Islamic just war theory and the challenge of sacred space in Iraq.

• Author: Hassner, Ron E.
• Position: Essay

The ongoing conflict in Iraq has transformed sacred sites into battlefields. (1) Iraq's Sunnis and Shias are firebombing one another's mosques and executing assassination attempts on religious and secular leaders in the midst of prayer. Insurgents in Iraq are also using mosques as rallying points, tactical bases and sites for the storage of weapons in the irregular war against U.S. troops. These attacks have placed U.S. forces in a difficult position: Attacks on mosques alienate the local population, bolstering Iraqi support for the insurgency; but repeated failure to pursue insurgents into mosques hampers U.S. operations and provides insurgents with a tactical advantage.

A series of clashes between U.S. forces and Iraqi insurgents in the fall of 2004 exemplified the tremendous challenges posed by combat in sacred space. In early October 2004, U.S. troops launched operations at seven mosques in the town of Ramadi, the southwestern point of the Sunni triangle. Although U.S. forces remained outside the mosques while their Iraqi counterparts searched for weapons, Ramadi residents responded in anger to these incidents, decrying U.S. desecration of their sacred sites. One prominent Sunni cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Bashar al-Faydi, launched an appeal to Pope John Paul II to condemn the attacks. Another, Sheikh Abdullah Abu Omar, exclaimed: "This cowboy behavior cannot be accepted. The Americans seem to have lost their senses and have gone out of control." (2)

By early November, operations in Ramadi began producing tangible results. Marines found weapons, ammunition and explosives in four Ramadi mosques including--in one mosque alone--fifty sticks of TNT, fifty-one pounds of black powder, eighty-eight mortar rounds, thirty artillery rounds, five rockets and several machine guns. Inside another, troops found explosives rigged to a transceiver, a setup presumably designed to implicate U.S. forces in the demolition of the mosque. Marines succeeded in preventing the destruction of yet another mosque, Ramadi's largest, in which they had uncovered a weapons cache. Having established positions on the roof of the mosque, they noticed a car careening towards the building. Firing at the car, the marines unleashed secondary explosions, possibly indicating that the driver had been a suicide-bomber who was intent on destroying the mosque. (3)

What are the public relations implications of various U.S. responses to the insurgent use of mosques? (4) To the extent that defeating the insurgency in Iraq involves a successful appeal to Iraqi "hearts and minds", understanding public perceptions regarding just and unjust behavior in war provides a useful analytical tool. I am particularly interested in how the Haditt--oral traditions relating to the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammad--and Muslim just war theory treat the implications of conflicts at sacred sites. Because the primary audience for U.S. counterinsurgency operations is Iraq's Sunni community, the sources I focus on in this paper are those considered most authoritative by this particular community

I begin with a brief overview of the Islamic sources used in this paper to evaluate the just war implications of fighting in mosques. I then qualify my use of these sources by considering the challenges posed by a biased selection of sources, misrepresentation of these sources and the questionable relevance of these findings to the current situation in Iraq.

In the third part of this paper, I briefly survey the empirical pattern of mosque use by insurgents in Iraq, the American response to this practice and the three challenges that this situation poses to just war theory Each of these challenges is examined in the three sections that follow: The limitations on the use of force within a sacred site; the protection of civilians in or near the mosque; and the requirements that the site itself be safeguarded from violence. I offer insights into the ethical implications of each scenario based on relevant Muslim oral traditions and jurisprudence.

To demonstrate the potential contribution of just war reasoning to the management of conflicts at sacred sites despite these challenges, I conclude the paper with an analysis of a significant historical precedent, the Saudi response to a hostage crisis in Islam's holiest site, the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. This incident highlights the importance of cooperating with religious authorities who can interpret laws restricting conflict at sacred sites in a manner that is conducive to the successful conclusion of military operations.

