International Development NGOs and Bureaucratic Capacity: Facilitator or Destroyer?
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912918772941 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Author | Susanna Campbell,Amanda Murdie,Matthew DiGiuseppe |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2019, Vol. 72(1) 3 –18
International Development NGOs
© 2018 University of Utah
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and Bureaucratic Capacity: Facilitator
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918772941
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918772941
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
or Destroyer?
Susanna Campbell1, Matthew DiGiuseppe2, and Amanda Murdie3
Abstract
Do development international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) facilitate or destroy the bureaucratic capacity
of the states in which they operate? The literature is split on this question. Some scholars argue that development
INGOs weaken state capacity by delivering social services that the government is supposed to provide. Others
argue that by increasing a country’s domestic demand for improved human rights, development INGOs improve a
government’s capacity to fulfill them. In this paper, we show that the effect of development INGOs on state capacity
depends on whether a state is democratic or nondemocratic. In our cross-sectional time-series analysis, we find
that development INGO presence has a significant positive relationship with state capacity in democracies but no
relationship with state capacity in nondemocratic states. These findings help explain the inconsistent claims in the
existing INGO literature and are also relevant for development INGOs and the policymakers that support them.
Keywords
INGO, civil society, state capacity, bureaucratic capacity, regime type
Introduction
community development by reducing state capacity to
deliver social services (Ell 2008; Kalb 2006; Karajkov
How does the presence of development international non-
2007). According to this critique, by providing services in
governmental organizations (INGOs), like Oxfam or
lieu of the state, development INGOs relieve the state of
CARE International, influence bureaucratic capacity in
popular pressure for the bureaucratic capacity necessary
the countries where they operate?1 Development INGOs
to deliver social services (Bodea and LeBas 2016; Bratton
engage in both service delivery—providing social ser-
1989; Ell 2008; Kalb 2006; Karajkov 2007).
vices, like nutrition or sanitation services, in the develop-
The literature on INGO advocacy, for its part, argues
ing world—and advocate for governments to provide
that advocacy by development INGOs may strengthen
improved social services to their own populations (Union
bureaucratic capacity and improve state-society relations
of International Associations [UIA] 2013/2014; Uvin
(Keck and Sikkink 1999; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).
2007). Bureaucratic capacity is defined as the quality and
The literature on Transnational Advocacy Networks
consistency of a state’s delivery of goods and services
(TANs) finds that INGO advocacy can encourage domes-
(International Country Risk Guide [ICRG] 2012). tic civil society actors to demand that their governments
Development INGOs aim to substitute for weak bureau-
respect human rights, including economic, social, and
cratic capacity by providing social services themselves
cultural rights (Keck and Sikkink 1999; United Nations
and strengthen bureaucratic capacity by working with
General Assembly 1986). These INGO–civil society
governments and advocating for the improvement of their
linkages can, in turn, enable the emergence of larger domes-
social services (Fowler 1991; Oxfam International 2015;
tic and international social movements and, in certain
Uvin 2007). In reality, how do development INGOs influ-
ence state bureaucratic capacity?2 Does their involvement
1
actually contribute to these dual, bottom-up and top-
American University, Washington, DC, USA
2The University of Mississippi, Oxford, USA
down, poverty alleviation aims?
3University of Georgia, Athens, USA
Although early literature on development INGOs consid-
ered them the “magic bullet” for community-based devel-
Corresponding Author:
Amanda Murdie, University of Georgia, 327 Candler Hall, Athens,
opment, many practitioner and scholarly critiques argue
GA 30602, USA.
