Common strategic interests balancing support for Israel against other American interests.

• Author: Ben-Meir, Alon

Editor's Note: A leading Middle East specialist and author of earlier analyses of Israeli-Palestinian politics looks at the current state of U.S.-Israeli relations and what may be a way forward.--The Editor

As the Obama administration is reviewing how to restart the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the depth of its involvement, the parties on all sides of the conflict are looking to see the real nature of the United States-Israeli relationship, and whether the current tensions run deeper than what may appear. Although U. S. and Israeli strategic interests seem to have diverged in the past few months, there is no denying that their ultimate goals for the region are both interlinked and complimentary. While both nations would like to see an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and have high stakes in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, their problems lay mostly in their miss-assessment of each other's concerns and priorities. But since very little progress, if any, can be made to unlock the Arab-Israeli Gordian knot without direct and active American involvement and a willing Israeli government, the Obama and Netanyahu administrations must demonstrate a better appreciation of each other's shifting strategic priorities. They must now find a way to agree on a modus operandi to end the festering Arab-Israeli conflict and rein in Iran's nuclear threat bearing in mind that time is of the essence.

Both Israel and the United States have a number of legitimate concerns that must be aired, and both sides must not only acknowledge these concerns but act in full coordination bilaterally to address them. This will not only start to ameliorate tensions on key issues between the two sides but will also suggest to the Palestinians, Syrians and other key Arab states that the greater American-Israeli cooperation is, the safer Israel will feel in making necessary concessions. The last sixteen months have clearly demonstrated that a lack of coordination and strained relations between the two allies will only stymie continued negotiations to the detriment of all parties to the conflict.

The Israeli concerns:

The Israeli concerns center on three issues that the majority of Israelis deem critical to their national security and a deeply rooted connectedness to the holy city of Jerusalem. Israel's first and immediate concern is the Palestinians' inability to assume long-term security responsibility. Whereas most Israelis grasp the inevitability of a two-state solution and understand the Palestinian sentiments and larger Muslim historic ties to East Jerusalem--they are not convinced that any Palestinian government is capable, at the present time, to prevent a major security violation as long as irredentist Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad continue to thrive and deny Israel's right to exist.

Notwithstanding the impressive advances in security that the Palestinian Authority has made recently in the West Bank, Israelis still recall with deep trepidation Hamas' takeover of Gaza following the Prime Minister Sharon's withdrawal, using the evacuated territories as a staging ground to attack Israel. Israel is deeply troubled by the prospect that a similar scenario could be played out in the West Bank, be that through the use of force or through democratic elections where Hamas enjoys widespread popularity. Moreover, although the Israelis do not doubt America's commitment to their country's national security, there is very little that the United States can do to prevent, for example, the shelling of rockets against Israel from Gaza other than condemning Hamas' provocations. Under the current circumstances, no one can rule out this possibility. This explains why the Israelis insist that under any peaceful agreement the IDF should be allowed to retain residual forces along the Jordan valley to prevent not only a Hamas takeover but also the infiltrations of weapons and extremists into the West Bank across the long and porous border with Jordan.

Israel's second concern is Iran's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and their repeated existential threats against its right to exist in the region. The Obama administration takes the Iranian threats and their regional aspirations quite seriously and has been cooperating with Israel in this regard, but still the two allies differ sharply in their intelligence assessments as to when Iran might reach a breakout capacity. In this connection, Washington and Jerusalem also differ about the urgency in dealing with the Palestinian problem and how that might impact on Iran's behavior. While the Obama administration believes that a solution to the Palestinian conflict would dramatically change the regional political dynamics and weakens Iran's resolve, the Netanyahu government feels that the focus should first be on Iran's race to acquire nuclear weapons.

What has further aggravated the relationship is that Washington has occasionally linked its efforts to contain Iran's ambitions to progress on the Palestinian front. Furthermore, Israel is very unhappy with the slow pace to mobilize a new set of international sanctions since the negotiations with Tehran failed to accomplish the intended goal by the end of 2009. Some in the Israeli intelligence community argue that the Iranian regime will not suffer seriously under new sanctions, especially because under the best of circumstances the new sanctions will be watered down to satisfy the Russian and Chinese requirements as a precondition for support. Some Israelis have expressed even a deeper concerns that although the Obama administration has not officially removed the military option off the table to force Iran's hand, the on-going war in Afghanistan and the continuing instability in Iraq has made nearly impossible for the Obama administration to contemplate a military strike against Iran should the new set of sanctions fail. In a recent secret memo sent by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to top administration officials, Gates indicated that the United States does not have an effective long-term policy to deal with Iran's continuing and steady progress of obtain nuclear weapons. In response, National Security Advisor General...