“It’s Largely a Rigged System”: Voter Confidence and the Winner Effect in 2016
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912918768006 |
| Author | Patrick D. Tucker,Steven S. Smith,Betsy Sinclair |
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2018, Vol. 71(4) 854 –868
“It’s Largely a Rigged System”: Voter
© 2018 University of Utah
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Confidence and the Winner Effect in
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918768006
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918768006
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
2016
Betsy Sinclair1, Steven S. Smith1, and Patrick D. Tucker2
Abstract
The 2016 presidential election provided a unique opportunity to revisit two competing hypotheses for how voters
establish their perceptions of electoral integrity. First, mass public opinion is believed to derive from elite messages.
In the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump maintained that the election system was “rigged,” while
election administration experts and officials received considerable media coverage in their efforts to counter Trump’s
claims. Second, literature on voter confidence has established a “winner effect”—voters who cast ballots for winners
are more likely than voters on the losing side to believe their vote was counted correctly. Thus, voters were exposed
to two theoretically opposite effects. In this paper, we find that the “winner” effect mitigates the effects from strong
pre-election cues from elites. We also show the effect of pre-election attention to the rigging issue, find a symmetry
of the election outcome effect for winners and losers, and reconsider our explanations of the winner effect. Finally,
we go beyond the existing studies of the winner effect to consider the kind of citizens who are most susceptible to
that effect.
Keywords
voter confidence, winner effect, public opinion, 2016 election, Donald Trump, Russian hacking
Political scientists have observed a tendency for citizens on
Nearly without exception, a winner-loser gap was found
the winning side of an election to be affected in their atti-
in the post-election period.
tudes about politics differently than citizens on the losing
The 2016 presidential election experience provides an
side. This “winner effect” is the positive influence of being
opportunity to evaluate the role between elite rhetoric and
on the winning side on citizens’ trust, perceptions of fair-
the winner effect. Would Trump’s claims about vote rig-
ness, consent to the outcome, and political efficacy ging and responses to those claims affect attitudes about
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio
the accuracy of vote counting? Similarly, would the
2002; Clarke and Acock 1989; Ginsberg and Weissberg
Clinton campaign’s efforts to promote the legitimacy of
1978; Maldonado and Seligson 2014). Because there appear
electoral institutions affect perceptions? The exception-
to be negative effects on attitudes about government among
ally strong elite cues in the pre-election period, unique to
citizens on the losing side, these findings cause concern
2016 among recent presidential election cycles, may have
about the effects of elections on system legitimacy (Price
generated partisan differences and altered winner-loser
and Romantan 2004; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1999),
differences after Trump won the election.
although it is not clear that these attitudes endure.
Using original panel data, we leverage the dissonance
In the United States, the winner effect has been
between the winner effect and the winner’s pre-election
observed in attitudes about the fairness of elections. The
claims about election rigging. By comparing pre-election
Florida episode of the 2000 presidential election moti-
panel survey data from September 2014 to October 2016,
vated political scientists to begin asking national samples
we demonstrate an effect of elite messaging on beliefs in
about their confidence in vote counts (Alvarez, Hall, and
Llewellyn 2008; Atkeson 2014; Atkeson and Saunders
1Washington University in St. Louis, MO, USA
2007). Survey researchers have asked national samples
2Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
about their confidence that “your vote was counted as
intended” and that “votes across the country were accu-
Corresponding Author:
Patrick D. Tucker, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale
rately counted,” or similar wording (see Sances and
University, 77 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA.
Stewart 2015, Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix).
Email: patrick.tucker@yale.edu
Sinclair et al.
