State institutions and the survival of dictatorships.

• Author: Ezrow, Natasha M.
• Position: Inside the Authoritarian State - Report

Nominally democratic institutions such as political parties and legislatures are common in dictatorships, which rely on them to maintain control of the state. Parties and legislatures provide a means through which dictatorships co-opt potential opponents, distribute rents to supporters and mitigate elite conflicts. Indeed, regimes with these institutions have longer tenures than those without them. Using evidence from postwar dictatorships, this study demonstrates that parties and legislatures also enhance the ability of authoritarian regimes to withstand leadership transitions. Transfers of power are inherently destabilizing. Yet we find that dictatorships with parties and legislatures are far less likely to be associated with instability because these institutions insulate regimes from the disruptive effects of unconstitutional leadership transfers.

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Dictatorships are commonly perceived as repressive regimes in which power lies in the hands of a single individual, not with political institutions. Though this is true of some dictatorships, for much of the authoritarian world the reality is far more complex. Many authoritarian regimes grant partial political rights to their citizens, incorporate some level of power sharing between leaders and elites and rely on other strategies beyond repression for their survival. (1) Perhaps most surprising is the frequency with which dictatorships incorporate nominally democratic institutions, such as political parties and legislatures, into the regime apparatus.

Indeed, legislatures and political parties serve important functions in both democracies and dictatorships, but before turning to this discussion, it is important to clarify what we mean by political parties and legislatures. We define political parties as organized groups with roughly similar objectives and views that seek to influence policy through the process of getting candidates elected to public office. (2) Political parties in democracies represent the citizenry, help aggregate interests, channel public opinion and educate and socialize voters. Though political parties in dictatorships are not always able to influence policy, they serve a number of important functions, like coordinating elections and organizing the masses to prevent coup attempts. Moreover, parties allow the regime to recruit supporters, providing an additional means of controlling society and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of foreign observers. They also help co-opt elites by facilitating power-sharing deals and manage elite conflicts by distributing the spoils of power. We define legislatures as independent bodies of elected or selected individuals vested with the responsibility of making, amending or repealing laws. (3) These institutions also serve as a forum for elites to discuss policies, map out political agendas, coordinate actions or simply air grievances. (4)

Dictatorships rely on parties and legislatures because they help to prolong their survival. (5) Indeed, regimes that use these institutions are longer lasting than those that do not. (6) On average, dictatorships with neither a party nor a legislature rule for three and a half years, dictatorships with at least one party rule for eight and a half years and dictatorships with at least one party and a legislature rule for eighteen years. (7) These differences are substantial. Regimes with at least one party last more than twice as long as their institution-free counterparts, a relationship that is even more pronounced when they also possess legislatures. (8) Because parties and legislatures are so important in extending the longevity of regimes, of the 236 authoritarian regimes in power from 1946 to 2009, only four used neither a party nor a legislature during their tenures. (9)

Dictatorships appear to be well attuned to the fact that legislatures and political parties prolong their lifespans. Most incorporate parties and legislatures into the regime apparatus at some point during their rule. In particular, as authoritarian regimes mature, the use of parties and legislatures becomes more likely. Table 1 shows that in the first year of the regime, about one in five dictatorships lacks both a party and a legislature, about one in three has at least one party but no legislature and about one in two has at least one party and a legislature. This distribution shifts considerably over the lifespan of the regime. By their last year, very few dictatorships (only 11 percent) have neither a party nor a legislature and the majority (60 percent) have both. (10) This trend reflects the utility of these institutions as a survival tool.

In this study we suggest a mechanism through which parties and legislatures extend the tenures of authoritarian regimes: by insulating them from the destabilizing effects of leadership transitions. (11) We show that parties and legislatures enhance the survival of dictatorships by increasing their ability to withstand transfers of power from one leader to the next. They do so by raising the likelihood of constitutional leadership transfers, which are far less threatening to regimes. We define constitutional leadership transfers as those occurring through established procedures, such as elections constrained by term limits. (12) Before delving into an analysis of how this process works, we turn to a brief discussion of the uses of parties and legislatures in authoritarian states.

THE USE OF PARTIES AND LEGISLATURES IN DICTATORSHIPS

In democracies, political parties and legislatures are institutions that, among their other functions, translate mass preferences into policies, organize and assist in the selection of political leaders and arbitrate political disputes. In dictatorships, the extent to which institutions serve these purposes varies markedly from one regime to the next. In some cases, parties and legislatures play a significant role in the selection of rulers and the shaping of policies, while in others they are politically impotent and tightly controlled by the leader. (13)

Regardless of the de facto political power of parties and legislatures across dictatorships, in many ways they serve a universal purpose: prolonging the survival of the regime. Parties and legislatures are tools that enable regimes to manage elite conflict, distribute spoils to supporters and co-opt opponents--all of which buffer regimes from threats to their survival. We discuss the functions of parties and legislatures in authoritarian states below.

Parties

Parties serve many important purposes for the regime, which explains why dictatorships invest valuable resources to support them. In many undemocratic environments, parties exist before regimes rise to power. (14) In such instances they serve as organizational forums that enable actors to seize control of the government. (15) In other cases, however, parties are created after the regime takes power as forums for coup leaders to distribute power to one another or as vehicles for alliance building with civilians. (16)

In any case, parties are a key feature of dictatorships' survival strategies. (17) Scholars have identified a number of reasons for this. One mechanism through which parties extend the survival of dictatorships is by enabling regime actors to establish "credible power-sharing deals" with the party, serving "as a kind of contract between the dictator and his coalition." (18) This pseudo-contract mitigates commitment problems and makes it easier for leaders to delegate spoils to their elite supporters. (19) When it is more difficult for leaders to renege on their commitments to political allies, elite dissatisfaction with the regime is less...