Introduction

• Author: John Norton Moore
• Pages: 225

W e have a distinguished panel of experts addressing issues associated with collateral damage. That general rubric would include issues that are dealt with in Protocol I, referred to as excessive civilian damage in attacks on otherwise lawful targets, and issues regarding feasible precautions in attacking.

I have three brief points that I would like to put before us before turning to the panelists. The first is for us to consider just how far we have come in relation to the systematic inclusion of the laws of war in military operations and to reflect for a moment on the creation of the field called operational law in the United States. As I think everyone in this room knows full well, the United States and particularly the US military had a sorry experience in Vietnam.

When the war was over and we looked back and sought to look at the lessons learned about Vietnam, a number of things emerged that were very important in relation to the laws of war. The first of those is that we had not trained as adequately in the laws of war as we should have. The result was a My Lai which had enormous cost for the United States in that war. We also found that one of the problems was a series of areas of advice given and constraints placed on the United States military ostensibly designed for ethical and law of war reasons, but in fact uninformed about proper targeting and correct operation of the law of war. The result was a series of inhibitions that were not required by the law of war and which dramatically stretched out the war and perhaps in the end cost the United States the war in Vietnam.

After Vietnam there was a review, led for the most part by the US military, that said in effect 'We're going to have to...