Is Iran's Era of Fear Coming to An End?

AuthorNathan, James A.

Historians know revolutions have their own rhythm. First, there is zeal and blood, then consolidation, and, finally, reaction. In France, events were compressed and reaction set: in when Napoleon decided to compete with--and then exceed--the crowned heads of Europe. In the Soviet Union, consolidation lasted 40 years. In Iran, revolutionary consolidation is nearing the end. Plainly, the Islamic revolt is running out of steam.

For the last year, Iran has had its own version of former U.S.S.R. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, a smiling mullah named Muhammad Khatami. Pres. Khatami's wildly popular vision of "civil society" is undermining Iran's reigning clerics and profoundly threatens the legions of hacks who replaced Iran's middle-class exiles.

The Western-educated Khatami's message, from the outset, has been that Iran must be a modern nation of civil law. His nomination by the official "Council of Guardians" was something of a fluke, but Khatami won a huge majority in 1997, with 70% of the vote. In prior years, the numbers who marched to the polls had diminished dramatically, but Khatami supporters flocked to vote in record amounts. Khatami's victory was remarkable not just for the moderation of the man and the message, but for the fact that his campaign was shrouded in a wall of silence by most of Iran's official media.

With Khatami's election, Iran's dour era of tear and repression is lifting. He has told CNN and anyone else who is listening that Iran wishes to join the international community. The rest of the world is responding. Flights to and from Tehran, even though scheduled at the most bizarre hours, are jammed with European businessmen; tourists are returning; and the slogan "Death to America" has disappeared from the front desk of the Hilton hotel.

Nevertheless, Iran remains a country of multiples and paradoxes. It has three calendars (Persian, Arabic, and Western), two armies, two navies, two air forces, two police forces, and parallel governance (civil and religious) that impenetrably interthread like DNA helixes.

The "supreme leader," Ali Khamenei, is, in theory, the most powerful figure in Iran, yet is a lesser religious authority than most of the senior clerical leadership. He rules at the sufferance of those zealous clerics who rose to power in the Revolution, but are painfully aware of their diminished appeal. Khamenei is said to be a pragmatist, though he is hardly the reformer Khatami is. The two men never appear at...

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