Intergovernmental Conflict on Environmental Policy: the Attitudinal Connection

• Author: William T. Gormley
• DOI: 10.1177/106591298704000206
• Published date: 01 June 1987
• Date: 01 June 1987
• Subject Matter: Articles

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE ATTITUDINAL
CONNECTION
WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR.
University of Wisconsin-Madison
VER
the past few years, the federal government has delegated con-
~
siderable authority over environmental protection to the states.
This practice, begun during the Nixon administration, has acceler-
ated under President Reagan. During Ann Burford’s tenure as Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator, for example, state program
responsibilities grew from 33 percent of possible assumptions of responsi-
bility to 66 percent (Stanfield 1984). Yet the states complain that they are
still saddled with too many federal regulations and too much federal con-
trol. These complaints are becoming increasingly bitter as the federal govern-
ment cuts back on funding for environmental programs.
A growing number of scholars sympathize with the states. Indeed, many
students of intergovernmental relations argue that the states should have
more autonomy, not less (Elazar 1984; Beam 1983; Kettl 1983). Several
arguments can be made in favor of greater state discretion.
First, state governments today are in excellent institutional shape. Gover-
nors are stronger, state legislatures are more professional, and state
bureaucracies are better organized. In Elazar’s words (1984: 188), &dquo;In-
stitutional change in the states since 1960 has been substantial, principally
directed to bringing state government into line with the managerial revo-
lution.&dquo; There is, of course, more to government than institutional ma-
chinery. However, improvements in the quality of personnel appear to have
paralleled improvements in government institutions.
Second, state governments are exposed to a much broader array of in-
terests than they were some years ago. The most dramatic changes have
occurred in state administration, long held to be &dquo;captured&dquo; by special
interests. Over the past decade, public representation in state administra-
tive decision making has been institutionalized in many policy domains,
especially in the regulatory arena (Gormley 1986). The public is now
represented in public utility commission hearings, in nursing home regula-
tory decisions, and on occupational licensing boards. The public is also
represented in state environmental proceedings in a variety of ways (He-
berlein 1976; Godschalk and Stiftel 1981; Rosener 1982).
Received: August 17, 1985
Revised MS Received: April 22, 1986
Accepted for Publication: April 29, 1986
NOTE: The author would like to thank Steve Born, Dan Bromley, Dean Mann, Kathy
Segerson and Carl Van Horn for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
The author is also grateful to the Robert M. La Follette Institute of Public Affairs for
its financial support.

---

286
Third, federal control and federal indecisiveness combine all too often
to create confusion and delay at the state level. For example, the U.S. EPA
took years to issue rules and regulations under the Clean Air Act, the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. So long as states are required to mirror EPA standards, un-
certainty at the federal level discourages states from adopting rules promptly.
If states do move swiftly, they may be forced to amend their rules as soon
as the EPA gets around to adopting its own final rules. The uncertainty
of federal funding also makes it difficult for states to plan for the future.
These are powerful arguments, and there is much to be said for greater
state discretion in environmental policy making. Yet nagging questions re-
main : can the states be trusted to protect the environment without strong
federal control? If so, which states? Under what circumstances? To what
degree? One way to answer these questions is to assess the attitudes of state
administrators who implement state and federal laws and regulations. In
environmental regulations, day-to-day decisions of enormous importance
are made by these state administrators, who draft new rules and regula-
tions, implement legislative enactments, grant waivers, impose fines, recom-
mend lawsuits, etc. If state administrators share the commitment of their
federal counterparts to environmental protection, one might dismiss strict
federal control as unnecessary and excessive. If, on the other hand, they
disagree with their federal counterparts on fundamental questions, the case
for state discretion is weaker.
The premise behind this inquiry is the proposition that successful policy
implementation depends in part on the attitudes of policy implementors.
This is a familiar theme in the policy implementation literature (Pressman
and Wildavsky 1973; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Mazmanian and
Sabatier 1983). While favorably disposed implementors do not ensure suc-
cessful implementation, unfavorably disposed implementors almost certainly
guarantee implementation problems. The success of federal delegation of
authority to the states depends significantly -
though not entirely -
on
the attitudes of state administrators.
Attitudes of state administrators are especially important in environ-
mental policy today, given the degree of autonomy states enjoy. As a re-
sult of a steady increase in federal delegation, most states now run most
environmental programs. Also, given the decline in federal grants-in-aid
to the states, an important source of federal leverage has diminished. Fed-
eral funding now constitutes a smaller percentage of state environmental
budgets than it did a few years ago. If states choose to defy the federal govern-
ment, they have less to lose.
For these reasons, it is important to identify those circumstances under
which state and federal attitudes are most likely to diverge. Rather than
policing all states in all issue areas with equal vigor, the federal govern-
ment might well concentrate on those states and issue areas that generate
higher levels of intergovernmental conflict. As Ingram (1977) has argued,
the relationship between federal and state governments is not hierarchical,
as some models of policy implementation imply. Rather, the federal govern-
ment’s power is the power to persuade or to bargain. If federal officials

