Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide: A Bridge over Troubled Waters

• Author: Charles H. B. Garraway
• Position: Was the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the US Naval War Collegefor academic year 2004-2005
• Pages: 337-355

Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide:

ABridge over Troubled Waters

Charles H. B. Garraway1

9/11 has now passed into folklore. As everybody, in another generation, can re-

call where they were when they heard of the assassination of President Ken-

nedy, so for this, the first information ofthe terrible events that unfolded that bright

September day are indelibly engraved on the memory. Iam amember of both gener-

ations and just as Ican recall standing in my school dormitory in England, frozen

with horror, at the news from Dallas, so Irecall the cold shiver down my spine as I

stood on the second tee ofthe famous Berkshire Golf Club, hearing on aradio, going

full volume on alocal building site, the chilling account of what was happening in

NewYork. By the time Ireturned to the Club House, the news from Washington and

Pennsylvania was also in. The world would never be the same again.

The purpose ofthis article is to look at the effect of9/1 1on the field ofinternational

and operational law, in particular on interoperability between the United States and

Europe. For most of the last century, the United States and Europe (the United King-

dom in particular), have worked together in the military field, to the great benefit of

world peace. It has been like amarriage. We have been comfortable together and

learned to work together, recognizing each others foibles. Difficulties have been over-

come with good will and awillingness to appreciate one another's point ofview. How-

ever, Iwill be suggesting in this analysis that there seems now to be less understanding

and more talking across each other. I, like agood marriage guidance counselor, will

Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide: ABridge over Troubled Waters

seek to go behind the rhetoric and try to look at what Isee as the underlying causes of

this malaise. In medical terms, Iwill try to look at the root of the illness rather than the

symptoms. That may involve analyzing some difficult, and indeed sensitive, areas.

Ispent most of my career in the UK Army working in the field of international,

and what we now call operational, law. To me, the former is the academic side and

the latter, in relation to the law of armed conflict, the practical application. Both go

hand in glove. One of the advantages of being amilitary lawyer is that one can mix

the academic and the practical, checking out the theory on the sounding board of

fact. The battlefield is avery practical place. There is no room for ivory towers or fine

theories. Delays can cost lives. Decisions have to be instant. The law of good faith is

often the lodestone. Over the years, Ihave learned that the law of armed conflict is a

vital tool in the commander's tool box. However, just as with the myriad of other

tools that can be found in that box, it must prove its usefulness if it is not to be dis-

carded. Law that is impracticable will be disregarded on the battlefield. That is afact

and those of us involved in the negotiation of international treaties and the develop-

ment ofinternational law forget that at our peril. The law of armed conflict is in some

ways aFaustian pact between the interests of humanity and military reality. If the

balance tilts too far in either direction the result is abreakdown in the whole system.

Much of my professional life has also been spent working with US forces. From

my early days as ayoung officer at the US Army JAG School at Charlottesville, Vir-

ginia, through atour at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium, to

Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Ihave worked alongside my US colleagues in friend-

ship and harmony. We have shared ideas and, on the surprisingly few occasions

when we have disagreed, we have worked together to find practical solutions to the

practical problems that we have encountered. As aresult, Ihave rarely found any se-

rious interoperability problems on the ground between UK and US forces.

But things are beginning to change. Since 9/11, there seems to have been an in-

creasing disconnect between the United States and Europe. That appeared to reach

its climax in the unseemly rows over the questions raised by Operation Iraqi Free-

dom.2The divide between the United States and what Secretary Rumsfeld de-

scribed as "Old Europe"3opened into achasm. The distrust, and in some cases,

open dislike, that has developed will take along time to overcome. The old "en-

tente cordiale" appears to have broken down and even within the "special rela-

tionship," there seem to be strains appearing. The United States and the United

Kingdom appear at times to be moving along diverging tracks. Tony Blair, in at-

tempting to form abridge between the United States and Europe has found him-

self like arider trying to sit astride two horses at the same time. At times those

horses have moved further apart than has been good for the health of the rider.

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