It’s Still about Race: Peremptory Challenge Use on Black Prospective Jurors

Published date01 February 2020
Date01 February 2020
DOI10.1177/0022427819873943
Subject MatterArticles
Article
It’s Still about
Race: Peremptory
Challenge Use on
Black Prospective Jurors
Whitney DeCamp
1
and Elise DeCamp
1
Abstract
Objectives: The use of race as a motive for excluding individuals from serving
on juries in American criminal trials is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Black
individuals remain substantially more likely than others to be removed
during jury selection through peremptory challenges. This study tests
whether and to what extent there is a racial effect on peremptory challenge
use by the prosecution or the defense. Method: Using data from 2,542
venire members in Mississippi, propensity score matching is used to exam-
ine racial differences in jury selection by comparing Black venire members
to similarly situated White venire member counterparts. Results: Findings
suggest that Black venire members are 4.51 times as likely to be excluded
from a jury due to peremptory challenges from the prosecution in compar-
ison to White venire members. Conversely, White venire members are
4.21 times as likely to be excluded through peremptory challenges by the
defense in comparison to Black venire members. Conclusions: After control-
ling for all observed variables, there remain significant differences between
White and Black venire members, suggesting racial discrimination by both
1
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA
Corresponding Author:
Whitney DeCamp, Western Michigan University, Sangren Hall, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA.
Email: whitney.decamp@wmich.edu
Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency
2020, Vol. 57(1) 3-30
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022427819873943
journals.sagepub.com/home/jrc
the prosecution and the defense in peremptory challenge usage. Black
individuals are more likely to be excluded from juries through these effects,
resulting in less racially diverse juries.
Keywords
peremptory challenge, race, propensity score matching, racial bias,
prosecutorial misconduct
The use of peremptory challenge to remove potential jurors to which a
prosecutor or defense attorney objects, but lacks evidence to remove for
cause, has been consistently permissible throughout America’s judicial
history (Beck 1997). In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States placed
a limitation on that power through its decision that it is unconstitutional to
use a peremptory challenge becaus e of the individual’s race (Batson v.
Kentucky 1986). However, despite this clear ruling on the matter, the effi-
cacy in detecting and enforcing violations is in serious doubt, with scholars
arguing that the Batson ruling failed to eliminate or reduce racial discrim-
ination in jury selection (Bennett 2010; Morehead 1994). It remains diffi-
cult to prove racial discrimination in jury selection in any given case. As
one scholar observed, using the Batson challenge “is an infinitely cumber-
some procedural obstacle course ...[and] only the most overtly discrimi-
natory or impolitic lawyer can be caught in Batson’s toothless bite and, even
then, the wound will be only superficial” (Cavise 1999:501).
One example of an overturned conviction due to the use of the Batson
challenge is the Supreme Court ruling in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005). In this
case, 10 of the 11 Black members of the jury pool were excluded on the
basis of peremptory challenges that could have been, but were purposefully
not, applied to White prospective jurors for similar reasons, as evidenced by
side-by-side comparisons of prospective jurors’ responses to questions
(Johnson 2014; Sommers and Norton 2008). Likewise, the opinion of the
court in Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) made direct comparisons between
strikes being applied to Black jurors when White jurors who provided
similar answers did not receive a strike. Such side-by-side comparis ons
of “similarly situated” venire members of different races, however, are not
possible in all trials. Justice Alito wrote, for example, in his concurring
opinion that the Flowers case is “likely one of a kind” (p. 1) and that “[w]ere
it not for the unique combinations of circumstances present here” (p. 2), he
would have “no trouble” (p. 2) allowing the conviction to stand. Further
4Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 57(1)

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