that development INGOs, in fact, undermine long-term
Email: murdie@uga.edu
4
Political Research Quarterly 72(1)
situations, lead to actual reductions in the levels of human
As outlined in selectorate theory, democratic regimes are
rights abuses by government actors (Hendrix and Wong
incentivized to respond to the demands of the broader
2013; Keck and Sikkink 1999; Murdie 2014). Better
population (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011), making
human rights practices by states are, in turn, associated
them more likely than nondemocratic regimes to respond
with improvements in state capacity (Englehart 2009). In
to this popular pressure by increasing the state’s bureau-
addition, scholarship on the role of advocacy in the rights-
cratic capacity and related service-delivery capacity
based approach to development argues that INGO advo-
(Kosack 2003, 13; Rodrik 1999). Autocratic states, on the
cacy and direct cooperation with governments will lead
other hand, tend to respond to the interests of a narrow
to increased bureaucratic capacity in response to increased
group of elites rather than the broader population, making
citizen demand (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004;
them less likely than democratic states to respond posi-
Jonsson 2003; Uvin 2004, 2007). In sum, instead of sub-
tively to population demands for increasing bureaucratic
stituting for the state, the literature on INGO advocacy
capacity (Kosack 2003; Lake and Baum 2001).
would contend that INGOs often complement the state’s
Second, development INGOs and democratic regimes
bureaucratic capacity.
are more likely to cooperate directly because they share a
These two arguments concerning the relationship
commitment to political pluralism and respect for the
between development INGOs and bureaucratic capacity
population’s rights (Bratton 1989). Democratic regimes
are diametrically opposed. Are development INGOs sub-
are more likely than nondemocratic regimes to embrace
stitutes or complements for the state? Does their presence
and permit development INGOs’ right-based focus and
harm state capacity or do development INGOs actually
related advocacy efforts (Bush 2015). Nondemocratic
enable a well-functioning state? While existing argu-
regimes may still work with INGOs when they support
ments identify the potential disparate effects of develop-
their goals and the desires of their selectorate (Teets
ment INGOs on bureaucratic capacity, extant literature
2014) but may be more restrictive in what they allow
fails to examine the conditions under which these INGOs
INGOs to do within their borders (Carothers and
may contribute to divergent outcomes. We contend this is
Brenchenmacher 2014; Cooley 2015; Hayman 2016).
due to the omission of a critical conditioning factor: the
Furthermore, development INGOs are likely to be more
regime type of the state where the development INGO is
comfortable collaborating directly with democratic
operating. While the literature on the relationship between
regimes than with nondemocratic regimes, for fear of
international aid and economic development has identi-
legitimizing their “unjust social order” (Bratton 1989,
fied the crucial conditioning role of regime type, the lit-
584). By working directly with the state to deliver goods
erature on INGOs has largely ignored the role of regime
and services, development INGOs can, thus, reinforce
type and the ways in which regime type can condition the
democratic states’ bureaucratic capacity.
effect of INGOs on bureaucratic capacity. We argue that
As such, our argument and findings support the existing
regime type moderates the relationship between develop-
literature’s assertion that development INGOs can play an
ment INGOs and bureaucratic capacity and that it is the
important role in supporting the claims of domestic civil
critical missing element in disentangling divergent argu-
society, which we theorize is due to a new causal mecha-
ments of whether development INGOs help or harm a
nism through which development INGOs bolster bureau-
state’s bureaucratic capacity. In democratic regimes,
cratic capacity—directly collaborating with the state to
development INGOs are able to aid in the development of
implement development projects—in addition to direct or
bureaucratic capacity. In nondemocratic regimes, devel-
indirect advocacy for changes in state bureaucratic capac-
opment INGOs are not.
ity. These mechanisms are dependent, however, on the
There are two interrelated causal mechanisms that
regime type of the state where the INGO is working.
help explain the long-term positive effects of develop-
Using a cross-sectional-time-series analysis of the
ment INGOs on bureaucratic capacity in democratic
short- and long-term effects of development INGO presence
regimes. First, development INGOs can increase popular
on bureaucratic capacity in developing countries (non-
demand for effective goods and services from the state.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
By buttressing the service delivery capacity of the state,
[OECD]), we find that the positive relationship between
development INGOs can demonstrate the value of development INGOs and bureaucratic capacity is largely
improved service delivery,...
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