Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?

• Publication year: 2021

86 Nebraska L. Rev. 488. Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?

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Note*

Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ................................................... 488 R
II. The Right to Competency to Stand Trial for Juveniles ........... 490 R
III. Are Juveniles Competent to Stand Trial? ........................ 495 R
A. What Legal Abilities are Required for Competency
to Stand Trial? ............................................. 495 R
B. Sources of Incompetence: The Impact of Immaturity
on Juveniles' Legal Abilities ............................... 498 R
C. What are Juveniles' Legal Abilities? ........................ 502 R
IV. The Impact of Immaturity in the Law of Competency
to Stand Trial ................................................. 506 R
A. The Modern Treatment of Maturity in Competency
to Stand Trial Law .......................................... 506 R
B. How Should the Law Treat Immaturity in
Competency to Stand Trial? .................................. 510 R
V. Conclusion ..................................................... 513 R

I. INTRODUCTION

The right not to be incompetent while tried is a right that has been labeled "fundamental to an adversary system."(fn1) It is a right afforded to all criminal defendants by the United States Constitution.(fn2) It is also a right that most jurisdictions have extended to juveniles being processed in the juvenile justice system.(fn3) While most states provide

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juveniles the right not to be incompetent while tried, the issue of what standard should apply to juveniles is a controversial one. Typically, jurisdictions have extended the adult legal standard for competency, known as the Dusky standard,(fn4) to juveniles.(fn5) However, many jurisdictions have modified the Dusky standard to better fit the needs of the system and the perceived required abilities of juveniles.

With regard to the competency standard, one issue of particular controversy is whether a juvenile's youth, either in terms of years or psychological development, should be allowed to influence the competency decision. Some jurisdictions have explicitly held that juveniles may not be found incompetent on the basis of immaturity,(fn6) while others allow just the opposite.(fn7) In addition, some jurisdictions have actually lowered the standard for competency in juvenile court, at least partially out of recognition that juveniles are less mature than adults.(fn8)

The purpose of this Note is to explore whether a juvenile's immaturity should impact the legal decision of competency to stand trial. Part II serves as an introduction to the basis of the competency right and its extension to juveniles. Part III attempts to answer the question of what are juveniles' legal abilities? Part III includes an analysis of what abilities are required for a defendant to be competent to stand trial, a discussion of what impact immaturity may have on juveniles, and a review and analysis of relevant social science research that evaluates juveniles' legal abilities. Part IV brings the analysis back to the law, beginning with a description of the law's current treatment of immaturity in juvenile court, and ending with an analysis of whether immaturity should play a role. Part V concludes by reviewing the main arguments in favor of legitimizing immaturity as a source of incompetence and introduces the questions that legitimizing immaturity would raise.

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II. THE RIGHT TO COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL FOR JUVENILES

The United States Supreme Court first substantively addressed the issue of competency to stand trial in 1960.(fn9) In Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction and remanded for a hearing on the defendant's competency to stand trial.(fn10) The Court did not discuss the constitutional basis for this procedural protection.(fn11) However, it did state that the appropriate test for determining competency to stand trial "must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."(fn12) This test has become known as the Dusky standard and has been codified in many jurisdictions.

Several years later, the Supreme Court again considered the issue of competency to stand trial. In Pate v. Robinson, the Court held that where there is bona fide doubt of a defendant's competency, failure to hold a hearing on the issue constitutes a violation of the defendant's constitutional due process right to a fair trial.(fn13) Nearly ten years after Pate, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that the right to not be incompetent while tried derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.(fn14)

In Drope v. Missouri, the Court took the opportunity to provide a slightly more detailed analysis of the link between competency to stand trial and the right to due process.(fn15) The Court relied on tradition, noting that competency to stand trial "has long been accepted" as a condition of prosecution.(fn16) Beyond tradition, the Court did not offer much argument in support of its conclusion that competency to stand trial is a due process requirement, stating only that "it suffices to note

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that the prohibition is fundamental to an adversary system."(fn17) In short, the Drope Court implied two ideas. First, the right to competency to stand trial is a fairly uncontroversial one; in practice, our legal system has never doubted that such right exists. Second, beyond tradition, competency is an essential requirement of the criminal justice system. Without it, a defendant cannot properly engage in his own defense, and justice is undermined.

While competency to stand trial may be an uncontroversial right for adults, it is quite the opposite for juveniles. The Supreme Court has never considered whether the Constitution requires that juveniles be extended the competency right and has not explicitly extended it.(fn18) However, the Court has extended juveniles other due process rights. In In re Gault, the Supreme Court considered the extent to which juveniles being adjudicated in juvenile court are embodied with procedural due process protections.(fn19) Noting that the juvenile court had failed in many respects to live up to its goals of rehabilitation and that adjudication as a delinquent often results in a loss of liberty equally severe as that of criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court held that juveniles are entitled to certain procedural safeguards.(fn20) To quote the Court, juvenile adjudications "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."(fn21) Specifically, the Court held that timely notice, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront witnesses all apply to juveniles just as they apply to adults.(fn22)

Beyond ruling on these particular rights, the Supreme Court made no attempt to elucidate exactly which due process rights are included among the "essentials" that the In re Gault decision extended to juveniles.(fn23) Subsequent rulings made it clear that the protections extended in In re Gault were not exhaustive. In the years following, the Court held that the burden of proof in juvenile proceedings must be

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"beyond a reasonable doubt"(fn24) and that juveniles are protected from double jeopardy.(fn25) In spite of this apparent trend to increase procedural rights for juveniles, the Court has never held that juveniles are entitled to all the procedural protections of adults. Arguably, by considering each right individually, the Court has implied just the opposite: juveniles are only entitled to a subset of procedural due process rights, presumably those that are considered "essential." Consistent with this reasoning, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, rejected the extension of certain adult rights to juveniles. For example, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that juveniles do not have a right to have a jury decide their cases.(fn26)

Because the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, it is unclear whether juveniles have a constitutional right to be competent to stand trial. One might argue that competency to stand trial is an essential due process protection and, as such, should be extended to juveniles under the reasoning of In re Gault. There is certainly support for this idea in the competency to stand trial caselaw.(fn27) After all, the Drope Court pronounced this right "fundamental to an adversary system."(fn28) It is not a far stretch to argue that any right that is considered "fundamental" must also be considered an "essential" right under In re Gault.(fn29)

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However, one must not divorce the question of whether the right is essential from its context. The Drope Court emphasized the importance of competency in an "adversary system,"(fn30) and the juvenile justice system, at least in principle, is not adversarial.(fn31) It is not clear that the Supreme Court would perceive the right as equally "fundamental" in this context. The In re Gault Court specifically considered

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whether granting due process rights would interfere with the special quality of juvenile proceedings and concluded that "essential" due process rights would not so interfere.(fn32) However, the McKiever Court refused to extend the right to a jury trial to juveniles because it would interfere with the quality of juvenile proceedings.(fn33) Thus, the question of whether the due process right is "essential" cannot be separated from the procedural context at issue, and the competency right will not be blindly extended to juveniles without any consideration of the impact that might have on the...