Interrogational Torture

• Date: 01 March 2012
• Published date: 01 March 2012
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912911430670
• Author: John W. Schiemann
• Subject Matter: Exchange

430670PRQ65110.1177/1065912911430670
Political Research Quarterly
65(1) 3 –19
Interrogational Torture: Or How
© 2012 University of Utah
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Good Guys Get Bad Information
DOI: 10.1177/1065912911430670
http://prq.sagepub.com
with Ugly Methods
John W. Schiemann1
Abstract
Debate about the sources of intelligence leading to bin Laden’s location has revived the question as to whether
interrogational torture is effective. Answering this question is a necessary—if not sufficient—condition for any
justification of interrogational torture. Given the impossibility of approaching the question empirically, I address
it theoretically, asking whether the use of torture to extract information satisfies reasonable expectations about
reliability of information as well as normative constraints on the frequency and intensity of torture. I find that although
information from interrogational torture is unreliable, it is likely to be used frequently and harshly.
Keywords
torture, interrogation, enhanced interrogation techniques, political theory
Competing claims about the source of the intelligence
to emerge given security concerns, fall short of the social
that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2,
scientific standard required to draw firm conclusions,
2011, have revived the debate about the effectiveness
certainly for torture proponents. Yet determining whether
of the Bush administration’s “enhanced interrogation”
interrogational torture works—defined as providing clear
techniques—which many say amount to torture (Levinson
and valuable information to the state—is essential. First,
2004; Greenberg 2006).1 To the degree that political phi-
if it does not work, then the main rationale for its use—it
losophy is concerned with the proper balance between
is the only method we have left when detainees refuse
legitimate state authority, including violence, on one
to talk—disappears, and any further use is pure sadism.
hand, and individual autonomy, including autonomy of
Second, if it does not work, then that means interrogators
the body, on the other hand, then interrogational torture is
are not getting the information necessary to save lives.
also an important problem in normative political theory.
Even its proponents would argue against it under these
This article aims to provide insight on an important—but
conditions. As Bagaric and Clarke (2007, 53) admit in
less systematically examined—aspect of this problem:
their utilitarian defense of torture, this is a “knock-down
the effectiveness of interrogational torture in revealing
argument” for, “if this objection were valid [they] would
clear and accurate information to the state. It may be that
change [their] minds and not countenance torture in any
interrogational torture cannot be justified under any cir-
circumstances.”
cumstances, but if it is to be justified at all, it must be
This article examines whether torture is effective in
effective. Interrogational torture’s effectiveness is a
revealing reliable information and at what cost in terms of
necessary, if not necessarily sufficient, condition for its
the frequency and intensity of the torture employed, even
justification.
under limited conditions and with restrictions such as the
Despite the importance of this practical question, there
“torture warrants” suggested by Alan Dershowitz or the
is little consensus among policy makers, academics, or
“torture thresholds” suggested by Bagaric and Clarke
even interrogators on whether interrogational torture
(Dershowitz 2003; Bagaric and Clarke 2007, 38-39).
works (Appendix A1).2 In large part this is because “the
empirical material . . . is . . . too fragmentary to allow for
1Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, NJ, USA
precise, validated causal claims” (Rejali 2007, 7). As a
result torture proponents are quick to dismiss any evi-
Corresponding Author:
dence as “a distracting and superficial numbers game”
John W. Schiemann, Department of Social Sciences & History,
Fairleigh Dickinson University, M-MS3-02, 285 Madison Avenue,
(Bagaric and Clarke 2007, 58). In short, the data thus far
Madison, NJ 07940
made available, even by Rejali, as well as any data likely
Email: jws@fdu.edu

