Iowa Right to Life Committee Inc. v. Tooker: the Eighth Circuit Ignores Citizens United by Striking Down an Iowa Campaign Finance Disclosure Requirement

• Publication year: 2022

48 Creighton L. Rev. 659. IOWA RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE INC. V. TOOKER: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IGNORES CITIZENS UNITED BY STRIKING DOWN AN IOWA CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT

IOWA RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE INC. V. TOOKER: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IGNORES CITIZENS UNITED BY STRIKING DOWN AN IOWA CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT

J. David Sund - '16

I. INTRODUCTION

In campaign finance law, governments typically enacted restrictions on individual and corporate contributions and expenditures in order to prevent corruption.(fn1) In recent years, however, courts have scaled back or struck down these restrictions as violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.(fn2) Courts have looked more favorably on disclosure or reporting requirements because they do not directly inhibit speech.(fn3)

In Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker,(fn4) a non-profit corporation challenged such a reporting requirement.(fn5) Iowa Right to Life ("IRTL") challenged an Iowa law that required ongoing reports from an individual or corporation making independent expenditures.(fn6) The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld some portions of the law, but determined the ongoing reports unconstitutionally infringed on IRTL's free speech.(fn7) The court stated IRTL should not be forced to choose between what it called burdensome regulatory requirements and the exercise of free speech.(fn8)

This Note will show that the Eighth Circuit erred by striking down Iowa's reporting requirements.(fn9) First, this Note will discuss the facts in Tooker, the procedural background of the case, and the panel's decision.(fn10) Next, this Note will expound upon the legal background of campaign finance decisions.(fn11) Such background will include the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,(fn12) which set forth a legal standard for reviewing campaign finance laws.(fn13) It will also include the challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,(fn14) including Citizens United v. FEC,(fn15) which changed the legal landscape for campaign finance.(fn16) This Note will discuss the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision in Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson,(fn17) which formed the basis for the court's ruling in Tooker.(fn18) The Analysis will show how the Eighth Circuit ignored Citizens United in Swanson and then repeated the same erroneous reasoning in Tooker.(fn19) Finally, this Note will conclude that the Eighth Circuit erred in striking down Iowa's disclosure laws.(fn20)

II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker,(fn21) a non-profit corporation in Iowa brought a constitutional challenge to the state's campaign finance laws.(fn22) Iowa Right to Life ("IRTL") filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against several Iowa government officials, including Megan Tooker in her official capacity as the executive director of the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board ("the Board") and the members of that same board.(fn23) IRTL alleged the challenged provisions of law unconstitutionally chilled its free speech rights to make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates.(fn24)

After the United States Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,(fn25) the State of Iowa changed its campaign finance laws.(fn26) Iowa law had previously prohibited campaign contributions and independent expenditures by corporations.(fn27) Under that law, corporations could form political committees to spend money on an election campaign.(fn28) The Court's ruling in Citizens United, which struck down federal limits on independent expenditures as a violation of free speech, invalidated Iowa's ban on independent expenditures.(fn29) Iowa amended its laws to eliminate the independent expenditure ban and require a termination report by groups that stop making independent expenditures.(fn30) The Board also made changes to administrative rules, creating independent expenditure committees that would be required to file statements under Iowa law.(fn31)

The new Iowa laws did not change the definition of a permanent organization or a political committee.(fn32) A political committee was an organization that spent over $750 in one calendar year to expressly advocate or oppose a candidate for office.(fn33) A permanent organization was a group that originally formed for some other purpose but temporarily engaged in election activities.(fn34) An independent expenditure committee was simply an organization required to report an independent expenditure statement.(fn35) Iowa law defined an independent expenditure as at least $750 of combined spending in express support of or opposition to a clearly identified candidate or ballot issue without coordination or approval from a candidate or committee.(fn36) The independent expenditure rules required an independent expenditure committee to file a statement of its independent expenditures and an initial report.(fn37) These reports were required within forty-eight hours of an independent expenditure of over $750.(fn38) The law also required such committees to file ongoing reports four times during election years and once a year during non-election years.(fn39) If the independent expenditure committee raised or spent over $1,000, it would file a supplemental report.(fn40) Lastly, a committee that ceased independent expenditures would file a termination report within thirty days.(fn41)

IRTL filed an action in district court claiming that it wanted to make an independent expenditure on behalf of a candidate for Attorney General, but did not do so due to the restrictions in Iowa's law.(fn42) IRTL's complaint alleged four counts against Iowa's campaign finance laws.(fn43) First, IRTL may have fallen under the definition of a political committee, which would unconstitutionally burden its free speech rights even though its major purpose was not express advocacy for election or nomination of candidates.(fn44) Second, the independent expenditure requirements were an unconstitutional burden on IRTL.(fn45) Third, the state's ban on corporate contributions was unconstitutional.(fn46) Finally, IRTL alleged a requirement that its board of directors must authorize, and an officer of the corporation must certify, that any independent expenditure was unconstitutional.(fn47)

The district court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction.(fn48) The district court reasoned that on the first count, IRTL was unlikely to prevail on the merits because it was unclear whether IRTL had standing to challenge the contested provisions.(fn49) On the second count, the court reasoned that the law was likely to withstand exacting scrutiny.(fn50) Discussing the third count, the court stated the decision in Citizens United had not struck down restrictions on corporate campaign contributions.(fn51) On the fourth count, the court found that IRTL had failed to reach its threshold burden on an equal protection claim.(fn52) The court found that IRTL was unlikely to succeed on the merits of any of its claims and denied the preliminary injunction.(fn53)

Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment.(fn54) The court granted Iowa's motion on three of IRTL's claims and certified two questions to the Iowa Supreme Court on the claim of the political committee restrictions in count one.(fn55) The district court found the ban on corporate contributions to be constitutional.(fn56) On the authorization and certification requirements, the court found IRTL did not have standing for its First Amendment claim and part of its equal protection claim and the provisions were constitutional.(fn57)

The court also upheld the independent expenditure reporting requirements.(fn58) The district court, relying on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit panel decision in Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson,(fn59) determined the law was properly tailored under the standard of exacting scrutiny.(fn60) Exacting scrutiny requires a substantial relation between the challenged provision and an important government interest.(fn61) The court noted that like the laws at issue in Swanson, Iowa's laws were no more burdensome than the disclosure requirements in Citizens United, which the Supreme Court upheld.(fn62) The court reasoned the State of Iowa had an important government interest in informing its citizens in a timely manner of who was behind independent expenditures.(fn63)

The Iowa Supreme Court answered two certified questions.(fn64) First, whether a corporation fitting IRTL's description would be considered an independent expenditure committee, a political committee, or both.(fn65) The Iowa Supreme Court answered that it would be an independent expenditure committee.(fn66) Second, the district court asked whether a corporation would become a permanent organization by making independent expenditures.(fn67) The Iowa Supreme Court said it would not.(fn68) The district court then found that IRTL lacked standing to pursue its claim on the political committee provisions.(fn69) IRTL appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.(fn70)

The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that IRTL lacked standing to challenge the political committee or permanent organization provisions.(fn71) The panel reasoned that because the Iowa Supreme Court had responded to the...