Is an Unequal Equitable Distribution Equitable?(divorce property) (Florida)

• Date: 01 January 2024
• Author: Sessums, Mark A.,Pinson, Brittany M.

In Florida, under the common law, title dictated the distribution of assets incident to a divorce. (1) Wives were at risk in a divorce and were dependent on alimony and child support as courts were not permitted to alter title to achieve equity. Trial courts were not permitted to equitably distribute property except to the title owner thereof.

The earliest expression of the philosophical underpinnings of equitable distribution and partnership concepts found expression in 1974 in Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In Brown, the couple had accumulated $233,000 in marital assets over a 21-year marriage, during which the couple had assumed traditional roles. Specifically, the wife had given up her career to make hfe worth living for the family. The wife abandoned her career as a nurse to be a housewife and mother, and the husband pursued a lucrative career as a CPA. At the time of the divorce, the husband held sole title to all of the parties' assets accumulated during the marriage. The Brown court squarely faced the limits of the common law's ability to impose equity in a property distribution incident to a divorce. The appellate court avoided an inequitable result for the wife by finding that no-fault divorce had altered the law and permitted the use of lump sum alimony, not only as an extraordinary remedy, but to "[adjust] the material wealth of the parties." (2) The trial court was empowered to consider the contributions of each and award lump sum alimony to achieve equity.

The Florida Supreme Court took the next step forward in the legal evolution of divorce fairness in 1980 when the court approved the remedy of equitable distribution in the seminal case of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). In Canakaris, trial courts were held to have the discretion to award lump sum alimony to ensure "an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage," provided that the trial court found there was justification for lump sum alimony and the corresponding ability of the other spouse to pay the award. (3) The lump sum alimony awarded to the wife in Canakaris was the husband's one-half interest in the jointly titled former marital home. (4) The justification for the imposition of lump sum alimony was the financial success of the marriage and the disparity in the parties' assets and income and the equity that would result without such an award. (5) The husband's net worth was $3,749,930 and all had been accumulated during the marriage in which the wife was a traditional housewife. (6) Even with the equitable distribution by lump sum alimony of the husband's interest in the former marital home, the wife received total assets of only approximately $385,000. (7) Thus, the wife's significant need and the gross asset disparity was the justification for the award in Canakaris. (8)

In 1985 in Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court further expanded the concept of equitable distribution of jointly owned real property to include non-support justification and determined that such an award was the "natural extension of the rule adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Canakaris." (9) The Tronconi court extended the proposition of the transfer of property interests and affirmed a trial court award allocating the ownership of three pieces of jointly owned real properties between the parties to achieve an equitable distribution of their various property rights. (10) The vehicle to achieve an equitable distribution in Tronconi was the cross-awards of property. (11) The resulting awards were not "precisely [an] equal division of value" but the award was found by the trial court to be equitable and achieved "a clean break from the bonds of matrimony and joint ownership." (12) The focus in Tronconi was the equitable justification for the award. (13) The basic tenet of a judicial system is to provide a remedy for every right. (14) Tronconi merely applied this basic jurisprudence concept to divorces and ruled that if justification was present, the trial court was empowered to reward the contributions of a spouse through an equitable award. (15)

The Canakaris court recognized the traditional justification of support needs and then expanded the permitted justifications to encompass a new justification, or an award of a special equity, that arises in appropriate equitable circumstances. (16) The Tronconi court then expanded the category of justifications to encompass the cross-awards of jointly held real properties to achieve an "equitable distribution." (17) The law strained and evolved to achieve fundamental fairness for the impecunious spouse who had contributed to the marital partnership.

In 1988, the State of Florida ultimately codified the concept of equitable distribution in its first equitable distribution statute, to-wit: F.S. [section]61.075 (1989). Prior to the adoption of the equitable distribution statute, an equitable distribution of marital property had been permissive. However, the 1989 statute mandated an equitable distribution in all actions. (18) The underpinning of the law was the judicially imposed presumption that marriage is a partnership and that both spouses contribute to the accumulation of marital property in direct or indirect ways (such as through a contribution of services whereby the other spouse is thereby supported and empowered to accumulate income or property). (19)

The current version of the equitable distribution statute, provides that "in distributing the marital assets and liabilities between the parties, the court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors." (20) This language not only narrows the trial court's scope of discretion in awarding an unequal equitable distribution but also requires the party requesting this relief to present sufficient facts to justify an equitable distribution pursuant to all or some of the 10 statutory factors (rather than relying on generalized notions of justice and equitll). Ergo, we have to analyze the appeate decisions and trends in the case law regarding application of the statutory factors in order to truly determine when it is legally appropriate (i.e., not reversible error) for a trial court to award an unequal equitable distribution.

Since an equitable distribution award is premised on contributions of both parties to a marital partnership, the cases in which an unequal equitable distribution is granted should be limited to those cases in which a substantial contribution is absent. In practice, obtaining an unequal equitable distribution is often a difficult task due to proof issues. Note, to have a chance at having an unequal equitable distribution scheme affirmed on appeal, the trial court must first properly identify, classify, and specifically value and distribute the marital assets and liabilities. Any failure to properly perform these tasks results in the trial court not having the information necessary to know if the award is equal or unequal. (21)

If the trial court believes the evidence presented at the final hearing was sufficient to justify awarding an unequal equitable distribution, the trial court must make specific findings of fact based on competent substantial evidence as to the statutory factors to support that conclusion. (22) Such findings are required and an appellate court will reverse any attempted unequal equitable distribution that does not include these findings. (23) This is true even when the record reflects that the trial court received potentially sufficient evidence and even referenced specific facts that could support an award of an unequal equitable distribution. (24) This is also true even if there is no transcript of the final hearing. (25)

If the trial court believes the evidence presented at the final hearing was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that an equal equitable distribution is appropriate, the trial court should deny the request for an unequal equitable distribution but must still make specific findings of fact based on competent substantial evidence about the statutory factors to support that conclusion. (26)

An analysis of the statutory factors contained in [section]61.075 and the apphcable caselaw reflects the type of cases in which an unequal equitable distribution is justified or rejected:

* The Contribution to the Marriage by Each Spouse, Including Contributions to the Care and Education of the Children and Services as Home-maker--Here, these contributions must generally be from a spouse directly and not indirectly through family members. For example, where a spouse's parents gifted money to both spouses during the marriage, those gifts were not a spouse's extraordinary contributions that would justify an unequal equitable distribution. (27)

* The Economic Circumstances of the Parties--Disparate earning capacity, without more, cannot act as the sole basis for unequal distribution. (28) The basic premise is that each party may play disparate roles in the partnership of marriage and earning more does not preclude other forms of contribution by the other spouse.

* The Duration of the Marriage--Regardless of the parties' cohabitation status, the length of the marriage is measured from date of marriage through date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage. (29) When the parties' marriage is short-term and only one spouse has contributed to the marital assets, unequal equitable distribution awards made to the contributing spouse have been upheld on appeal in multiple districts. (30)

* Any Interruption of Personal Careers or Educational Opportunities of Either Party--The focus of this factor is not merely that some type of interruption occurred, but that there was some resulting sacrifice by the party who experienced the interruption. The facts of Cooley v. Cooley, 253 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), are...