Is Public Ignorance a Problem? An Epistemic Defense of Really Existing Democracies

• Published date: 01 September 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241244715
• Author: Aris Trantidis,Nick Cowen
• Date: 01 September 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2024, Vol. 77(3) 759–771

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129241244715

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Is Public Ignorance a Problem? An

Epistemic Defense of Really Existing

Democracies

Aris Trantidis

1

and Nick Cowen

1

Abstract

Does good governance require citizens to be knowledgeable of basic facts and best poli cy ideas? Some scholars suggest

that it does, and propose disenfranchising the most ‘ignorant’voters. In contrast, we argue, political systems are com plex

systems inevitably exhibiting incomplete, imperfect and asymmetric information that is dynamically gene rated in society

from actors with diverse life experiences, antagonistic interests and often profoundly dissonant views and values,

generating radical uncertainty among political elites over the consequences of their decisions. Radical uncertainty, radical

dissonance and power asymmetry are inescapable properties of politics. Good performance signif‌icantly depends on

how political elites navigate through radical uncertainty to handle radical dissonance. Democracy, by offering citizens

equal rights to participate in politics and talk freely, both enables and compels political actors to track social feedback

regarding the effects of their decisions on a diverse public, and consider it in ways that mitigate these three problems.

Keywords

epistemic democracy, radical dissonance, complex systems, disenfranchisement, representation, deliberation

Introduction

Most citizens are far from being well-informed about

relevant political facts and best policy options. Many of

them even lack basic knowledge of the political process. Is

this type of ignorance a problem for the performance of

democratic systems? Consolidated democracies tend to

provide better outcomes in terms of both personal freedom

and overall human f‌lourishing compared to authoritarian

regimes (De Mesquita et al. 2005;Estlund 1997;Feng

1997). This record is attributed to the fact that democ-

racies, through elections, civil rights, public contestation,

and checks and balances, prevent elites from fully cap-

turing the political system (Bagg 2018; Cf.; Dahl 1971;

Green 2016) and push them to be responsive to the views

of the many (Arnold and Franklin 2012;Page 1994;

Uslaner and Weber 1983). This line of argument points to

democracy’sincentive structure regarding elite behaviour,

the constraints and terms of competition set by democratic

institutions and norms, but does not address questions

over the epistemic qualities of democratic systems and the

key objection, as old as Plato’s Republic, that a poor

quality of citizens in terms of levels of knowledge would

undermine the quality of political outputs and policies.

This ‘input-output’epistemic relationship has been a

central concern in discussions regarding how to reform

democracy and improve its performance and outcomes.

Assuming that widespread public ignorance under-

mines the quality of the judgements, choices and con-

tributions of citizens poses a compelling challenge for

instrumental arguments defending democracy (Estlund

2008;Knight and Johnson 2007;Landemore 2012,

2020). If we see the democratic process primarily as

selection based on preferences –the election of political

representatives and voting for political platforms and

ideas –public ignorance must negatively affect the quality

of the preferences that will be cast and counted as ballots,

and represented in elected decision-making bodies. Al-

ternatively, if we understand democracy as broader pro-

cesses of participation, contestation and deliberation,or

even ‘a mode of collective teaching and learning by which

1

University of Lincoln, UK

Corresponding Author:

Aris Trantidis, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of

Lincoln, Bridge House, Brayford Campus, Lincoln LN5 7BN, UK.

Email: atrantidis@lincoln.ac.uk