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4
Political Research Quarterly 65(1)
Given the absence of any reliable and systematic data
model. The goal here is to see if the outcomes of the ana-
from either the field or the laboratory on the effectiveness
lytical model support or undermine the normative model.
of torture, the article investigates this question theoreti-
The fourth section concludes by discussing some impli-
cally. I employ the tools of game theory—the theory of
cations for state-sanctioned interrogational torture.
interdependent, strategic choice—to examine the effec-
tiveness of interrogational torture on the part of a state that
A Normative Model of
generally prefers not to use torture, but will do so if it
believes it necessary. I examine the necessary and suffi-
Interrogational Torture
cient conditions for torture by a pragmatic state to gener-
The pragmatic defense of limited, last-resort interroga-
ate equilibria that include clear and valuable information
tional torture rests on certain constraints on the way in
and little “unnecessary” torture.3 Game theory allows us
which torture is employed as well as the expectation it will
to build an analytical model of restricted, limited interro-
be effective in revealing valuable information. I focus on
gational torture incorporating realistic elements and
two normative principles concerning the regulation of
corresponding to what one might call the pragmatically
torture as state-sanctioned violence and an epistemic prin-
normative view of interrogational torture: that “limited”
ciple concerning the information generated by torture.
or “restrained” torture is unfortunately necessary in lim-
The normative principles define two constraints on
ited cases. It is then possible to compare the outcomes of
the use of torture by the state: frequency and intensity.
the analytical model with the criteria defining the norma-
If torture is used as a last resort by a democratic state on
tive model of interrogational torture’s proponents (e.g.,
known guilty, knowledgeable detainees who fail to pro-
Bagaric and Clarke 2007; Dershowitz 2003; McCarthy
vide valuable information via other methods, and in
2006). The analytical model’s outcomes thus substitute
cases where innocent lives are threatened, then it should
for the empirical data we do not—and likely will not
be used relatively infrequently. As prominent propo-
ever—have to assess torture’s effectiveness. If the ana-
nents state, “[T]orture should be confined to situations
lytical model’s results satisfy the normative criteria, then
where the right to life is imperiled” (Bagaric and
the effectiveness part of the pragmatic argument for inter-
Clarke 2007, 35). Similarly, “when [torture] is used,
rogational torture is supported.4 If the model outcomes
the minimum degree of pain necessary should be used to
fail to satisfy those criteria, then support for even limited
obtain the information” (Bagaric and Clarke 2007, 36;
state-sanctioned torture falters. Since my goal is to address
also see Dershowitz 2003, 281). Whatever the (de)mer-
the problem of interrogational torture and since the
its of the legal reasoning behind them, Bush Justice
intended audience includes all those interested in this
Department memos justifying interrogation methods
problem—not just those interested in (or familiar with)
amounting to torture clearly emphasize the importance
game theory—the discussion in the main text is nonformal
of these minimization criteria in their repeated refer-
(and so occasionally somewhat imprecise). The formal
ences to safeguards, precautions, and escalation of tech-
description of the model, a discussion of specification
niques (e.g., Bybee 2002; also see the CIA’s inspector
choices, derivation, and proofs of the equilibria, compara-
general report, CIA 2004). Torture should be minimized
tive statics analysis of thresholds, and proofs of the prop-
in intensity as well as frequency.
ositions are all available in Appendices B–F.
In addition to constraints on how torture is actually
The article proceeds as follows. The first section out-
implemented in interrogations, the normative model of
lines a normative model of pragmatic interrogational tor-
pragmatic interrogational torture also relies on a necessary
ture. The point of this model of torture as last resort is to
epistemic condition concerning the information gained
identify, first, constraints on the use of torture in interro-
through interrogational torture: reliability.5 As Roger
gations and, second, the anticipated consequences of
Koppl (2006, 91, 94) has shown, interrogational torture is
employing interrogational torture, including the expected
(supposed to be) an epistemic system, a social process
reliability of the information gathered and the degree to
designed to generate true judgments, and the measure of
which torture is employed (severity and frequency).
an epistemic system’s success is its reliability, a high
Together they define how torture should work on the
“ratio of true judgments to total judgments.” In the case of
pragmatic view. The second section develops two vari-
interrogational torture, “truthful...