Iraq and Vietnam: some sad and somber rhymes.

• Author: Bullington, J.R.
• Position: Ambassador James R. Bullington speaks on the cureent American-Iraqi war relating to the infamous American-Vietnam debacle

Editor's Note: From a decade's experience with U. S. involvement in Vietnam, Ambassador Bullington draws meaningful parallels to the current situation in Iraq. His insights might guide our response to the president's speech of January tenth--and warn of the consequences of failure in Iraq.

"History never repeats itself. At most, it sometimes rhymes."

Ernest May, Harvard history professor

Professor May's dictum is one of the relatively few bits of wisdom I retained from my graduate studies long ago. I have on several occasions found it useful in trying to understand current events.

In reviewing the President's January 10 speech announcing a new strategy for Iraq and the background materials issued by the White House to support it, as well as the report of the Iraq Study Group, I discovered several "rhymes" with the Vietnam War, in which I was extensively involved during the first half of my Foreign Service career, both in Vietnam and in Washington.

For example:

* In the press briefing on the speech, an anonymous "Senior Administration Official" said, "If the prior strategy was to clear, hold and build, we cleared but did not hold, and the build never arrived." This was equally characteristic of the first years, through mid-1968, of our involvement in Vietnam, when what we called "pacification" was at most only a secondary part of the war effort. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland's "search and destroy" strategy, seeking victory by attrition, was replaced by General Abrams' "clear and hold" strategy, backed by much more robust support for our South Vietnamese allies. It was only then, as pacification became not "the other war" but the only war, that we began to make real progress in countering the insurgency.

* In spite of spending hundreds of billions on the war, we have failed to properly support and equip the Iraqi armed forces and police. I recall that many of us in Vietnam noted with growing dismay between 1965 and 1968 that we had ample resources to send battleships and B-52s and U.S. Army divisions against the enemy, but could not find funding to equip the South Vietnamese forces with modern basic infantry weapons such as the M-16 rifle. Most of them were still using World War II M-1s, while their Communist foes had the superb AK-47. This changed after 1968, with the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war.

* The Iraq Study Group and other observers have noted the failure to effectively integrate American military and...