ISLAMIC ORAL TRADITIONS, JURISPRUDENCE AND JUST WAR

Both traditional sources for contemporary Muslim just war thinking, Islamic oral traditions and Islamic jurisprudence, trace their roots to the religion's founding years. The Hadith--collections of direct and transmitted oral reports about the sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammad--were compiled and canonized during the 8th and 9th centuries. Because these reports provide an indication of the Sunnah--the way of life of the Prophet and his companions--they are regarded as valuable elaborations and additions to the guidance provided by the Quran. The Quran and the Sunnah (as transmitted through the Hadith) have, in turn, provided the basis for Islamic jurisprudence, or Fiqh. One branch of this jurisprudence, dealing with appropriate and inappropriate behavior at times of war, is Islamic just war theory, which experienced its greatest revival in the writings of scholastic Muslim thinkers between the 8th and 12th centuries.

What can the study of these texts teach us about the management of conflicts involving sacred sites in Iraq? I argue that the traditions relating to the Prophet and Islamic just war theory underlie modern Muslim conceptions of what is just and unjust in war. Like Augustine and Aquinas' arguments on just war which contributed to the construction of what is acceptable, required, or prohibited in Western conceptions of war--early medieval Islamic scholars shaped current Muslim understandings of fairness and deceit, guilt or innocence in war. (5) Thus, an understanding of traditional Muslim just war theory is imperative for persuading Muslim observers that U.S. operations in Iraq are constrained by ethical guidelines.

In deliberating the justifications for military actions, restrictions on the use of force or protection of civilians, U.S. decisionmakers and U.S. forces are drawing, consciously or otherwise, on elements from Western just war theory. (6) The foundation for these debates in the Christian West rests with St. Augustine in the 4th century and St. Aquinas in the 13th century, as well as with their followers in the high and late Middle Ages, who were among the first scholars to engage with questions regarding the definition of a just cause for war, the proper authority to wage war and the requirement for minimizing force during battle. These just war thinkers have come to affect the practice of war in the West by indirectly shaping the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the founding documents of international institutions that govern the practice of war (such as the charters of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross), core principles of international law regulating war and even the training manuals of the U.S. military and the Marine Corps. As Americans grapple with these questions, they are rarely explicit in invoking the traditional sources of just war theory. Instead, they cite these institutionalized and legalized manifestations of Christian just war theory more familiar to a Western audience.

References to the canonical sources of Western just war theory seem prudent if the aim is to persuade American or European observers that operations in Iraq are influenced by moral imperatives. However, if U.S. troops wish to exhibit ethical restraint to a local audience, either in Iraq specifically or the Middle East more generally, an appeal to Christian or Western sources seems sorely misguided. To "win the hearts and minds" of Iraqis, U.S. troops should look to Islamic sources on the conduct of just war, not to their Christian counterparts.

The impact of classical Islamic thought on Iraqi public opinion is indirect, to be sure. Presumably, few Iraqis are familiar with the legacy of 9th century Muslim theologians and fewer yet invoke such arguments when they justify or condemn specific insurgent practices. Nonetheless, common understandings of just and unjust behavior in war implicitly rest on chains of arguments, practices and institutions that can be traced to early Islamic scholars. Fatwas, religious rulings issued by clerics that are based directly or indirectly on arguments from the Sunnah and the Fiqh, drive both insurgent activities and popular support for these activities. (7)

A study of 9th century Islamic thought on the inviolability of sacred space should lend insight into how Iraqi observers interpret and judge U.S. counterinsurgency operations involving mosques. Of particular relevance are the Hadith collected in the 9th century by the Imam Bukhari (810 to 870 C.E.) and the writings of Muhammad al-Shaybani (unknown to 804/805 C.E.).

Muslims consider Muhammad ibn Ismail ibn Ibrahim ibn al-Mughira al-Bukhari to have compiled the most authentic Hadith collection, recognized as forming the cornerstone of the Hadith tradition by Sunni Muslims. (8) Many consider this collection to be the most important Islamic text after the Quran. Bukhari is said to have collected over a half-million reports about the Prophet and his companions. He determined authenticity by developing methods for tracing and documenting the genealogy of Hadith. Of these, he selected the most accurate and reliable reports, less than 3,000 in all, for inclusion in his collection. Known as Sahib al-Bukhari, meaning "Bukhari's authentic [collection]," it arranges reports by subject matter for the reader's convenience.

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