Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities
| Published date | 01 December 1991 |
| Date | 01 December 1991 |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591299104400415 |
| Author | R. Allen Hays |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
LOBBYING:
TOWARD
AN
UNDERSTANDING
OF
ISSUE
PRIORITIES
R.
ALLEN
HAYS
University
of
Northern
Iowa
he
purpose
of
this
paper
is
to
examine
the
lobbying
activities
of
national
organizations
representing
general
purpose
units
-JL-
of
state
and
local
government.
Using
testimony
before
Congress
as
an
indicator
of
lobbying
activity,
it
will
examine
the
issue
priorities
of
these
organizations
and
attempt
to
relate
them
to
the
needs
and
priorities
of
the
state
and
local
governments
which
they
represent.
BACKGROUND
The
literature
on
intergovernmental
interest
groups
has
chronicled
both
increases
and
decreases
in
their
lobbying
activities.
Haider
(1974)
traces
the
formation
of
the
major
intergovernmental
groups:
the
National
Governor’s
Association
(NGA);
the
National
Conference
of
State
Leg-
islators
(NCSL);
the
National
Association
of
Counties
(NACO);
the
National
League
of
Cities
(NLC);
and
the
United
States
Conference
of
Mayors
(USCM).
Spawned
by
the
rapid
expansion
of
the
federal
role
in
domestic
policy
in
the
1930s,
these
groups,
after
passing
through
hard
times
in
the
1950s,
rose
again
in
influence
with
the
next
great
spurt
of
federal
domestic
activity
in
the
mid-1960s
and
early
1970s.
Haider
credits
them
with
a
major
role
in
reorienting
federal
spending
from
categorical
grants
to
block
grants.
Articles
by
Reed
(1983)
and
by
Levine
and
Thurber
(1986)
pick
up
the
story
where
Haider
leaves
off.
They
describe
these
groups’
fall
from
grace
in
the
Executive
Branch
as
the
Reagan
Administration
tried
to
radically
reorient
the
federal
domestic
role.
According
to
Reed,
rather
than
seeing
these
groups
as
legitimate
and
useful
conduits
of
information
about
state
and
local
needs,
Reagan’s
appointees
saw
them
as
self-serving
supplicants
at
the
public
trough,
driving
up
federal
Received:
April
18,
1990
First
Revision
Received:
October
12,
1990
Second
Revision
Received:
November
27,
1990
Accepted
for
Publication:
November
30,
1990
NOTE:
This
is
a
revised
version
of
a
paper
presented
at
the
1990
Midwest
Political
Science
Association
Meeting,
Chicago,
Illinois.
1082
costs
in
order
to
enhance
their
own
influence.
According
to
Levine
and
Thurber,
reducing
their
federal
funding
was
part
of
a
larger
Reagan
effort
to
&dquo;defund
the
left&dquo; - to
remove
subsidies
from
groups
pushing
for
a
greater
federal
role
in
various
areas.
This
literature
provides
a
useful
historical
account,
but
it
fails
to
provide
a
clear
theoretical
framework
with
which
to
understand
the
behavior
of
these
groups.
As
a
first
step
toward
the
development
of
such
a
framework,
this
essay
offers
a
systematic
analysis
of
the
types
of
issues
which
attract
the
lobbying
energies
of
these
intergovernmental
groups.
Given
the
many
issues
facing
subnational
units
of
govern-
ment,
why
will
their
national
representatives
focus
their
energies
on
some
and
not
others?
The
research
reported
here
does
not
speak
directly
to
the
effectiveness
of
these
groups
in
accomplishing
their
objectives,
but
it
sets
the
stage
for
further
inquiry
in
this
area.
Paul
Peterson’s
seminal
work,
City
Limits
(1981),
is
a
source
of
testable
hypotheses
concerning
the
activities
of
national
intergovernmental
interest
groups.
The
main
focus
of
his
work
is
the
shaping
of
programmatic
and
spending
choices
of
localities
by
their
need
to
compete
in
the
economic
marketplace
for
investment
and
growth.
Since
this
political/economic
dependence
is
useful
in
explaining
local
spending
decisions,
it
may,
by
extension,
be
useful
in
understanding
what
local
governments
seek
when
they
go
to
Washington.
This
theo-
retical
framework
may
also
be
usefully
extended
to
state
governments,
although
as
larger,
more
economically
diverse
and
politically
autono-
mous
entities,
they
are
not
as
tightly
constrained
as
localities.
Peterson’s
bold
assertion
that
economic
growth
is
the
central
goal
for
all
local
policy
decisions
has
been
widely
criticized
for
giving
too
little
weight
to
the
discretion
of
political
leaders
and
to
other
legitimate
needs
which
communities
seek
to
meet.
Other
perspectives,
such
as
the
&dquo;regime&dquo;
theory
espoused
by
Stone
and
others,
do
a
better
job
of
explaining
the
differences
among
communities
in
their
handling
of
eco-
nomic
growth.
(Stone
1987;
DiGaetano
1989)
Nevertheless,
even
Peterson’s
critics
accept
the
basic
thrust
of
his
argument
for
the
depen-
dence
of
localities
on
the
national
political
economy,
and
such
a
per-
spective
is
useful
in
understanding
the
common
goals
of
subnational
units.
To
understand
how
Peterson
might
be
useful,
let
us
explore
some
of
his
arguments
in
more
detail.
Peterson
expands
on
his
main
asser-
tion
that
cities
seek
economic
growth
above
all
else
by
creating
a
typol-
ogy
of
policy
areas
based
on
their
relationship
to
this
central
goal.
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