---

287
are to make the most of their bargaining resources, they should use them
where they are most needed. They should also use strategies that take the
attitudes of state administrators into account.
METHODOLOGY
To discern the attitudes of environmental regulators, I conducted a ques-
tionnaire survey of regulators at three environmental protection agencies
-
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the Ohio En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) - Region V. The EPA-Region V seemed a logical
choice because both pollution problems and economic problems are acute
in this region, which includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
and Wisconsin. Also, as the largest regional office in the country, based
on both population and personnel, Region V is arguably the most impor-
tant. The two state agencies were selected because they differ in certain
respects. The Wisconsin DNR
is an agency that combines regulatory and
conservation functions. Its head is appointed by a Board whose members
are appointed by the governor as vacancies arise. The Ohio EPA is a &dquo;little
EPA&dquo; with purely regulatory responsibilities. Its head, in contrast to Wis-
consin’s, serves at the pleasure of the governor. Given these differences,
the Ohio EPA would seem more vulnerable to politicization than the Wis-
consin DNR. In practical terms, this could mean that pressures for trade-
offs between environmental protection and economic development are more
strongly felt in Ohio.’
Within each agency, regulators were identified from personnel rosters.’
2
In practice, this meant that all non-clerical employees in air, water, and
waste divisions or bureaus were included in the sample. The questionnaire
survey was mailed to 1,112 regulators during the second week of Novem-
ber 1984. Individual letters were sent to each respondent, with assurances
that responses would be treated as confidential. Regulators were instructed
to mail their responses (in a stamped, pre-addressed envelope) directly to
the author.
Of 297 questionnaires mailed to Wisconsin regulators, 250 were
returned, for a response rate of 84 percent. Of 386 questionnaires mailed
to Ohio regulators, 278 were returned, for a response rate of 72 percent.
Of 429 questionnaires mailed to EPA-Region V regulators, 252 were
returned, for a response rate of 59 percent. The overall response rate was
1
In broader terms, "superagencies," such as the DNR, may take a more holistic view of
environmental problems than "little EPAs." For evidence that these kinds of agencies
behave differently, see Lester et al., 1985: 226.
2

At the Wisconsin DNR’s central office in Madison, persons with regulatory and conserva-
tion responsibilities are easily distinguished, and only regulators were surveyed. At dis-
trict offices, where responsibilities overlap to some extent, district directors and deputy
district directors were surveyed because they often deal with both kinds of issues. Other-
wise, only regulators were surveyed.

---

288
780/1,112 or 70 percent. With one minor exception,3 this response rate
was achieved without the benefit of a follow-up or reminder letter.4
4
The questionnaire survey included 40 closed-ended questions on pub-
lic policy -
the focus of this paper. These...