Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: a Case Study

• Author: Paul Marantz
• DOI: 10.1177/106591297502800108
• Published date: 01 March 1975
• Date: 01 March 1975
• Subject Matter: Articles

130

INTERNAL

POLITICS

AND

SOVIET

FOREIGN

POLICY:

A

CASE

STUDY

PAUL

MARANTZ

University

of

British

Columbia

N

RECENT

years,

the

realms

of

domestic

and

foreign policy

in

the

Soviet

I

Union

have

become

increasingly

interconnected

and

interdependent.

It

is

-*-

clear,

for

example,

that

the

current

d6tente

is

a

product

not

just

of

external

considerations

(the

Sino-Soviet

conflict,

West

Germany’s

Ostpolitik,

changes

in

American

foreign

policy,

etc.),

but

of

domestic

concerns

too

(agricultural

difficulties,

pronounced

technological

deficiencies).

Conversely,

decisions

which

might

be

thought

of

as

basically

domestic

in

nature

(the

treatment

of

Solzhen-

itsyn,

Sakharov

and

other

dissidents,

the

imposition

of

an

exit

tax

on

emigrating

Jews,

or

the

jamming

of

foreign

broadcasts)

are

now

heavily

influenced

by

foreign

policy

considerations.

Stalin

did

not

have

to

frame

his

foreign

policy

with

an

eye

to

domestic

opponents

nor

be

concerned

that

a

foreign

set-back

would

seriously

damage

his

domestic

standing.

Brezhnev

is

not

so

fortunate.

It

is

unfortunate-though

understanable-that

students

of

linkage

phe-

nomena

have

been

slow

to

bring

the

Soviet

Union

into

their

purview.

For

many

years,

under

the

influence

of

the

totalitarian

model,

it

was

widely

assumed

that

the

leaders

of

the

Soviet

Union

were

able

both

to

insulate

domestic

politics

from

unwanted

foreign

influences

and

to

formulate

their

foreign

policy

in

a

setting

divorced

from

domestic

constraints

and

pressures.

Until

relatively

recently,

most

studies

of

Soviet

foreign

policy

revolved

around

the

question

of

the

role

of

ideology

in

determining

Soviet

conduct.

Although

there

were

significant

differences

even

within

this

approach-with

some

analysts

pointing

to

the

&dquo;Soviet

Design

for

a

World

State&dquo;

and

a

&dquo;Communist

Blueprint

for

Victory,&dquo;

while

others

postulated

a

more

subtle

relationship

between

policy

and

doctrine-

the

general

tendency

was

to

employ

&dquo;non-reactive&dquo;

models

of

Soviet

behavior.

As

William

Zimmerman

has

noted,

Soviet

foreign

policy

was

conceptualized

in

&dquo;mechanistic&dquo;

or

&dquo;essentialist&dquo;

terms

which

left

little

room

for

the

operation

of

domestic

constraints

or

influences.’

Moreover,

even

when

the

totalitarian

model

began

to

fall

into

disfavor,

there

was

still

the

practical

problem

of

severely

limited

sources

of

information.

Sustained

kremlinological

digging

might

yield

a

few

fascinating

glimpses

of

intra-elite

conflicts,

but

it

has

been

extremely

difhcult

to

relate

these

(and

other

domestic

influences)

to

Soviet

foreign

policy

with

any

degree

of

precision.

In

the

last

few

years,

the

approach

toward

the

study

of

Soviet

foreign

policy

has

begun

to

shift.

A

new

concern

with

the

interrelation

of

Soviet

do-

mestic

and

foreign

policy

has

arisen

due

both

theoretical

considerations

(the

increased

attention

of international

relations

theorists

to

linkage

phenomena)

and

practical

developments

(the

relative

decline

of

ideology

and

the

limited

1

William

Zimmerman,

"Soviet

Foreign

Policy

in

the

1970s,"

Survey,

19,

No. 2

(1973), 188-98.

131

pluralization

of

Soviet

politics).

In

this

area,

Vernon

Aspaturian,

William

Zim-

merman,

and

Alexander

Dallin

have

all

made

notable

contributions.’

