9/11 Intelligence Reform: an opportunity lost.

• Author: Hastedt, Glenn

We have now passed the five-year anniversary of September 11, 2001. For many younger Americans the terrorist attacks of that day promise to become a generational event of the magnitude of Pearl Harbor. It may in time define how they think about America's role in the world and the steps necessary to ensure its safety. Already 9/11 has helped elevate a seldom used concept, homeland security, to a place of prominence in the rhetoric of American foreign policy much as Pearl Harbor did, over one half century ago, for the concept of national security.

From the point of view of both homeland and national security, Pearl Harbor and 9/11 raise the classic questions about surprise: How did the Japanese catch the U.S. government unaware by such an attack and what should be done to prevent another in the future? Both events offer similar answers: Surprise happened because analysts failed to connect the dots, lacked needed intelligence resources, and fell short of communicating effectively with one another. Reorganization can help avoid surprise. In response to Pearl Harbor, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency as part of the 1947 National Security Act. Following 9/11 the government created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The two are linked in the minds of many. In signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, President George W. Bush called it "the most dramatic reform of our Nation's intelligence capabilities since Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. Under this new law, our vast intelligence enterprise will become more unified, coordinated, and effective."

Does this presidential rhetoric accord with reality? The argument laid out below demonstrates that it does not. The overall rhetoric accompanying the creation of the DNI marks, instead, the triumph of domestic over international politics. Given the logic of administrative reorganizations, the nature of presidential commissions, and the dynamics of the rhetorical presidency this is not an unexpected outcome. That outcome, moreover, raises serious questions about the extent to which the American government fully understands the potential for future surprise attacks and their consequences for future homeland security policy debates.

Creating the Position of Director of National

Intelligence The DNI represents the signature intelligence reform proposed by the presidential commission chaired by Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton. Officially known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, the Commission got off to a rocky start. The White House had resisted its very creation in large part for fear that the Commission would lay blame at its doorstep just prior to the 2004 presidential election. The administration described such a commission as unnecessary because of an impending House-Senate inquiry. Families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks disagreed. They also regarded the terms of reference and the time frame of this investigation as too restrictive. They supported, instead, legislation to create a special commission introduced in December 2001 by Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman. The House passed the necessary legislation in July 2002. The White House withheld official endorsement until October and created the Commission the following month.

Though originally designated as the Commission's co-chairs, Henry Kissinger and George Mitchell quickly withdrew under conflict of interest charges. The Commission held its first hearing in late January 2003 and by late July began publicly complaining of a lack of cooperation by the White House and Justice Department in making documents and personnel available. In October Kean threatened to issue subpoenas to gain the administration's cooperation. The timing of the Commission's final report also became a point of conflict. When the Commission sought an extension beyond its scheduled termination on May 27, 2004, the Bush administration objected but vigorous lobbying by the 9/11 families forced it to agree to a sixty-day extension in February 2004.

The Commission, which issued its report on July 22, 2004, identified four kinds of failures that contributed to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and made forty-one recommendations. Its centerpiece reform proposal became creating the position of DNI with an office in the White House. This individual would oversee all-source national intelligence centers, serve as the president's primary intelligence advisor, manage the national intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence community. Included in the DNI's powers should be submitting a unified intelligence budget, appropriating funds to intelligence agencies, and setting personnel policies for the intelligence community. Although congressional leaders promised to move quickly to overhaul the intelligence community, the White House urged caution, and acting CIA Director John McLaughlin, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge all spoke against creating a DNI. With Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry endorsing creation of a DNI, the Bush administration found it necessary to follow suit but wanted to limit the DNI's authority to coordination of intelligence.

In October 2004 the House and Senate passed different pieces of legislation creating a DNI. The Senate bill most closely followed the recommendations of the Commission by granting broad powers to the DNI. The House bill reflected the White House's position. Although the Senate bill gave the DNI the power to "determine" the intelligence budget, for example, the House bill only gave the DNI the power to develop the budget and give guidance to the intelligence community. Similarly, the Senate version placed the CIA under the authority, direction and control of the DNI while the House version only stated that the CIA director would report to the DNI. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), chair of the House Armed Services Committee, was particularly adamant that the Pentagon not loose control over its intelligence budget and that the overall intelligence budget remain secret. In the end, behind the scenes negotiations produced a compromise bill acceptable to House Republicans and the White House. President Bush signed it into law on December 17, 2004.

Preventing Intelligence FailuresMuch of the debate surrounding the ability of the DNI to prevent future intelligence failures focuses on the powers given and denied to this official. Viewed from the perspective of world politics and the literature on intelligence, this debate misses the mark for a very important reason: Intelligence failures are inevitable. Events in world politics do not move forward in neat readily identifiable bundles. They travel in odd shaped sizes, in bits and pieces...