Is It Still a Mandate If We Don’t Enforce It? The Politics of COVID-related Mask Mandates in Conservative States

• DOI: 10.1177/0160323X211035677
• Author: Jeffrey Lyons,Luke Fowler
• Date: 01 June 2021
• Published date: 01 June 2021
• Subject Matter: Research Articles

Original Research General Interest Article

Is It Still a Mandate If We Don’t

Enforce It? The Politics of

COVID-related Mask Mandates

in Conservative States

Jeffrey Lyons

1

and Luke Fowler

1

Abstract

Questions of whether to enforce COVID-related mask mandates are complex. While enforced

mandates are more effective at controlling community spread, government imposed behavioral

controls have met significant opposition in conservative states, where a political bloc on the right is

skeptical that COVID presents a significant and immediate threat. The authors conduct a split

sample survey in order to examine how inclusion of a fine provision attached to mask mandates

affects support. The survey was conducted in Idaho (a Republican dominated state) at a time when a

mask mandate was a central debate. Unsurprisingly, respondents were more supportive of a mask

mandate if a fine was not included. Further investigation indicates this is primarily a result of shifting

Republican attitudes, which highlights the complex political situation in conservative states as leaders

consider best mechanisms for battling COVID.

Keywords

COVID, mask mandate, enforced compliance, survey

Since the SARS-CoV-2 (commonly referred to

as COVID-19) pandemic began in early 20 20,

public health officials have largely relied on

voluntary compliance for social distancing,

mask wearing, and hygiene practices to slow

community spread (Phillips 2020). Even

though the Biden White House and the Centers

for Disease Control (CDC) indicate that herd

immunity in the U.S. will likely be achieved

by summer 2021 for the most common strain,

public health authorities are still trying to con-

tain the spread of the virus while vaccinations

are rolled out (Haseman 2021). Although vari-

ous restrictions on social and economic activi-

ties and suspensions of existing regulations

are in place across the country (Curley and

Federman 2020), the key policy tool at state

and local-levels are mask mandates (which is

somewhat of a misnomer given that not all are

actually mandatory) for which two questions

remain: 1) is public support for mask mandates

affected by enforcement language?; and, 2)

what are the implications for policy design?. The

latter is particularly concerning for leaders of

conservative-leaning states whose po pulations

1

Boise State University, ID, USA

Corresponding Author:

Luke Fowler, Boise State University, 1910 University Dr,

MS 1935, Boise, ID 83725, USA.

Email: lukefowler@boisestate.edu

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ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X211035677

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2021, Vol. 53(2) 106–\ 121

are relatively unconvinced that COVID-19 poses

a significant and immediate threat, which has

already sparked protests and o ther displays of

civil disobedience (along with some uncivil

forms of disobedience that have included threats

of violence) in response to efforts to limit eco-

nomic and social activity (e.g., Maqbool 2020;

Shepherd 2020).

In recent years, policy design theory has

worked to rectify theories of human choice pro-

cesses (e.g., behavioral economics) and admin-

istrative theory so that beh avioral changes are

nudged, rather than forced (Howlett 2019).

Given that governments are often faced with

multiple target populations, there tends to be

a spectrum of potential compilers and non-

compliers that require multip le policy tools to

be used simultaneously as well as those policy

tools to be calibrated to the specific groups tar-

geted (Weaver 2009; Howlett 2018). For mask

mandates, this means that state and local gov-

ernments must determine the mechanisms most

likely to induce compliance, which shift based

on the political and socio-economic character-

istics of populations. Although regulatory com-

pliance strategies are best thought of as fitting

along a continuum, they are most often

described as fittinginto two categories: enforced

versus voluntarycompliance (May 2005). Under

traditional enforcement approaches, govern-

ments monitor target populations and then use

sanctions (e.g., fines, prison) against violators,

so that compliance essentially becomes non-

optional. In contrast, voluntary compliance

assumes that non-compliance is a result of a lack

of knowledge or capacity, as opposed to unwill-

ingness, and that target populations will comply

out of a sense of duty or moral obligation. Gov-

ernments, then,provide information on potential

threats (e.g., outreach campaigns), offer sugges-

tions for best practices, and facilitate compli-

ance by removing barriers (May 2005;

Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger

2011; Siddiki, Espinosa, and Heikkila 2019).

By July 2021, forty states have issued some

form of a mask mandate requiring face

coverings, although thirty-two states have

rescinded those orders as case numbers

declined. The specific provisions vary across

states; most extend to public indoor areas

(e.g., restaurants, government buildings) and

outdoor areas in which social distancing

cannot be maintained. In lieu of fines, law

enforcement may bar entry to public places to

non-mask wearers or use criminal penalties

related to upholding public order (e.g.,

disturbing the peace) if circumstances escalate.

However, enforcement across states h as varied

(Curley and Federman 2020; Hubbard 2021;

Markowitz 2021). For instance, New Mexico’s

Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham has

instructed law enforcement agencies to

“aggressively enforce” the mandate, and has

made a fine possible for violators (Romero

2020). While in Kansas, the state legislature

passed a law that strips authority to use

criminal penalties to enforce executive orders

from law enforcement agencies and some

agencies have indicated that they have no

plans to enforce at all (Shorman and Tidd

2020). Additionally, Florida and Texas have

passed laws preempting local authorities from

enforcing their own mask mandates (Hubbard

2021; Markowitz 2021). For states and

localities where mask mandates do exist,

enforcement has been lax with police

encouraging compliance, but are hesitant to

issue fines or make arrests even where those

options are available (Jacobs and Ohinmaa

2020; Phillips 2020).

Complicating these dynamics are competing

and sometimes contradictory directives from

federal, state, and local governments. On one

hand, the Trump administration was heavily

criticized for its response (or lack thereof) and

the President’s attempts to downplay the sever-

ity of the pandemic. For many Republicans,

supporting the White House’s narrative was a

litmus test to a certain extent, so state elected

officials supporting initiati ves like mask man-

dates have largely been framed as rebuking the

President. On the other hand, local govern-

ments have filled the policy void left by states

failing to respond to increasing ca se numbers,

which has led some state legislatures to push

back against local governments through threats

of preemption (e.g., Kansas, Texas). Addition-

ally, most states are reliant on local

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Lyons and Fowler