Intercameral Relations in a Bicameral Elected and Sortition Legislature*

• Author: Pierre-Étienne Vandamme,John Pitseys,Christoph Niessen,Min Reuchamps,Vincent Jacquet
• DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789890
• Date: 01 September 2018
• Published date: 01 September 2018
• Subject Matter: Special Issue Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218789890

Politics & Society

2018, Vol. 46(3) 381 –400

© The Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789890

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Special Issue Article

Intercameral Relations in

a Bicameral Elected and

Sortition Legislature*

Pierre-Étienne Vandamme

Université catholique de Louvain

Vincent Jacquet

Université catholique de Louvain

Christoph Niessen

Université de Namur and Université catholique de Louvain

John Pitseys

Université catholique de Louvain

Min Reuchamps

Université catholique de Louvain

Abstract

The idea of a hybrid bicameral system combining election and sortition is investigated. More

precisely, the article imagines how an elected and a sortition chamber would interact, taking

into account their public perception and their competing legitimacies. The article draws

on a survey of a representative sample of the Belgian population and Belgian members of

parliament assessing their views about sortition in political representation. Findings are

combined with theoretical reflections on election’s and sortition’s respective sources of

legitimacy. The possibility of conflicting legitimacies and mutually detrimental interactions

leads to considerations of the effects of different possible distributions of power between

the chambers as a crucial determinant of their interactions and perceived legitimacy.

Keywords

bicameralism, elections, sortition, legitimacy, conflict, power, public opinion

Corresponding Author:

Pierre-Étienne Vandamme, Place Montesquieu, 3, bte L2.06.01, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

Email: pierre-etienne.vandamme@uclouvain.be

*This special issue of Politics & Society titled “Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative

Governance” features a preface, an introductory anchor essay and postscript, and six articles that

were presented as part of a workshop held at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, September 2017,

organized by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright.

789890PASXXX10.1177/0032329218789890Politics & SocietyVandamme et al.

research-article2018

382 Politics & Society 46(3)

John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright propose a hybrid bicameralism, with one chamber

composed of elected politicians and the other of ordinary citizens chosen by sortition.

Although they envision interactions between the two chambers as a “creative tension,”

the question of intercameral relations deserves more careful attention. We argue that

the chambers would have not only different virtues but also different legitimacies,

which might become particularly conflictual if each chamber had the power to veto the

proposals of the other, as Gastil and Wright recommend. If the elected chamber proves

less popular than the sortition one, the legitimacy of elections might come into ques-

tion. In turn, elected representatives might try to discredit the sortition representatives

as, for example, lacking experience or accountability.

To imagine these intercameral relations, picture a triangular relationship among the

two chambers and the public. To understand how those relationships might develop,

we wanted to get a preliminary measure of the public support for each mode of selec-

tion. In addition, we sought to grasp current political support for sortition among

elected officials. We investigated these questions in Belgium, where the idea of sorti-

tion has received particular attention in recent years. We conducted a survey of a rep-

resentative sample of the Belgian population and Belgian members of parliament

(MPs) to assess their views of sortition, if it were used for political representation.

As we explain in detail later, the results show that a pure sortition chamber will be

difficult to achieve politically, because of limited public support and even lower sup-

port among politicians. Our findings also suggest that, once installed, a sortition cham-

ber might continue to face resistance and opposition from the political class. Hence, to

test the viability of Gastil and Wright’s sortition chamber proposal, we must imagine

intercameral relations and their effects on the perceived legitimacy of the two cham-

bers.1 Beyond our survey findings, we also offer theoretical reflections on the respec-

tive legitimacies of elections and sortition—and on their potential antagonisms. We

then consider the effects of different possible distributions of power between the

chambers as a crucial determinant of their interactions.

Conflicting legitimacies are not a problem per se. For instance, in existing demo-

cratic systems, the relations between legislative, executive, and judiciary powers

involve constant tension between their respective rationales. Nonetheless, it cannot be

taken for granted that the coexistence of an elected and a sortition chamber would

strengthen, rather than weaken, the overall balance of legitimacy in a democratic sys-

tem. Sortition could challenge the very basis of electoral legitimacy, so intercameral

interactions must be considered carefully.

We begin by explaining why Belgium is the right site for investigating these issues;

then we present the results of our survey. In the second section, we explore the comple-

mentary virtues and competing legitimacies of elections and sortition in theoretical

terms. We then draw on our data regarding legitimacy perceptions—and on more gen-

eral observations about bicameral interactions in contemporary democracies—to con-

sider different potential distributions of power between the two chambers and their

potential political consequences. We will review four institutional scenarios: (1) an

elected and a sortition chamber having identical powers; (2) the elected one being sub-

ordinated; (3) the sortition one being subordinated; and (4) a single mixed chamber,