855
election rigging. Similarly, by comparing pre-election
categories of theory are most relevant: cognitive biases
October 2016 and post-election November 2016 survey
that extend beyond cognitive dissonance, the influence of
data, we show a winner effect. In addition, we examine
affect (mood) on survey responses, informational- and
the kinds of supporters who are most susceptible to these
personality-based responses to political stimuli, and the
distinct influences. Finally, we investigate the relation-
influence of elite cues. We argue that rather than winning
ship between beliefs about electoral integrity and promi-
triggering cognitive processes and losing triggering emo-
nent news stories that may undercut beliefs about
tional processes, it is likely that the same process, which
legitimacy.
we argue is mood, is involved in both.
Our findings complement the expanding political sci-
The science of political attitudes gives emphasis to
ence of conspiratorial beliefs (Berinsky 2017a; Nyhan
cognitive biases generated by political identities and can-
and Reifler 2010). Scholars argue that conspiracy-theo-
didate preferences, as do the Sances-Stewart study
rists hold their beliefs as a kind of motivated reasoning
accounts of partisan identity in its individual-level mod-
(Kunda 1990); that is, conspiracy-theorists rely on their
els. The mechanisms that generate bias range from moti-
beliefs to maintain their attitudes in the face of attitude-
vated reasoning, perceptual screens, priming and framing
changing information (Lodge and Taber 2013). In this
by media sources and opinion leaders, and selective
case, a lack of confidence in a voting system reflects dis-
learning (for reviews, see Bartels 2002; Bolsen,
approval of a nefarious, scheming political opponent—
Druckman, and Cook 2014). The core thesis is that estab-
that is, support for the conspiracy theory is driven by a
lished political loyalties can have such pervasive effects
need to align the world with one’s political partisanship
on perceptions of the political world that a change in con-
(Berinsky 2017b). As our attention is on political compe-
text, such as the partisan implications of an election out-
tition between two partisans, we focus on partisanship,
come, may significantly impact attitudes about the
not ideology, as the principle that drives susceptibility to
political system. Particularly when politically relevant
conspiracy about whether the ballots are counted identities generate opposing narratives of political events,
properly.
differences in identities can generate widely different
perspectives on even basic facts about politics.
Cognitive, Emotional, and
Mood, or the affective state of an individual, may con-
dition responses to the political environment. Kaempfer
Personality Foundations for the
and Mutz (2014, 268) summarize recent findings from
Winner Effect
the European Social Surveys:
Previous studies have emphasized that the winner effect
Many of the indicators used in political opinion polls are
is the product of cognitive dissonance: the conflict
strongly influenced by the affective state of the respondent
between the “best candidate” and an election outcome is
in the days preceding the interview. As expected, a positive
resolved, at least for some people, by inferring that there
mood leads to more positive judgments on political issues
is something flawed about the election (Anderson and
while negative affective states result in more negative
Tverdova 2001; Anderson et al. 2005; Sances and Stewart
judgments.
2015). Sances and Stewart attribute the difference
between confidence in one’s vote being counted accu-
Furthermore, they report that less well-informed respon-
rately and the country’s vote to greater trust in local insti-
dents exhibit stronger mood effects. The Kaempfer-Mutz
tutions than remote institutions, citing Mutz and thesis is grounded in well-established psychological studies
Flemming (1999). While a valuable distinction, we find
of the influence of affect on cognition (for reviews, see
this approach to be incomplete. The cognitive dissonance
Bower 1991; Brader and Marcus 2013; Clore and Huntsinger
part of their story explains the losers’ experience: only
2007; Forgas 2000; Glaser and Salovey 1998; Rahn 2000).
losers must rationalize the difference between their per-
These studies report that mood selectively primes facts from
ception of the best candidate and the election outcome.
memory, increases or decreases the salience of consider-
Yet, Sances and Stewart show that, for the pre-2016 elec-
ations, motivates the use of accessible knowledge and cog-
tion cycles, winners show at least as much of a gain in
nitions, and tends to generate congruent social judgments.
confidence, and losers show a loss. We require an account
Plainly, there is a range of cognitive and emotional
that explains the near symmetry in positive effects on
processes that could produce the...
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