission had been granted, the task
of framing and reporting the bill had to be vested in a committee.
Once introduced, the rules provided that every bill was to undergo three read-
ings and that motions to refer to a committee of the whole or a select committee
would be in order upon the second reading. It should be noted that originally the
House saw little need for standing or permanent committees. The rules, as first
adopted, provided for the existence of only one standing committee, a committee on
elections.4 It should also be noted that the committee of the whole was viewed dif-
ferently than it is today. It was seen simply as a committee of the House, no different
in basic nature from any other House committee and equally eligible to receive any
subjects or bills the House might choose to refer to it.5
1

Annals of Congress, 1 Cong. 1, 98-101 (April 7, 1789). Since the pagination of various edi-
tions of the Annals differs in the case of the First Congress (1789-91), references to this
Congress include dates.
2
De Alva S. Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (Boston, Little,
Brown, 1916), p. 181. See also Register of Debates in Congress, 19 Cong. 2, 775-76 and
20 Cong. 1, 823-27.
3
Once in operation the House chose to rely on the committee-action form of introducing bills,
rather than the individual-action form. Resolutions moved by individual members re-
questing permission to have bills introduced were infrequent throughout the period from
1789 to 1829. See Asher C. Hinds (ed.), Precedents of the House of Representatives
(8 vols.; Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1907), Vol. 4, Section 3365.
It should also be noted that the House did not always strictly follow its rules regard-
ing the committee-action form. The rules provided for the introduction of bills "by an
order of the House on the report of the committee," i.e., after a subject had been referred
and reported on. From the first, however, the House at times gave a committtee power to
introduce a bill when it initially referred the subject. See, for example, Annals, 1 Cong. 1,
120-21 and 893 (April 11 and Sept. 16, 1789).
4
Annals, 1 Cong. 1, 122 (April 13, 1789).
5
Alexander, op. cit., p. 256.
45

---

46
In short, the First Congress adopted rules which provided for a law-making
process involving three stages: consideration and decision with respect to subjects;
reference to select committees for the framing of bills; and decisions with respect
to bills.&dquo; Yet, although these rules defined basic procedures for the House to follow
in the conduct of its business, the manner in which it was to be led, advised, and
informed as it went about the task of law-making remained largely undetermined.
The provisions regarding the introduction of bills upon the reports of com-
mittees, the framing of bills by committees, and the reference of bills to committees
implied use of committees to advise and inform the House. Still, the extent to which
the House would rely on its committees, rather than on executive officers, remained
an open question. Under the rules executive officers could communicate with the
House on their own initiative and the rules did not forbid the sending of advice or
detailed plans in addition to factual material. Nor did they forbid the House to
refer its business to executive officers for the purpose of securing information, advice,
or detailed plans. The House could refer a subject to an executive officer, either by
requesting him to report on it or, in cases where petitions or memorials were in-
volved, by referring the paper itself to him for a report. In other words, within the
rules it was quite possible to rely on executive officers for leadership and direction,
to use the committee of the whole as a forum for considering executive plans and
proposals, and to confine the role of smaller committees to minor or even ministerial
functions.
In summary, the rules adopted by the First Congress left the question of how
the House was to be led, advised, and informed as it went about the task of law-
making amenable to very different solutions. Ultimately, the House chose not to
make itself totally dependent on executive officers. It chose instead to develop its
own
sources of information and expertise, to develop a standing committee system.
The object of this paper is to examine the effect that Jeffersonian attitudes toward
executive leadership had in producing such an outcome.
THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1789-1801
Jeffersonian attitudes toward executive participation in the law-making process
were not fully formed when American government under the Constitution began.
Rather, the Jeffersonian position was one which developed and took shape over the
course of several Congresses. What the future followers of Jefferson did share from
the very beginning was not a set of precise attitudes on procedural questions, but
rather a general belief in legislative autonomy. They believed from the start that the
legislature was the law-making branch and that its decisions should be the result of
its own desires -
that it should be free to make up its own mind without being sub-
ject to executive control.7 Given this general attitude, what remained unclear was
the kinds of executive involvement which infringed or threatened legislative inde-
pendence.
6
The committee of the whole was not regarded as an appropriate mechanism for use in the
actual framing of bills. This function was confined to smaller committees.
7

Annals, 1 Cong. 1, 384-96, 486-87, and 592-607 (May 20, June 17, and June 25, 1789).
See also Annals, 5 Cong. 2, 349-50, 858, 862-63, 882-83, 887-88, 905-7, 926-27, 1087-
88, 1121-22, and 1211.

---

47
Opposition to Leadership by Department Heads
In the First Congress ( 1789-91 ) numerous references were made to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, for opinions and plans, and the Annals do
not record any opposition by members who would later be known as Republicans.&dquo;
Similarly, requests for opinions and plans were also made to the Secretary of State,
Thomas Jefferson, and he honored them without complaint.9 In addition, when the
bill establishing the Treasury Department came up for consideration, two promi-
nent future Republicans, James Madison of Virginia and Abraham Baldwin of
Georgia, supported vesting the Secretary of the Treasury with the power to report
financial plans to Congress on his own initiative.10
Jefferson and his cohorts reversed themselves sharply on these questions in the
next Congress, but even in the First Congress the Jeffersonian position began to take
shape. Though Madison and Baldwin supported authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to report plans on his own initiative, John Page of Virginia led the opposi-
tion to this proposal and succeeded in carrying an amendment that restricted the
Secretary to the preparation of plans, which the House might call for or not, as it
desired.11- Secondly, the House, led by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, refused to
allow Hamilton to come onto the floor to report and explain his plan for support of
the public credit. 12 Finally, the House established an important precedent by adher-
ing to its rules and refusing to receive a bill which Hamilton had drafted and sent to
it for consideration. 13 The introduction of bills by executive officers was seen, even
by strong supporters of Hamilton, as an infringement of the House’s independence
and the precedent has endured, at least formally, from the First Congress to the pres-
ent one.&dquo;
Alarmed and angered both by Hamilton’s programs and by the control he
exercised over Congress, Hamilton’s enemies in the House began a concerted attack
on
him soon after the Second Congress ( 1791-93) opened its doors.I5 The men who
now
began to organize in opposition to Hamilton felt, in the words of Jefferson, &dquo;that
the Executive had swallowed up the legislative branch.&dquo; us
8
Indeed, on one occasion, the Annals record that Page and Baldwin spoke in favor of reference
to the Secretary of the Treasury for a plan. Annals, 1 Cong. 2, 1071-72 (January 20,
1790). On another occasion, Jackson appears to have advocated reference to...