Should courts instruct juries as to the consequences to a defendant of a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict?

• Author: Ellias, Randi
• Position: Supreme Court Review - Case Note

1. INTRODUCTION

   In Shannon v. United States,(1) the United States Supreme Court held that under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA), courts need not instruct juries on the consequences to defendants of a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)."(2) The Court first held that the IDRA contains no provision requiring such an instruction.(3) The Court also ruled that general federal practice did not mandate such an instruction.(4) This Note argues that the Court properly held that the IDRA does not require such an instruction, even though its legislative history implies that Congress envisioned that courts would give it. This Note further argues that the absence of empirical evidence indicating that jurors commonly misunderstand the nature of an NGI verdict supports the Court's position that general federal practice does not require the instruction. Finally, this Note contends that the longstanding proscription against telling jurors the consequences of their verdict remains in the absence of empirical evidence indicating that such an instruction might aid the defendant.

2. BACKGROUND

   To properly assess the Court's decision in Shannon v. United States, it is necessary to examine three governing factors: the role of the jury throughout history; the effect that the passage of the IDRA had on the insanity defense; and various federal circuit court decisions regarding instructing the jury on the legal consequences of an NGI verdict.

   1. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE JURY

      The modern jury finds its roots in eleventh century England, when courts initiated a practice of calling the defendant's neighbors to testify about various facts of the case at bar.(5) Eventually, courts began to ask these witnesses, known collectively as "the presenting jury," to determine whether the facts warranted a verdict of guilty or not guilty.(6) By the fourteenth century, the process had developed to the point where the jury that returned the verdict (known as the "petit jury") was different from the group of people who testified.(7) As a result, the jury's verdict became based not on the knowledge of its own members, but on the knowledge of other witnesses.(8) For the first time, the jury assumed its current role as the finder of fact.(9)

      The United States inherited the jury in this form from Great Britain. After the Revolutionary War, the Framers recognized the right to trial by jury as fundamental to the protection of individual liberty.(10) The Constitution embodies this recognition in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.(11)

      At the time the Constitution was framed, however, the boundaries between the role of the jury and the role of the judge lacked clear definition. Courts generally upheld the presumption that the jury functioned solely as a factfinder, while the judge remained the arbiter of the law.(12) At the same time, however, the judge commonly instructed juries that they possessed the right to determine the law as well as the facts, and that they could reject the judge's determination of the law.(13)

      In the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to curb this virtually unfettered power of the jury with the use of such mechanisms as the directed verdict and the special verdict.(14) Finally, the United States Supreme Court, which had previously upheld the jury's power to decide both the facts and the law, ruled that in federal criminal cases the jury ought to accept the judge's instructions on the law.(15) Thus, while the jury still had the ability to disregard its instructions without fear of punishment, it no longer possessed the Court's sanction to do so.(16)

      This view of the proper disposition of judicial power between the judge and the jury persists today. Under this formulation, the legal consequences of a particular verdict are a question of law, within the exclusive province of the judge.

   2. FEDERAL COURTS ON THE COMMITMENT INSTRUCTION PRE-IDRA

      Prior to the passage of the IDRA in 1984, most federal jurisdictions did not distinguish a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" from their standard "not guilty" verdict.(17) Thus, someone found NGI received the same treatment under the law as someone found simply "not guilty." These jurisdictions generally refused to allow courts to tell the jury the legal consequences to the defendant of an NGI verdict.(18)

      When explaining their refusal to give such an instruction, most courts invoked a similar rationale--that the jury lacked any role in sentencing and, therefore, should not take sentencing into account when reaching a verdict.(19) Moreover, courts feared that an instruction regarding the legal consequences to the defendant of any verdict would distract the jury from its factfinding role and invite compromise verdicts.(20) Such a verdict might arise when a jury returns a verdict of not guilty in a case in which the prosecution has clearly met its burden of proof, simply because the jury feels that the defendant does not deserve as harsh a punishment as the law prescribes.(21) This fear of compromise verdicts, as well as the desire to maintain a clearly defined division of labor between the judge and the jury, prompted courts to refuse to give an instruction regarding the sentencing ramifications of any verdict.

      The refusal to instruct the jury about the consequences of an NGI verdict actually worked to the defendant's advantage in most federal jurisdictions. As stated, with the exception of the law of the District of Columbia, no federal law provided for an NGI verdict separate from the more standard verdict of "not guilty."(22) Furthermore, no federal statute allowed the trial court to mandate commitment for an NGI acquittee.(23) Rather, the states had to pursue separate civil commitment procedures against the NGI acquittee.(24)

      NGI acquittees often went free because the federal courts and the state courts generally allocated the burden of proof of insanity differently.(25) To meet the burden under federal law, the accused often needed only to create a reasonable doubt as to their sanity.(26) State commitment procedures, however, generally required affirmative proof of insanity.(27) Because of the disparity, an NGI acquittee might offer enough evidence of insanity to satisfy the federal requirement, without providing enough evidence to enable the prosecution to trigger the state's commitment procedues. Thus, the NGI acquittee might escape institutionalization. The prohibition against informing juries of the consequences of a successful insanity plea, therefore, protected defendants. It foreclosed the possibility that the prosecution would play on the jurors' fears that a dangerous person would gain immediate release into society to gain a conviction.

      Unlike the other federal jurisdictions, the District of Columbia did statutorily mandate commitment procedures following the return of an NGI verdict.(28) This precluded the possibility that an NGI acquittee might gain immediate release. Not surprisingly, the District of Columbia courts held different beliefs about the propriety of telling the jury the consequences of that verdict. In Lyles v. United States,(29) the D.C. Court of Appeals held that courts should always inform the jury that an NGI verdict led to the defendant's involuntary commitment, unless the defendant affirmatively indicated that he did not wish the court to the give instruction.(30) In so holding, the court acknowledged the familiar rule that the jury should not concern itself with the consequences of its verdict.(31) The court found persuasive, however, the argument that jurors did not hold a common understanding of the nature of an NGI verdict.(32) The court professed that the jury had a right to understand the insanity verdict in the same manner as it understood the verdicts of "not guilty" and "guilty."(33) Unlike court opinions from jurisdictions which refused to instruct the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict, the opinion in Lyles failed to mention any concern about fairness to the defendant.

   3. THE INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984

      Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984(34) in response to virulent criticism of the insanity defense emanating from the John Hinckley trial.(35) The Act embodied a number of changes to the existing federal law. First, the Act provided a new standard for insanity, allowing defendants to offer, as an affirmative defense, evidence that at the time they committed the crime, they were unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.(36) This construction eliminated the alternative "irresistible impulse" prong of the test previously followed by some jurisdictions, whereby defendants might prove insanity by offering evidence that even though they appreciated the wrongfulness of their actions, they nevertheless lacked the ability to conform their behavior to the law.(37)

      Second, the Act shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecution to the defendants, who then had to prove their insanity by clear and convincing evidence.(38) This differed from previous federal guidelines, which required the defendant simply to raise the insanity defense, triggering a burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.(39)

      Further, the Act provided for a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" in addition to the two traditionally accepted verdicts of guilty and not guilty.(40) Previous law, as discussed, subsumed an NGI verdict into the umbrella "not guilty" category.

      Finally, the IDRA set forth a federal procedure for commitment of defendants found NGI.(41) This aspect of the Act addressed perhaps the most serious loophole in pre-IDRA federal law--the possibility that the defendant might escape commitment because of the disparities between the federal and state evidentiary requirements for proof of insanity.

   4. FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS ON THE COMMITMENT INSTRUCTION AFTER THE PASSAGE

      OF THE IDRA.

      The text of the IDRA does not...