Iranian beliefs and realities.

AuthorKupchan, Clifford

THE SPINES of Western leaders shivered following the election of Tehran's mayor, hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as Iran's next president. And for good reason. Ahmadinejad's resume and rhetoric are not pretty. He was a member of the ideological Revolutionary Guards and of the paramilitary Basij. He is a leader of the Abadgaran (Developers) movement, comprised of younger hardliners who feel that their elders have lost their revolutionary fervor. In keeping with someone who looks back to the early 1980s as the golden age of the Islamic revolution, the new president celebrates the revolutionary ideals of the Khomeini era and ardently criticizes the United States.

The election stunned and alarmed the West, which had counted on the more pragmatic "wheeler-dealer" Hashemi Rafsanjani to win and invigorate negotiations with the West over Iran's nuclear program. In response, U.S. policy has already stiffened. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has commented disparagingly on Ahmadinejad's track record, while the Europeans are gloomy about the future of negotiations on the nuclear issue, as no compromise is in sight. We are approaching an abyss.

So it is the time to step back, take stock of today's Iran and make well-informed decisions. Americans know too little about how Iranians think or about political and economic realities in that country. Many academics and policymakers alike are ill acquainted with the central beliefs among the Iranian elite on the nuclear issue and with the key realities on the ground as the Iranian policymaking community sees them.

Now is not the time to rely on ideologues--be they neoconservatives or liberal-democracy devotees--or for them to substitute their beliefs about Iran in place of the facts on the ground. Given our experience in Iraq, now is certainly not the time to rely on "our Iranians" for "inside information" as to what is happening there.

This article, in contrast, is based on discussions held in Tehran with top Iranian leaders, including leading conservatives and key members of the Supreme National Security Council. It also relies on meetings with politically connected academics whose views span the spectrum. Finally, the analysis draws on many discussions with average Iranians from many backgrounds. Accurately reporting what they are saying does not constitute endorsement, but no responsible U.S. policymaker should be charting a course of action vis-a-vis Iran without at least taking into account what is being said-and what is believed--by his opposite numbers in Tehran.

Based on these observations, I believe--in contrast to what others are saying--that Iran is stable and that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has consolidated his power. If that is the case, the current deadlock is increasingly likely to become a U.S.-Iranian confrontation. As a result, Washington should pursue a better-informed policy and not throw in the towel on diplomacy unless Tehran forces it to do so.

Iranian Realities

IRAN HAS many power centers, including the presidency, the Majlis, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary and others. Supreme Leader Khamenei was always the primus inter pares, and he especially has had the final word on nuclear and foreign policy matters. He has now brought wayward institutions, including the presidency when it was held by reformist Mohamed Khatami, into line. Ahmadinejad is above all else loyal to the leader.

The president-elect will surely offer very hard-line security policy advice, stressing more aggressive policies and tougher negotiating tactics. The views of his new, conservative team will be buttressed by their close connection to...

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