Intermunicipal Cooperation in the Netherlands: The Costs and the Effectiveness of Polycentric Regional Governance

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12931
AuthorBas Denters,Maurits Sanders,Pieter‐Jan Klok,Marcel Boogers
Date01 July 2018
Published date01 July 2018
Intermunicipal Cooperation in the Netherlands: The Costs and the Effectiveness of Polycentric Regional Governance 527
Pieter-Jan Klok
Bas Denters
Marcel Boogers
University of Twente
Maurits Sanders
Nyenrode Business University
Intermunicipal Cooperation in the Netherlands: The Costs
and the Effectiveness of Polycentric Regional Governance
Abstract: This article examines the effects of the structure of intermunicipal cooperatives (IMCs) on the perceived
transaction costs and benefits of IMCs. Hypotheses based on a polycentric theory of regional governance are tested using
data from Dutch municipalities. The findings are mixed. In line with polycentric theory, networks characterized by
a multiplicity of territorial scales reduce IMC transaction costs. Contrary to polycentric theory, however, if IMCs are
organized under a uniform legal regime, lower costs and higher benefits are reported. Structural factors that dominate
the debate between polycentrism and monocentrism prove to be of limited importance. On the other hand, the results
indicate support for the hypotheses that intermunicipal trust (as a cultural variable) contributes to perceptions of
effective and efficient cooperation.
Evidence for Practice
• An undiscriminating reduction of network complexity (by imposing a fixed or limited set of cooperative
partners) does not improve the functional performance of regional governance.
• Variety in cooperative partners appears to reduce the costs of cooperation but does not result in higher
benefits.
• A consistent uniform regulatory regime that creates a set of rules on how to organize decision making and
representation in intermunicipal cooperation increases functional performance of cooperation.
• Structural factors indicating how cooperation is organized play a minor role in explaining functional
performance or cooperation. The cooperative climate (indicated by the level of trust) plays a more important
role. Trust comes with lower levels of costs and higher levels of regional benefits but does not influence local
benefits for individual municipalities.
Over the years, in the United States (e.g.,
Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992; Norris
2001; Ostrom 1972) and Europe (e.g.,
Baldersheim and Rose 2010; Hulst and Van Montfort
2007; Teles 2016), the proper institutional structure
for regional governance has been a hotly debated
topic, both in academic circles and in political arenas.
In this debate, we distinguish two main positions:
monocentrism and polycentrism.1
Both monocentrists and polycentrists recognize the
need for some form of regional governance to avoid
problems that will emerge in a system of completely
independent municipalities. These problems include
possible production inefficiencies (diseconomies of
scale), allocation inefficiencies (failure to internalize
spatial spillover effects), and effects on regional
economic growth, prosperity, and employment.2
But monocentrists and polycentrists differ in the
institutional arrangements they propose for overcoming
such problems. As Vincent Ostrom (1989) has argued,
these differences pertain to two institutional factors:
1. First, monocentrists have a preference for concentrating
regional governance in one authority that is responsible
for regional governance. This might be a unitary,
single-tier authority created by an amalgamation of all
municipalities into a single municipality. However, it
could also take the form of a two-tier system in which
municipalities retain their responsibility for all local
matters but one newly established regional authority
takes over all municipal responsibilities for decisions
that require regional governance.
2. Second, monocentrists also have a preference
for uniformity of institutional design. Clear
and consistent (nationally imposed) regulation
will reduce uncertainties, lowering transaction
costs and increasing the chances for successful
collaboration.
Alternatively, polycentrists prefer a “fragmented”
system in which independent municipalities
are more or less free to enter into collaborative
arrangements. Here the main vehicle for regional
governance is essentially voluntary intermunicipal
Marcel Boogers holds a chair in
Innovation and Regional Governance in the
School of Behavioural, Management and
Social Sciences of the University of Twente,
the Netherlands. His research focuses on the
structure of and dynamics within networks
of local and regional governments,
production and service industries, higher
education institutes, and other third-sector
organizations.
E-mail: m.j.g.j.a.boogers@utwente.nl
Bas Denters holds a chair in Public
Administration in the School of Behavioural,
Management and Social Sciences of the
University of Twente, the Netherlands. His
research focuses on issues of democracy,
participation, and representation in local
and regional governance.
E-mail: s.a.h.denters@utwente.nl
Pieter-Jan Klok is assistant professor
of policy science in the Department of
Public Administration in the School of
Behavioural, Management and Social
Sciences of the University of Twente, the
Netherlands. His current research includes
creating cooperation and innovation
through different modes of governance,
including citizen participation. He teaches
in the fields of policy, network approaches,
and governance systems in public
administration.
E-mail: p.j.klok@utwente.nl
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 4, pp. 527–536. © 2018 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12931.
Maurits Sanders is senior lecturer on
public private partnerships at Nyenrode
Business University, the Netherlands.
Current research includes the design and
performance of public-private partnerships
and regional governments.
E-mail: maurits.sanders@ppsconstruct.nl
Research Article

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