Investor Sentiment and Credit Default Swap Spreads During the Global Financial Crisis

Published date01 July 2017
AuthorYuen Jung Park,Jeehye Lee,Sol Kim
Date01 July 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/fut.21828
Investor Sentiment and Credit Default
Swap Spreads During the Global
Financial Crisis
Jeehye Lee, Sol Kim, and Yuen Jung Park*
This paper examines whether investor sentiment can predict credit default swap (CDS) spread
changes. Among several proxies for investor sentiment, change in equity putcall ratio
performs best in predicting variation in CDS spread changes in both rm- and portfolio-level
regressions; in particular, the explanatory power of this proxy is greater for non-investment-
grade rms than for investment-grade rms. More importantly, sentiment may be a critical
factor in determining CDS spread changes during the global nancial crisis and may best
explain the differences in CDS spread in the group of rms whose leverage ratio and stock
volatility are highest. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 37:660688, 2017
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent literature investigating credit spread changes focuses on nding the systematic
determinant to resolve the weak explanatory power of theoretical variables.
1
Avramov,
Jostova, and Philipov (2007) conduct a linear time series regression of differences in
corporate bond credit spread using a structural model incorporating macroeconomic
dummies and the Fama and French (1993) three factors (hereafter, FF factors). These
authors report that although the FF factors are signicant in the total sample, the explanatory
power of the FF factors are not observed when corporate bonds are categorized by the three
credit risk groupslow, medium, and high. Galil, Shapir, Amiram, and Ben (2014) propose a
model for CDS spread changes by analyzing the FF factors along with the Pastor and
Jeehye Lee is a graduate at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea. Sol Kim is at College of
Business, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea. Yuen Jung Park is at Department of Finance,
Hallym University, Gangwon-do, Korea. We thank the editor, Robert Webb, and an anonymous referee for
their valuable comments. We also thank discussant Professor Chan Shik Jung and seminar participants for
helpful suggestions at the 2015 Conference of the Asia-Pacic Association of Derivatives. This study was
written while the rst author was a student at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.
This work was supported by the Hallym University Research Fund, HRF-201602-009. This work was
supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2017.
JEL Classication: G01, G13, G14
*Correspondence author, Department of Finance, Hallym University, 1 Hallymdaehak-gil, Chuncheon, Gangwon-
do, Korea. Tel: þ82-33-248-1855, Fax: þ82-33-256-3424, e-mail: yjpark@hallym.ac.kr
Received February 2016; Accepted October 2016
1
The theoretical model shows a large gap from the historically observed credit spread. For example, Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001) show that the variablesof the theoretical model explain only a limited portion of credit spread changes of
bonds. In addition, using credit default swap (CDS) spreads as a proxy of credit risk, Ericsson et al. (2009) show that
theoretical variables have low explanatory power for credit spread changes.
The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 37, No. 7, 660688 (2017)
© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Published online 28 December 2016 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com).
DOI: 10.1002/fut.21828
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor and the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) ve factors
(henceforth, CRR factors). Although the coefcients are signicant only in the FF factor
model, insignicant coefcients are observed in the CRR and FF factor models in addition to
the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor.
The poor performance of such empirical studies of rational CDS spread determinants
motivates us to undertake a study considering factors beyond traditional structural
determinants. In this paper, we suggest a novel approach to the determination of corporate
credit spread and investigate whether credit default swap (CDS) spread changes can be well
predicted by investor sentiment proxies, utilizing a structural model that embeds theoretical
factors as control variables. Thus, we test the hypothesis that investor sentiment plays a role
in common or systematic risk factors for CDS spread changes, and we explore which
sentiment measure is the most effective determinant of CDS spread changes.
In addition, a second, more important hypothesis in the present research is that investor
sentiment explains CDS spread changes better in turbulent periods. Tang and Yan (2010)
empirically show that the interaction between default risk of CDS spread and investor
sentiment can be dependent on market states, such as bullish or bearish markets. Further,
Stambaugh et al. (2012) show that when sentiment is widespread in the market, limitations
on short sales play a major role in increasing the severity of asset mispricing. These authors
also hold that a higher level of sentiment, in turn generally considered as an indicator of a
downturn, is associated with more overpricing. Based on the theory of Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2012) as well as the results from Tang and Yan (2010), we conjecture that, in bad
economic times, overpricing boosted by the impediment to short selling hinders the hedging
of CDSs by equity or equity options and increases CDS spreads, whereas in stable periods the
effect of market-wide sentiment should not be strong, due to the absence of short selling
restrictions. Therefore, to examine the framework set forth in Stambaugh et al. (2012), we
divide the sample period into two periods: the pre-crisis period as a normal term and the
Global Financial Crisis period as a representative turbulent term.
This paper restricts examination to the Global Financial Crisis and does not include the
post-crisis period in the comparative sample. The reason for this is that asset prices in
the U.S. market were externally inuenced by several events originating in the debt problems
of Greece in the post-crisis period. Many studies report a contagion effect of the European
debt crisis. See for example, Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Gorea and Radev (2014), Kim,
Park, and Ryu (2016), and Mink and Haan (2013), among others. In this regard, the post-
crisis period in the U.S. market cannot be considered either a purely normal or purely
(endogenously) turbulent term.
To test our hypotheses, we perform both rm- and portfolio-level regressions. Although
most studies on credit risk conduct regression analyses only at the rm-level, a regression
analysis at the portfolio level is carried out here to alleviate the problem of idiosyncratic risk in
rm-level regressions. We build our 5 5 portfolios using the leverage ratio and stock
volatility of individual rms.
2
The main results of our empirical tests are as follows. First, most of the sentiment
proxies are economically signicant factors that explain CDS spread changes. Among the
sentiment measures, change in equity putcall ratio performs best in predicting CDS spread
2
In detail, the process of constructing portfolios follows Kim et al. (2017). We rst compute the time series averages
of volatility and leverage ratio for each corporation over the full sample period. Next, we set the upper and lower
limits of ve groups classied by the magnitude of the average leverage ratio and then, within a leverage ratio group,
set the upper and lower limits of ve groups classied by the magnitude of the average volatility. Each of the 285
rms are allocated to 1 of the 25 portfolios, classied by ve volatility and ve leverage ratio ranges. Finally, we
calculate the cross-sectional averages of the CDS spread, volatility, and leverage ratio for each portfolio, and
generate the time series of each variable for the 25 separate portfolios.
Investor Sentiment and Credit Default Swap Spreads 661

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