Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence Analysts

• Published date: 01 June 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/1098611118796890
• Date: 01 June 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Intelligence-Led

Policing in Practice:

Reflections From

Intelligence Analysts

Morgan Burcher

1

and Chad Whelan

1

Abstract

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a managerial law enforcement model that seeks to

place crime intelligence at the forefront of decision-making. This model has been

widely adopted, at least notionally, in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,

and Australia. Drawing on interviews with intelligence analysts from two Australian

state law enforcement agencies, this article contributes to the relatively small body of

literature that has examined ILP in practice. The article identifies three relational

themes that inhibit the successful implementation of ILP: analysts and data, analysts

and tools, and analysts and decision makers. Furthermore, it calls attention to the

need to better understand the structure and operations within law enforcement

agencies, including the similarities and differences among organizational units, in

order to better understand how these nuances shape the practice of ILP.

Keywords

intelligence-led policing, crime intelligence, intelligence analysts, law enforcement

Introduction

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) seeks to move from a “reactive” or “prosecution-

directed mode” of policing to a more “proactive” style of crime prevention

1

School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia

Corresponding Author:

Morgan Burcher, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University, 75 Pigdons Road, Waurn

Ponds, Geelong, Victoria, 3216, Australia.

Email: morgan.burcher@deakin.edu.au

Police Quarterly

2019, Vol. 22(2) 139–160

!The Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/1098611118796890

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(Innes, Fielding, & Cope, 2005, p. 41; Innes & Sheptycki, 2004, p. 1). This

involves a shift away from responding to individual incidents and “threats” in

isolation to one that is future orientated and strategic in nature (J. G. Carter,

2013; Ratcliffe, 2016). ILP seeks to achieve this by placing what is often referred

to as “crime intelligence” at the forefront of decisions concerning the prevention

and control of crime (Guidette & Martinelli, 2009, p. 132; Ratcliffe, 2016,

p. 89).

1

Under this model, crime intelligence should guide operations “rather

than operations dictating intelligence-gathering priorities” (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 6).

While gaining momentum for some years prior to this point, ILP was widely

adopted throughout the United Kingdom following the adoption of the

National Intelligence Model (NIM) by the U.K.’s Association of Chief Police

Officers in 2000. The NIM, in short, is a “business model” that takes an

“intelligence-led approach to policing” (Belur & Johnson, 2016; James, 2013;

National Centre for Police Excellence, 2005, p. 8) and in 2004, the U.K.

Government legislated that all police forces in England and Wales were to

have fully implemented the NIM by the following year. ILP has since been

widely adopted in many countries including the United States, Canada,

Australia, and New Zealand (J. G. Carter, 2013; Gul, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2016).

Crime intelligence or the intelligence process, more broadly, is often concep-

tualized in terms of ideal models. The most well-known of such models is the

“intelligence cycle.” There are numerous versions of the intelligence cycle; how-

ever, they broadly follow the same six stages: planning, collection, collation and

evaluation, analysis, dissemination, and feedback (Gill & Phythian, 2013;

Warner, 2013). The most common criticism of the intelligence cycle is that the

practice of intelligence is much more fluid than as it is depicted in the model.

A further criticism is how it views intelligence in isolation, paying no consider-

ation to the broader law enforcement environment in which it sits, including a

failure to articulate how intelligence analysis is linked to decision-making. In

contrast, Ratcliffe’s (2016) 3-I model seeks to clearly illustrate the role of intel-

ligence within policing. The 3-I model is not necessarily a representation of how

intelligence functions within law enforcement currently, but a depiction of how

law enforcement organizations should function if they are to be truly

intelligence-led. The 3-I model consists of three components (crime intelligence

analysis, decision makers, and criminal environment) and three processes con-

necting these components (interpret, influence, and impact), creating a triangle

(Gul, 2009). There are two main differences between the intelligence cycle and

the 3-I model, and they primarily relate to the latter two “Is.” The first is the

significance placed on crime intelligence analysts having an influence over deci-

sion makers. The second, in turn, is for decision makers to actually implement

various initiates who do have an impact on crime. This is perhaps the most

contentious component of this model and is a key difference from other

models that often see the creation of an intelligence product and its dissemina-

tion as the conclusion of this process (Coyne & Bell, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2016).

140 Police Quarterly 22(2)