The

study

of

Soviet

politics,

which

developed

so

long

outside

the

mainstream

of

political

science,

is

now

reentering

it

(albeit

gingerly ) .

This

study

represents

an

attempt

to

further

our

understanding

of

internal-

external

linkages

in

Soviet

policy

through

a

case

study

approach.

The

period

1953-57

has

been

chosen

for

two

reasons.

First,

this

was

a

time

of

intense

change

in

both

domestic

and

foreign

policy.

A

prolonged

struggle

for

power

among

Stalin’s

successors

paralleled

the

introduction

of

extensive

foreign

policy

innova-

tion,

and

it

may

be

fruitful

to

examine

the

interrelation

of

these

two

processes.

Second

(and

not

by

coincidence ) ,

this

is

the

period

least

beclouded

by

the

mists

of

Soviet

secrecy.

The

bitter

political

in-fighting

of

those

years

resulted

in

the

publication

of

a

variety

of

materials

that

are

ordinarily

well

hidden

from

foreign

eyes.

Our

sources

for

the

study

of

Soviet

politics

remain

painfully

inadequate,

but

for

this

particular

period

somewhat

less

so.

Broadly

speaking,

Soviet

foreign

policy

from

1953

through

1957

can

be

divided

into

three

phases;

first,

a

period

of

pragmatic

readjustment

aimed

at

lowering

international

tension

and

reducing

the

risks

of

nuclear

war

( 1953-54 ) ;

second,

a

period

characterized

by

a

more

thorough

reexamination

of

earlier

Soviet

policies

and

resulting

in

the

repudiation

of

a

number

of

Stalin’s

basic

assumptions

about

the

world

( 1955-56 ) ;

and

third,

a

period

in

which

the

Soviet

Union

abruptly

shifted

its

efforts

to

improve

relations

with

the

West

and

em-

barked

upon

a

vigorous

campaign

to

increase

Soviet

influence

throughout

the

world

(this

phase

began

in

late

1957

and

did

not

end

until

late

1962).

The

main

question

that

will

concern

us

is

the

extent

to

which

foreign

policy

during

this

period

was:

( a )

a

reflection

of

domestic

political

considerations,

especially

the

three-sided

struggle

for

power

between

Malenkov,

Khrushchev,

and

Molo-

tov ;

and

(b)

a

response

to

international

events,

and

in

particular

the

changing

calculus

of

dangers

and

opportunities

that

originated

in

the

Soviet

Union’s

external

environment.

This

article

is

divided

into

two

major

sections.

Although

it is

impossible

to

separate

completely

description

and

analysis,

the

first

section

aims

primarily

at

untangling

the

complex

events

of

1953-57,

while

the

second

endeavors

to

set

these in

a

broader,

more

analytic

context.

I

Within

days

of

Stalin’s

death,

the

Soviet

Union

embarked

upon

a

whole

series

of

measures

aimed

at

moderating

East-West

hostility.

Some

of

the

meas-

2

Vernon

V.

Aspaturian,

"Internal

Politics

and

Foreign

Policy

in

the

Soviet

System,"

in

Approaches

to

Comparative

and

International

Politics,

ed.

R.

Barry

Farrell

(Evanston:

Northwestern

University

Press,

1966),

pp.

212-87;

Vernon

V.

Aspaturian,

"The

Soviet

Military-Industrial

Complex—Does

it

Exist?"

Journal

of

International

Affairs,

26,

No.

1

(1972),

1-28;

William

Zimmerman,

"Elite

Perspectives

and

the

Explanation

of

Soviet

Foreign

Policy,"

in

The

Conduct

of

Soviet

Foreign

Policy,

ed.

Erik

P.

Hoffmann

and

Frederic

J.

Fleron,

Jr.

(Chicago:

Aldine-Atherton,

1971),

pp.

18-30;

Alexander

Dallin,

"Soviet

Foreign

Policy

and

Domestic

Politics:

A

Framework

for

Analysis,"

in

Hoffman

and

Fleron,

ibid.,

pp.

36-49.