Intra-Military Divisions and Democratization in South Korea

• Published date: 01 October 2013
• Author: Insoo Kim
• Date: 01 October 2013
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X12454533
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article
Armed Forces & Society
39(4) 695-710
Intra-Military Divisions
ª The Author(s) 2012
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and Democratization in
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X12454533
afs.sagepub.com
South Korea
Insoo Kim1
Abstract
This paper investigates how a highly politicized system of military reshuffling under
the authoritarian military regime contributed to the transition to democracy in
South Korea in the 1980s. Through an analysis of individual data on 2,666 Korean
Military Academy (KMA) graduates, this study shows that promotion policies
favored a small group of KMA graduates, called the Hana faction, who were
preferentially treated in military promotions and recruited into the military
leadership. These biased promotion procedures undermined the cohesion within
the military as the marginalized non-Hana faction graduates became increasingly
resistant to the subordination of their Hana faction superiors. This disintegration
of military cohesion ultimately reduced the regime’s capacity to block the
transition to democracy.
Keywords
democratization, South Korea, military organization, intra-military conflict
Introduction
South Korea offers an extraordinary case of successful democratization in a former
military regime. Recent work interpreted this as the triumph of civil society over the
1 Department of Political Science, Korea Military Academy, Seoul, South Korea
Corresponding Author:
Insoo Kim, Department of Political Science, Korea Military Academy, P.O.B. 77-2 Nowon-Gu
Kongreung-Dong, Seoul, 139-799, South Korea.
Email: kma6453@gmail.com

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Armed Forces & Society 39(4)
military.1 This approach appears to assume that the political relation between mili-
tary government and civil society is a zero-sum game, overlooking the wisdom that
‘‘armies with high internal cohesion will have greater capacity to intervene in
domestic politics.’’2 The central premise of this study is that no matter how great
their size and strength, civil society alone cannot explain democratic transition.
Political transition to democracy is explained at least as much by intra-military con-
flict as it is by the growth of civil society.
This article examines how a highly politicized system of military reshuffling
under South Korea’s military rule (1979-1993) dissolved intra-military cohesion,
unintentionally eroding the capacity of the authoritarian regime to block the transi-
tion to democracy. The article is organized in four sections. The first section presents
a brief history of South Korea’s democratization. The second section reviews the
existing literature on transition to democratization. The third and forth sections
demonstrate that in South Korea in the 1980s, a highly politicized system of military
reshuffling restricted the regular circulation of military elites, and discontented offi-
cers came to see political transition to democracy as a viable means of replacing
those in power. In the conclusion the findings of this study are summarized addres-
sing the meaningful implications with respect to the effect of military organizational
structure on political transition.
A Brief History of South Korea’s Democratization
In 1961 the South Korean military entered politics through a military coup headed by
General Park Chung-hee. After retiring from active service, General Park Chunge-
hee was elected as president in 1963 and in 1967. In 1969, President Park revised the
constitution so that he could run for a third term in 1971 and was re-elected as pres-
ident. In 1971 however his party lost the two-thirds majority in the National Assem-
bly, and he could not revise the constitution any more to extend his rule. This forced
him to declare a national emergency in 1971 and, subsequently, martial law in 1972.
On October 26, 1979, President Park was fatally shot by the chief of the Korean CIA,
Kim Jae-kyu. On December 12, 1979, the commander of the Defense Security Com-
mand (DSC), General Chun Do-hwan, arrested the chief of general staff, General
Jeong Seung-hwa, charging him with the involvement in President Park’s assassina-
tion. This incident is often called the 12-12 military mutiny.
The 12-12 military mutiny had its origin in a power struggle between the old gen-
erals (pre–Korean War generation) and the group of young generals who had been
trained in the Korean Military Academy (KMA; post–Korean War generation).3 The
old generals expressed their opinion that they did their best to suppress the military
mutiny staged by General Chun but faced the resistance of their subordinates who
were mostly drawn from the KMA graduates. This is at least in part because the
mutiny’s leadership consisted of KMA-trained generals who could successfully
exploit the resentment that KMA-trained officers felt toward a system of reshuffling
biased against them. Ironically, the four-year-long military education at the

