IRS Creeping Back With Erroneous Ruling About Governance

Published date01 March 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/npc.30439
Date01 March 2018
Bruce R. Hopkins’ NONPROFIT COUNSEL
5
March 2018
THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS MONTHLY
Bruce R. Hopkins’ Nonprofit Counsel DOI:10.1002/npc
media professional that its directors have met through
years of networking.
The organization is governed by three directors,
including X and Y; all are involved in the “performance
promotion” business. X and Y own and operate several
performance media for-profit companies. One of these
companies is W, which markets this organization’s activi-
ties. In order for persons to make submissions for the con-
tests, they must use the online resources of W. W earns
commissions in connection with these transactions. W’s
staff screens applicants to identify finalists, whose entries
will then be screened at live events by judges represent-
ing media and broadcast companies, selecting a winner.
The organization advised the IRS that the sharing of W’s
portal is “for efficiency and to save resources.”
Analysis
The IRS, conceding that this organization’s contests
“bring attention to artistic works,” ruled that the tax
exemption it sought is defeated by the private benefit
doctrine. Private benefit was seen flowing to W, the
contest participants, and X and Y as owners of W. The
organization was said to structure its contests to benefit
X and Y.
The IRS focused on the fact that participants in
the contests must enroll through W’s portal and then
become subject to W’s terms of service and fees. The IRS
observed that this organization’s activities “will enable W
to increase users on its portal, have intellectual property
loaded and controlled through its portal and expose
contest participants to distributors that will generate
commissions for W.” [20.12]
Commentary: The IRS went far beyond the bounds of
common sense and the law in this case. Sure, the con-
test participants are privately benefited, but that is the
context of the way the exempt function program works.
This type of unavoidable private benefit is no different
than a student gaining an education from an exempt
school or an individual regaining health because of the
interventions of an exempt hospital. The Tax Court held
(in the American Campaign Academy case, not cited in
this ruling but summarized in the July 1989 issue) that
this is the type of primary private benefit that is not pre-
cluded by the private benefit doctrine.
As far as any unwarranted private benefit to X and Y
is concerned, the analysis should have been undertaken
pursuant to the private inurement doctrine. There, the
test is whether the economic benefit to them was rea-
sonable. The ruling is silent on that point. A tax-exempt
organization that purchases services from a company
controlled by insiders is not engaging in private inure-
ment if the compensation involved is reasonable. Thus,
this ruling as to private benefit is erroneous.
The benefit to W, however, is unwarranted private
benefit, under the est case (not cited either but sum-
marized in the June 2006 issue) because the contest
participants are locked in to use of W’s portal, resulting
in the flow of commissions to that company.
IRS CREEPING BACK WITH
ERRONEOUS RULING ABOUT
GOVERNANCE
In the foregoing ruling, the nonprofit organization
involved has a governing board of three individuals, two
of whom are married—gasp!—to each other. This board
structure has appeared in recent rulings, with the IRS
mercifully not bringing up the matter of governance.
That practice has stopped with this ruling.
The IRS first ruled, without any stated factual support
for the conclusion, that X and Y are “indistinguishable”
from W. Then, the IRS ruled that X and Y have not
established that the nonprofit organization will not be
operated for the benefit of X and Y through W. If the
IRS had applied the correct body of law (see above), that
issue would have been resolved.
Then, the IRS reverted to its mantra on governance,
writing that “operating under the control of one person
or a small, related group suggests [note that word] that
an organization operates primarily for non-exempt pur-
poses.” That is not the law, no matter how many times
the IRS proffers the statement.
Usually, in support of its misstatement of the law,
the IRS cites the Bubbling Well Church case (summarized
in the June 2014 issue). Not so in this ruling. Instead,
for this proposition, the IRS relied on Rev. Rul. 61-170.
This revenue ruling, however, does not support the IRS’s
“suggestion.”
The revenue ruling concerned the issue as to whether
an association composed of professional private-duty
nurses and practical nurses, where the organization’s pri-
mary activity was operation of a nurses’ registry to afford
greater employment opportunities for its members, was
eligible for tax-exempt status as a charitable entity. The IRS
ruled that the organization was precluded from exemp-
tion by reason of the private benefit doctrine, in that it
was providing personal employment services principally
for the benefit of its members. The IRS stated: “Public
participation in the management and support of [this]
organization is negligible. This is shown by the fact that
it draws its support primarily from members and is con-
trolled by a board of trustees composed of professional
nurses, without public participation of any kind.” Note
that the foregoing statement is merely one of fact about
this particular organization. Yet the IRS makes it appear
that this element of “public participation” is a general
prerequisite for tax exemption (which is not the law).
The IRS contrasted this “professional society” with
a “community nursing bureau,” which maintained a
register of qualified nursing personnel for the benefit of

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