Introduction to Symposium on Tacit Collusion

DOI10.1177/0003603X9303800101
Date01 March 1993
Published date01 March 1993
Subject MatterArticle
The Antitrust Bulletin/Spring 1993
Introduction to symposium
on tacit collusion
BY JONATHAN B. BAKER*
1
The four articles in this symposium address antitrust's longstand-
ing and important problem
of
identifying and proving tacit collu-
sion among horizontal competitors under Sherman Act §1.1The
questions raised are hardy perennials: Should tacit collusion vio-
late
the
Sherman
Act? When may
courts
infer
an
agreement
among competitors to fix price from circumstantial evidence
of
parallel pricing? Do the legal standards for inferring ahorizontal
agreement from circumstantial evidence properly reflect the con-
temporary economic understanding
of
coordinated behaviort-Yet
it is timely to revisit these topics because
of
the recent attention
given them by state and federal enforcers.t and because recent
* Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Economics, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The views expressed in this introduction are not neces-
sarily those
of
the United States Department
of
Justice.
15 U.S.C. §1 (1988).
2See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990), cert, denied.
III
S.Ct. 2274 (1991) (consolidated proceeding involving suits brought by
several states); American Home Products Corp., 5Trade Reg. Rep.
e1993 by Federal Legal Publications. Inc.

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