Introduction: Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights—Legal and Economic Perspectives

• Author: Robert J. Levinson
• DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1405900201
• Published date: 01 June 2014
• Date: 01 June 2014

THE ANTITRUST BUL L E T I N :Vol. 59, N o. 2/Summ er 2014 :173

Introduction: Competition policy

and intellectual property rights—

legal and economic perspectives

BY ROBERT J. LEVINSO N*

This symposium issue of The Antitrust Bulletin considers, from legal,

economic, and historical perspectives, a number of topics at the junc-

ture of antitrust policy and intellectua l property rights. Intellectual

property rights and competition policy can, and frequently do, act in

harmony. The U.S. antitrust authorities have clearly articulated the

central role of innovation in fostering competition.1The U.S. Constitu-

© 2014by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.

* Vice President, Antitrust and Competition Economics Practice, Charles

River Associates.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: Robert Harris and Anne Layne-Farrar provided helpful comments

on an earlier d raft of this ar ticle. Any er rors in this art icle are mine. T he views

expressed in this article are mine and do not purport to reflect those of Charles River

Associates or any of its other officers, affiliates, or employees.

1U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINESFOR

THE LICEN SING OF INTE LLECTU AL PROPERT Y § 1.0 (Ap r. 6, 1995) , available at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [hereinafter

DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES] (“The intellectual property laws and the antitrustlaws

share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer

welfare. The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and

its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property

rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and

original works of expression. In the absence of intellectual property rights, imi-

tators could more rapidly exploit the efforts of innovators and investors with-

out compensatio n. Rapid imitation w ould reduce the comm ercial va lue of