IV. Federal Speedy Trial Act

• Library: The Rights of the Accused under the Sixth Amendment (ABA) (2016 Ed.)

IV. Federal Speedy Trial Act

Two years after Barker v. Wingo was decided, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was passed by Congress to put teeth in the defendant's speedy trial rights, and out of dissatisfaction with speedy trial jurisprudence.⁹⁹ Senator Sam Ervin, the Act's chief sponsor, explained the policy behind the Act as follows: "[T]he courts, undermanned, starved for funds, and utilizing 18th century management techniques, simply cannot cope with burgeoning caseloads. The consequence is delay and '[t]he solution is to create initiative within the system to utilize modern management techniques.'"¹⁰⁰

The Act established temporary time limitations to give the courts an opportunity to prepare for the severe time limits, which went into effect in July 1980.¹⁰¹ As originally enacted, from July 1, 1975, to July 1, 1979, trials of all defendants detained solely because they were awaiting trial would commence no later than ninety days following the beginning of continuous detention.¹⁰² However, on August 2, 1979, the effective date of the Act was postponed to July 1, 1980, extending the temporary time limitations by one year.¹⁰³ After July 1, 1980, the Act required that criminal defendants be tried within 100 days after arrest or service of summons, with the exclusion of certain limited periods of delay.¹⁰⁴ Despite the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, there is a wide variance among the district courts in the time to dispose of criminal cases. For example, for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2011, the median time for disposition of criminal cases ranged from 2.3 months in New Mexico to 17.6 months in western Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁵ Lastly, the Act created experimental pretrial service agencies in ten selected districts to provide support and supervisory services to noncustodial defendants awaiting trial.¹⁰⁶

A. General Time Limitations

The current Speedy Trial Act has the goal of trying individuals within 100 days after their arrest.¹⁰⁷ The Act delineates several general time limitations. The Act commands that indictments be filed within thirty days of arrest or summons, allowing for a thirty-day extension if there has been no grand jury in session in the first thirty-day peri-od.¹⁰⁸ Further, trial must begin within seventy days from the date the indictment was filed, or from when the date the defendant "has appeared before a judicial officer of the court," whichever is later.¹⁰⁹ In addition, unless the defendant consents to the contrary, trial may not begin within thirty days of the defendant's first appearance.¹¹⁰ The Act also requires that a court set the case for trial "at the earliest practicable time" after consulting both sides, so that, when possible, trial is scheduled more quickly than statutory deadlines require.¹¹¹

These time restrictions apply equally to cases where an initial indictment is refiled after having been dismissed or dropped.¹¹² Case law has interpreted this to mean that a new thirty-day deadline is set from the time of refiling, unlike the judicial interpretation of similar provisions in state codes.¹¹³

B. Exceptions and Tolling Provisions

Subsection (h) of the Speedy Trial Act provides a nonexclusive list of events that will toll the time periods set out in the previous section.¹¹⁴The list includes delays resulting from mental competency and/or physical capacity determinations,¹¹⁵ incompetence or incapacitation of the defendant,¹¹⁶ pretrial motions (from filing through disposition),¹¹⁷ trial on other charges,¹¹⁸ interlocutory appeal,¹¹⁹ and consideration of plea agreements.¹²⁰

The clock is tolled for a period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or a witness.¹²¹ Delay "relating to the transfer of a case or removal of any defendant" from another district is likewise exempted from the calculation of the relevant time period.¹²² The Act also tolls the clock in the event that prosecution has been deferred to permit the defendant to demonstrate good conduct.¹²³

Some delays that are part of the tolling provisions are subject to reasonability requirements or caps. Delays resulting from joinder of a defendant to a codefendant whose clock has not yet run must be "reasonable" to toll the Act's requirements.¹²⁴ Delays resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, are discounted from the relevant time period, but delays over ten days are "presumed to be unreasonable."¹²⁵ A catchall provision exempting periods when the court has "any proceeding concerning the defendant" under advisement is subject to a thirty-day cap after the issue is joined.¹²⁶ However, an administrative motion which does not require a response or hearing is under advisement at the time the motion is filed and only tolls the speedy trial clock for thirty days.¹²⁷ Also, where a finding has been made by a preponderance of the evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 3292 that the evidence of an offense is located in a foreign country, any period of court-ordered delay, not to exceed one year, shall be excluded from the general time limitations.¹²⁸

Finally, under certain limited circumstances, the Act can be tolled when a judge grants a continuance on her own motion, or at the request of the government or a defendant.¹²⁹ For the Act to be tolled, the judge must find that "the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."¹³⁰ The judge must set forth in the record of the case (orally or in writing) the reasoning as to why the balance weighs in favor of the continuance.¹³¹ The Act outlines certain factors that must be considered in determining whether to grant a continu-ance.¹³² These factors include whether failure to continue the case would result in a miscarriage of justice;¹³³ whether the case is so unusual or so complex that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or trial within the time limits;¹³⁴ whether there was delay in filing an indictment following arrest;¹³⁵ and whether failure to continue the case would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would deny either party continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation.¹³⁶

Moreover, for the Act to be tolled, the continuance cannot be granted "because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the attorney for the Government."¹³⁷

Finally, subsection (h)(5) of the Speedy Trial Act reiterates that the interval between an indictment's dismissal and refiling is not simply tolled. Instead, the clock begins anew.¹³⁸ Similarly, subsection (i) provides that if trial did not commence within the general time limitations outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3161 because the defendant withdrew a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant shall be deemed indicted, for purposes of the time limitations, on the day the withdrawal of the plea is final.¹³⁹

C. Sanctions for Violating the Statute

A violation of the Speedy Trial Act results in the dismissal of the com-plaint.¹⁴⁰ The Act provides that the judge may dismiss the case with or without prejudice.¹⁴¹ In making that decision, a court must consider three factors: "the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of . . . justice."¹⁴²

It must be noted that the defendant bears the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for failure to commence trial within the time limits set out in section 3161(c).¹⁴³ However, the government has the burden of going forward with evidence that delay due to the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness should be excluded from the time computation.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, if the defendant fails to move for dismissal on speedy trial grounds prior to trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant waives the right to dismiss on these grounds.¹⁴⁵

The Act also suggests sanctions for attorney misconduct that causes delay,¹⁴⁶ specifically where counsel:

(1) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(2) files a motion solely for the purpose of

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