Iran's regional policy: between radicalism and pragmatism.

• Author: Menashri, David
• Position: THE REGIONAL BALANCE

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a major turning point in the modern history of Iran, with reverberations far beyond its borders. Twenty-eight years on, the new regime is still searching for an appropriate approach to cope with the challenge of governance while it contends with domestic disenchantment, perpetual struggle for power between competing tendencies and grave regional and international challenges. (1)

Since the mid-1990s, the pro-reform camp has gained popular support and sustained control of the elected bodies of government. This is evident from Mohammed Khatami's presidency (1997), the reformists' dominance of the local councils (1999) and the Majlis (2000) and Khatami's reelection (2001). However, the conservatives have maintained their control over the non-elected institutions (such as the Council of Guardians, Council of Experts, Expediency Council and numerous extra-governmental bodies, in addition to the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah All Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini), thus preserving their ability to thwart crucial political, social and economic changes. Since then, the conservatives consolidated their control of the local councils (2003) and the Majlis (2004), culminating in 2005 with the ascendancy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who demonstrated adherence to the original revolutionary dogma more than any of the contesting candidates to the presidency. As a result, the policy of dialogue between civilizations, promoted by Khatami, was replaced by an eventual clash of civilizations; the process of reform gave way to growing conservatism, and the policy of detente--in regional and international relations--gave way to a growing tension. Iran's involvement in Iraq, in Lebanon and within the Palestinian Authority, combined with a determination to pursue its nuclear program, and the current president's incendiary statements (against the United States and Israel and regarding the Holocaust) have led Iran to stir up conflict with both its immediate neighbors and countries far from home.

This brief survey seeks to examine Iran's regional policy in the framework of the revolutionary experience and the recent changes in the domestic and international arena. Some key issues, such as Iran's nuclear policy, relations with the United States and the relative power of the different domestic factions--despite their direct bearing on our discussion--will be mentioned only briefly. Other important questions, like Iran's strategic alliance with Syria, the impact of the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and developments in the Gulf area are similarly not discussed. The first part of this essay focuses on the general trend of pragmatism in past Iranian regional policy, while the second part is limited to an examination of some of the main areas in which Iran has been recently involved--the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah and Iraq.

IRAN AND ITS TROUBLED NEIGHBORHOOD

The Islamic Revolution led to a dramatic change in Iran's foreign outlook and its international relations. For the new leaders of Iran, the Islamic Revolution was not just a title for a movement, but an ideal they wished to put into practice throughout the Muslim world. The Islamic regime viewed its victory as one stage in and an instrument of an overall change in the world of Islam--a model for imitation by other Muslims. "Our movement is for an Islamic goal, not for Iran alone," Khomeini said upon taking power. Iran was only "the starting point." Muslims "are one family," he added, "even if they live in regions remote from each other." (2) Even being Shia or Sunni "is not the question." (3) For many revolutionaries, the ultimate goal remained to launch an ideological crusade aimed at bringing the genuine messages of Islam to people everywhere. Assessments by Mohammed Javad Larijani (former Iranian deputy foreign minister) highlight the centrality of such a worldwide mission. Following the fall of the USSR, he stated that "the cresting of the Islamic movement will soon transform the face of the world" in the same manner the Renaissance changed Europe. (4) Just as the Renaissance "brought new fundamentals" of legitimacy, freedom and scientific progress to the West, so Islamism--launched from Iran--would have a similar impact: "We shall be the watchmen of this immense ideological political movement. We shall pave the way for the expansion and deepening of contemporary Islamism." (5) But such an approach--typical of revolutionary movements in history--always had a ritual rather than a pragmatic ring to it.

THE VALUE OF PRAGMATISM

As historian Roger Savory wrote, "Islamic tradition per se," may be "either quietist or activist," and to the extent that the Ithna Asahri (Shia) heritage is part of this tradition, "the same may be said about it." (6) In the past, attempts to actively propagate Shiism beyond Iran's borders have been pursued as a "result of factors such as religious persecution, economic opportunities, and the random exploitation of political opportunities," but were not "the result of state policy." (7) In this sense, Khomeini's ideology, "which sees the world in terms of apocalyptical struggle between the forces of good and evil," has initially "gone beyond traditional Ithna Asahri messianism." (8) In due time, however, the expressions regarding the export of the revolution, voiced in moments of enthusiasm in the early days of the revolution, were eventually toned down. In fact, sobering realities of years in power forced a significant departure from the professed revolutionary creed in favor of pragmatic considerations. While the revolutionary intent dictated the new regime's general outward approach, actual realities have often forced a somewhat greater realism and an emphasis on "reasons of the state" as opposed to "ideological crusade." (9)

Gradually, then, ideology was subordinated to interests and actual policy succeeded somehow in combining the early ideological conviction with a healthy dose of regard for national interests. With few exceptions, whenever ideological convictions have clashed with the interests of the state--as prescribed by the clerical ruling elite--state interests ultimately have superseded revolutionary dogma in both foreign relations and domestic politics. The change, noticeable already under Khomeini, became even more discernible following his death in 1989.

Although national considerations were alien to Khomeini's stated desire to expand Islamic influence throughout the Middle East, his regime chose to conduct its policy primarily from a perception of Iran's state interests. How does Iran's assertion that there is no difference between Muslims--either in ethnic or in sectarian affiliation--accord with the 1979 Constitution that establishes the necessity of both Shia and Iranian origin as prerequisites for presidential candidacy? To be sure, it is also difficult to reconcile the abhorrence of national divisions within the world of Islam with the insistence that the Gulf must be called Persian. (10) Evidently, Khomeini's ideology did not preclude close relations with Arab-nationalist and secular-Baathist Syria which has in fact turned into Iran's main regional ally.

Still, concerning the scope and depth of transformation, domestic factions widely differed in their approaches. The two primary groups in post-revolutionary politics--which were generally defined as reformists, pragmatists and moderates on the one hand, and conservatives, traditionalists and extremists on the other hand--were engaged in a struggle to dictate Iran's policies. Recently, following the emergence of Ahmadinejad, three main groups are usually identified: reformists, traditionalists and conservatives, or neoconservatives. While all have been part of what has been known in revolutionary parlance as "Imam Khomeini's Line," their differences are profound, encompassing major policy realms; this is a contest between the revolutionary ideals of 1979 and the spirit of the 1997 reform movement. Similarly, it is a contest between institutions of power and the emerging civil society, between the old guards and the new generation. While reformists support greater political freedom, economic openness and social change and advocate improved ties with the outside world, including the West, the conservatives emphasize the supremacy of dogma in formulating policy. It is a profound and vigorous debate based on pivotal questions of religion and state, idealism and national interest, isolation, globalization and the preferred attitude vis-a-vis the outside world. Thus, Iranian policy has developed into a dualistic, complex and intricate set of laws and strategies--generally characterized by pragmatism but streaked with radical guidelines for good measure.

An...