It Means What It Says

AuthorBryan A. Garner
Pages28-29
It Means
What It Says
Old-fashioned textualism is all about
interpretation, not legislating from bench
By Bryan A. Garner
You’ve probably heard recently about
the “Gorsuch brief ”—a brief that ma kes
closely analyzed t extual arguments
based on gramma rs and dictionaries—
and about how progressive advocat es
are relying more and more on Sca lia-
style textua lism. These subjects have
been much in the news. You may also
know that Justices Ruth Bader Gin sburg and Stephen G.
Breyer typical ly analyze interpretive questions by focu s-
ing on four elements in this order: (1) text, (2) structure,
(3) purpose a nd (4) legislative history. That technique
was begun embryon ically by Justice Robert H. Jackson
and carried i nto mature development by Justice David
Souter. As Justice Elena Kaga n said famously a few years
ago, “We’re all textualists now.”
While consequentiali sts think about ideal results (be st
policies for the future) and purposiv ists think about
broad legislative purpo ses (what Congress ha d in mind),
textuali sts consider the words actually adopted. A s
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared in a 1930 opin-
ion, “There is no warrant for seek ing refi ned argu ments
to show that the statute does not mea n what it says.”
Of course, this subjec t can be politically dangerous—
especially when we’re tal king about constitu-
tional as opposed to sta tutory interpretation.
So I’ll leave constitut ional interpretation to
the side and talk here about some fi ne points
of statutory inter pretation. Being pretty apo-
litical myself, I’ ll try to refrain from polic y
arguments and hew to t he text. In any ques-
tion of interpretation, policy i s bound to rear
its head. But it’s always good to make a t ex-
tual argu ment fi rst.
This approach is old-fashioned. The con-
ventional view has alw ays been that to inter-
pret is to do a fi nite number of things relating
to understanding what words me an in their
context. Some act ivities exceed its ambit: to
expand, to tw ist, to contort, to stret ch,
to interpolate, to re strict, to bend,
to make exceptions to, to ig nore, to
evade, to fl out, to repeal, to nullif y, to
abrogate. Judges are often ur ged to
engage in these activ ities, but they
aren’t interpretation.
The 18th-century v iew, as expres sed by the commenta-
tor John Raithby, was that “our laws ... have been framed
... by the suggestions of deliberative w isdom.” Although
these laws may sometimes prove imperfec t, “our judges ...
are not at liberty t o dispense with them, or to alter them.”
Another scholar of the period, Fr ancis Sullivan,
explained why he thought judges, “the di spensers of
justice,” must “follow the strict let ter of the positive laws;
lest, under the pretense of ex plaining and extending
them, the most valuable privi leges of the people might be
betrayed or rendered illusory.” In sum, departing from
the enacted words is a st ratagem that can be used for any
possible political end.
IT’S NOT POLITICAL
So the ideal textu alist is content-neutral, at
least in theory. Justice Louis Bra ndeis warned
that “we must be ever on our guar d, lest we
erect our prejudices into legal pr inciples.
If you feel I’m getting political here, I don’t
mean to. We’re talking about statute s in a
mainstream w ay. That’s why Chief Justice John
Marshall wr ote in an 1804 opinion that “a law
is the best expositor of its elf. ” Courts can’t sub-
stitute their words for the legisl ature’s.
But what if the legislature is dy sfunctional?
A revered British commentator says t hat in the
United Kingdom, Parliament “is in a st ate
of acute malfu nction, producing laws
which are excessive in qua ntity and
de cient in qua lity. The same might be
said of American leg islatures, where
scrutiny has been m inimized on the
pretext of a shortage of t ime. Some
28 || ABA JOURNAL APRIL 2019
PHOTOS BY PAUL J. RICHARDS/AFP/GETTY IMAGES AND BY WINN FUQUA PHOTOGRAPHY
Bryan
Garner
on Words
FOLLOW ON TWITT ER
@BryanAGarner
“WE’RE ALL
TEXTUALISTS
NOW.”
—JUSTICE ELENA KAGAN
Practice

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