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prestigious military academy delayed promotion in comparison to the officers
trained at other military schools. Whereas KMA graduates entered the military acad-
emy and were commissioned as second lieutenants after a four-year education, other
officers entered the military and were commissioned in the same year. When KMA
graduates were commissioned as second lieutenants, other officers who entered
other military schools in the same year reached the rank of captain or major.
The South Korean Army leadership, made up mostly of the old generals, consid-
ered this delayed promotion legitimate and took no measures to reform the practice.4
Therefore, the KMA graduates, marginalized by the old generals, had a clear reason
to cut off the efforts of the old generals to suppress the military mutiny. As the KMA
graduates refused to engage their alumni in the rebels’ camp, the formal chain of
command headed by the old generals dissolved.5 In the aftermath of the 12-12
military mutiny, the old generals were replaced and the barriers that hindered the
KMA graduates’ ascension to the upper ranks of the armed forces were eliminated.6
On May 16, 1980, anti-military demonstrations took place at Seoul Station, bring-
ing together over 100,000 students and citizens. In reaction to this political crisis, on
May 17, 1980, General Chun Doo-hwan assumed state power. Expanding martial
law to the entire country, he dissolved the National Assembly and banned all polit-
ical activities. On May 18, 1980, in defiance of a military ban on political activities
200 college students protested in Kwangju, the capital of Cholla province. On May
19, 1980, General Chun moved paratrooper units to Kwangju to crush the protesters.
On May 20, 1980, 300,000 attended the large street demonstrations in Kwangju to
demand the immediate withdrawal of these martial law troops. On May 21, 1980,
the resistance was suppressed in a brutal crackdown, and on August 27, 1980, Gen-
eral Chun was elected president through indirect presidential elections.
In the late 1980s, mass protests throughout South Korea called for the end of the
military regime. Despite the fact that President Chun repeatedly promised that he
would not serve past the limits of his term, thousands of students poured into the
street calling for direct presidential elections and the end of military rule. Demon-
strations reached their peak after June 10, 1987. In response to this political crisis,
President Chun ordered the military to prepare the enforcement of martial law.7
In spite of multiple rumors that President Chun would declare martial law and quash
demonstrators, he accommodated the opposition’s demands for free presidential
election. However, the competition between two opposition party leaders—Kim
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung—allowed President Chun’s colleague, former Army
general Roh Tae-woo, to win the presidential election in 1987.
In 1992, Kim Young-sam elected as the first truly civilian president since the mil-
itary coup of 1961. He ordered the prosecution of the Chun and Roh and the generals
involved in the 12-12 military mutiny of 1979 and the Kwangju massacre of 1980.
They were sentenced to penalties ranging from three years to life in prison.
Compared to other countries, where intense military resistance blocked human
rights initiatives, South Korea offers an extraordinary case of the successful inves-
tigation of the military’s human right violations.8 South Korea’s transitional process

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Armed Forces & Society 39(4)
to democracy in the 1980s suggests that the military’s capacity to block the transition
to democracy has decreased since the military mutiny of 1979. This is a result of the
fact that the military successfully suppressed popular uprisings in 1980 but could not
fend off the transition to democracy in 1987 nor Kim Young-sam’s purges in 1993.
In the next section, theories that emphasize socioeconomic development as a driving
force of democratization are reviewed to provide some guidance in explaining the
behavior of the South Korean military.
Socioeconomic Development and Democratization
The structural approach to democratization sees democratization as reflecting
changes in class power: capitalist development creates favorable conditions for
democratization by enlarging the working (or middle) class and reinforcing its
capacity for mass pressure.9 From this perspective democratization may come...