Introduction: Symposium on HRM, “Big Government Conservatism,” and the Personnel Legacy of George W. Bush

• Date: 01 December 2010
• DOI: 10.1177/0734371X10384654
• Author: William G. Resh,Edmund C. Stazyk,Robert F. Durant
• Published date: 01 December 2010
• Subject Matter: Articles

30410.1177/0734371X10384654Durant
et al.Review of Public Personnel Administration
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Review of Public Personnel Administration
30(4) 372 –378
Introduction:
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“Big Government
Conservatism,” and
the Personnel Legacy
of George W. Bush
Robert F. Durant1, Edmund C. Stazyk1,
and William G. Resh1
In his book, History of the World, Sir Walter Raleigh warned historians of the dangers
of critiquing the events of one’s own days. Judging “truth too near the heels,” wrote
Raleigh, “[t]here is no mistress or guide that hath led her followers and servants into
greater miseries” of misinterpretation (cited in Baucom, 1992, p. xiii). Still, scholars
bent on rigorously, empirically, and systematically assessing events, activities, and
policy initiatives in any era depend on early evaluative efforts as they begin accumu-
lating evidence confirming, disconfirming, or amending more impressionistic con-
temporary judgments. This symposium joins that early evaluative task as it applies to
the emerging legacy of a key agenda component—federal human resource management
(HRM) policy—of one of the most controversial yet consequential presidencies in
U.S. history—that of George W. Bush.
If nothing else, Bush’s presidency has demonstrated that presidents “need not be
shackled by thin electoral margins, by bare majorities, in Congress, or by modest or
even low levels of popular approval” (Rockman, 2008, p. 328). However, as presidential
scholar Stephen Skowronek (2008) so aptly puts it, while all presidents bring about
change, it is seldom in the direction they expect. Prompted by this insight, we aim in
this symposium to join other early scholarship seeking a dispassionate assessment of
key components of the Bush administration’s efforts to enact the president’s vision of
1American University, Washington, DC
Corresponding Author:
Robert F. Durant, School of Public Affairs, Department of Public Administration and Policy,
American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016
Email: durant@american.edu

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Durant et al.
373
“big government conservatism” during his turbulent tenure in office—in this case,
involving federal personnel policy (e.g., Campbell, Rockman, & Rudalevige, 2008;
Maranto, Lansford, & Johnson, 2009; Schier, 2009a, 2009b).
This aim requires us first to come to terms with what big government conservatism
(or “heroic conservatism”) means. First, Bush did not choose this label for his efforts.
Rather, it was coined by various supporters and opponents to characterize Bush’s efforts
to build a permanent conservative electoral coalition in America, one that adapted Rea-
ganism to changed conditions (demographic, cultural, and philosophical changes speeding
up in America; Brooks, 2004; Gerson, 2008). As Lara Brown notes, Bush “was socially
and economically conservative, but he was also a government activist” in pursuing those
aims (2009, p. 80). As a heroic conservative himself, columnist David Brooks captured
it best early in the Bush presidency: “Bush understood that the simple government-is-the-
problem philosophy of the older [Reagan] Republicans was obsolete . . . [and he grasped]
the paradox that if you don’t have a positive vision of government, you won’t be able
to limit the growth of government” (2004, para. 19-20). Put differently, Bush understood
that government could be used actively to advance conservative principles.
At an operational level, this meant that Bush’s efforts were destined to run pell-mell
into not only normal partisan opposition but also significant “old Republican” rear-guard
action. As Michael Gerson puts it,
He (Bush) defined a series of traditionally liberal goals: better education for minor-
ity children, help for addicts and the homeless, prescription drugs for the elderly.
This, in his view, required a strong, energetic executive to break up existing bureau-
cratic arrangements—the use of federal power to push power beyond government.
And this willingness to use executive power put him at odds with some in the
...