Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory.

• Author: Ahmed, Rumee
• Position: Book review

Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory. By Robert Gleave. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. Pp. xii + 212. $120, 75 [pounds sterling] (cloth); $39.95, 24.99 [pounds sterling] (paper).

Robert Gleave has a problem with the way academics approach the genre of Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh). He believes that their preconceptions about Islamic law cause them to overlook its complexities, especially with respect to literalism. Specifically, they presume that Muslim legal theorists were and are obsessed with finding a single, literal and authoritative meaning within foundational texts. There is an obsession, Gleave acknowledges, but he points out that what one legal theorist means by "finding the literal meaning" might be very different from another. He faults academics for loosely equating common terms in medieval legal theory manuals related to literalism--such as zahir, haqiqa, wad', and muhkam--as though they all functioned in the same way. Close attention to these terms, he contends, reveals that Muslim legal theorists conceive of "literal" meanings in multiple ways that reflect different ideas about how Islam's foundational texts ought to be interpreted. Over seven chapters Gleave chronologically surveys different views of literalism in Islamic legal and exegetical writings. In a welcome move, both Sunni and Shi'i traditions are represented throughout. An introductory chapter clearly lays out the problem that Gleave aims to address. He points out that the term "literal" is itself somewhat ambiguous--it can refer either to the semantic meaning of words in a text or to the authoritative meaning of that text, apart from, and sometimes in spite of, its semantic meaning. Then Gleave further complicates notions of the "literal," using Francois Recanati's erudite typology, which separates literal meanings into subcategories called t-literal, m-literal, and p-literal, to describe precisely what legal theorists meant when they used such terms as zahir and haqiqa. These subcategories help explain how legal theorists used terms often translated as "literal" to refer to meanings found in semantics, conventional usage, or illocution. The reader does not need to master Recanati's typology to see how it illuminates, and Gleave reminds the reader of its relevant details when necessary.

In chapter two, Gleave explains literalism's pertinence to Islamic legal hermeneutics. He describes the medieval...