“Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: The Perverse Effect of Illegality on Skills”—A Reply to the Note

• Date: 01 August 2013
• Author: Laura Serlenga,Giuseppe De Arcangelis,Nicola D. Coniglio
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12048
• Published date: 01 August 2013

“Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: The

Perverse Effect of Illegality on Skills”—A Reply to

the Note

Nicola D. Coniglio, Giuseppe De Arcangelis, and Laura Serlenga*

Abstract

The purpose of this reply is twofold. First, we discuss the major point raised by Stark and Lukasz (Review

of Development Economics 17, no. 1 (2013):156–62), i.e. the fact that a framework which explicitly consid-

ers asymmetric information is correct and would imply a reversal of our finding. Although, we acknowledge

that the mechanism highlighted by the authors is an alternative explanation to return decisions, we argue

that the suggested framework is unsuitable in the specific context analyzed in our paper (as well as most

real-world situations). Instead, the assumptions underlying our simple theoretical model are strictly linked

to data availability in order to perform a sensible empirical analysis. Second, we present a slightly different

version of the model proposed in the original article that overcomes possible inconsistencies on the saving

behavior of the migrants. Although all the computations are shown in one of the articles cited in our pub-

lished paper, we now prefer to show them fully in this issue of the Review. The conclusions of our theoreti-

cal model do not change. Hence, we conclude that the empirical evidence of the original article—which is

the main contribution of our work—is supported by a robust framework.

1. A reply to Stark and Lukasz (2013)

In Coniglio et al. (2009a) we showed that the return decisions of illegal migrants may

differ from the return decisions of regular migrants when considering their skill

endowment. Although in the literature return migration seems to be characterized by

negative self-selection, our main argument is that illegality may affect skilled migrants

more intensively than the unskilled ones and the self-selection may turn positive.

The main reason lies in the negative effect of clandestine status on the return to

skills. If the host-country job market confines irregular migrants to unskilled and

often over-exploited occupations—like in Italy, which is the basis for our empirical

analysis—then skills are typically “wasted”; hence, the opportunity cost of return

migration is lower for the skilled migrants.

In what follows we reply to the critiques of Stark and Lukasz (2013) on the theo-

retical part of our paper. In the first part of our reply we address the key points raised

by Stark and Lukasz (2013). In the last section we present a slightly modified version

of the model which takes into account some inconsistencies correctly raised by Stark

and Lukasz (2013). However, we show that our simple amended theoretical frame-

work (already present in one of the references of the original paper) is robust to their

criticisms.

* De Arcangelis: Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali and Economiche, Sapienza University of Rome, P.le

Aldo Moro, 5, 00185 Rome, Italy. E-mail: giuseppe.dearcangelis@uniroma1.it. Coniglio: Dipartimento di

Scienze Economiche, University of Bari, Bari, Italy and SNF, Bergen, Norway. Serlenga: Dipartimento di

Scienze Economiche, University of Bari, Bari, Italy and IZA, Bonn, Germany.

Review of Development Economics, 17(3), 540–548, 2013

DOI:10.1111/rode.12048

© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd