Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities

• Author: Michele Crepaz,Marcel Hanegraaff,Wiebke Marie Junk
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221109441
• Published date: 01 March 2023
• Date: 01 March 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(4) 530–560

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221109441

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Is There a First Mover

Advantage in Lobbying?

A Comparative Analysis

of How the Timing of

Mobilization Affects the

Inf‌luence of Interest

Groups in 10 Polities

Michele Crepaz

1

, Marcel Hanegraaff

2

, and

Wiebke Marie Junk

3



Abstract

The f‌irst mover advantage is a critical factor for the productivity of f‌irms that

enter new markets. Surprisingly, however, the importance of timing is rarely

explored in studies of interest groups and their inf‌luence on new policy

agendas. In this article, we therefore develop a theory of f‌irst mover ad-

vantages in lobbying. We argue that especially more resourceful and more

highly affected organizations should be able to benef‌it from early lobbying.

Using granular survey data on the timing of lobby efforts by interest groups on

Covid-19 related policies in 10 European democracies, we test this novel

theory. Our results show that timing is an important predictor of lobbying

inf‌luence, but that interest groups which are hardly affected by a new policy

cannot benef‌it from early mover advantages in the same way as affected

1

School of Sociology and Political Science, NUI Galway, Galway, Ireland

2

Universiteit van Amsterdam Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen, Amsterdam,

Netherlands

3

Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

Corresponding Author:

Marcel Hanegraaff, Universiteit van Amsterdam Faculteit der Maatschappij- en

Gedragswetenschappen, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, Amsterdam 1012 DL, Netherlands.

Email: m.c.hanegraaff@uva.nl

organizations. Moreover, we give evidence for differences in f‌irst mover

advantages depending on organizational staff resources.

Keywords

f‌irst mover advantage, interest groups, inf‌luence, comparative politics,

organizational theory

Introduction

In the past two decades, lobbying scholars have contributed to the study of

political inf‌luence by analyzing which strategic choices allow interest groups

and f‌irms to shape government decisions in line with their preferences. As a

result, a wealth of important studies identif‌ies various conditions underlying

lobbying success, for instance, related to the choice of lobbying a particular

venue, lobbying alone or as part of a coalition, or by employing a set of

specif‌ic tactics (cf. Baumgartner et al., 2009;Binderkrantz & Pedersen, 2019;

Dür et al., 2015;Heaney & Lorenz, 2013;Holyoke, 2009;Klüver, 2013;

Leech, 2010;Lowery, 2013;Rasmussen et al., 2018). However, the temporal

dimension related to lobbying strategies, that is the extent to which the timing

of lobbying efforts matters for inf‌luence, has remained largely unexplored.

This is surprising given that practitioners tend to stress the importance of

timing in their work. As a lobbyist with 20 years of experience in European

Union (EU) lobbying declared: “a lobbyist instinctively knows timing is

everything. Too often, lobbyists step [too late into] the process. Whatever you

say, however useful, will simply be ignored. What you are putting forward has

not been delivered at the right time”(McLoughlin, 2018). To address this gap

in existing research, this article develops and tests a theory of f‌irst mover

advantages in lobbying in order to shed light on the association between early

lobbying and its inf‌luence over new policies.

To do so, we build on the literature on f‌irm prof‌itability, market con-

centration, and organizational survival (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988;

Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007), which explains why f‌irms which enter a market

early, have considerable advantages over f‌irms entering the same market later.

Building on these insights, we argue that similar effects apply to interest

groups that try to inf‌luence the political process. We here rely on a behavioral

def‌inition of interest groups, which includes all organizations which use

lobbying strategies to pursue a political interest, but do not seek off‌ice (cf.

Beyers et al., 2009; Baroni et al., 2014). This includes a variety of group types,

including NGOs, labor unions, professional organizations, think tanks,

business associations, and also individual f‌irms, in as far as they actively seek

policy inf‌luence.

1

Crepaz et al. 531