INSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS, ILLEGITIMACY, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VIGILANTISM IN LATIN AMERICA

• Author: AMY E. NIVETTE
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12099
• Published date: 01 February 2016
• Date: 01 February 2016

INSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS, ILLEGITIMACY,

AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VIGILANTISM

IN LATIN AMERICA∗

AMY E. NIVETTE

Department of Sociology, Utrecht University

KEYWORDS: vigilantism, legitimacy, punitiveness

Why do individuals or groups support vigilantism as a means of conflict resolution?

Most researchers tend to agree that support for and participation in vigilantism occurs

in “stateless locations,” that is, when formal justice institutions are weak or absent. De-

spite this general consensus, quantitative evidence of this relationship is limited to a

handful of country-specific studies that used only subjective survey-based measures of

institutional weakness. This study seeks to extend research on vigilantism by assessing

the relationship between subjective and objective conditions of formal justice institu-

tions and public support for vigilantism across 323 provinces in 18 Latin American

countries by using the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey. Specifically, this study uses

multilevel logistic regression techniques to examine the variability of public support for

lethal vigilantism within and across Latin American countries. When controlling for a

wide range of potential confounds, the results show that the most robust predictors

of support for violent vigilantism are subjective indicators of institutional illegitimacy,

personal victimization, and punitive attitudes. Evidence also exists that objective inse-

curity, as measured by province-level homicide rates, fosters public support for violent

vigilantism in certain situations.

Why do individuals or groups support vigilantism as a means of conflict resolution?

Most researchers tend to agree that support for and participation in vigilantism occurs

when formal justice institutions are weak, absent, or otherwise “unavailable” (Abrahams,

1998; Buur and Jensen, 2004; Cooney, 1997; Schuberth, 2013). Despite this general con-

sensus, quantitative evidence of this relationship is limited to a handful of country-specific

studies that used only subjective survey-based measures of institutional weakness (Haas,

de Keijser, and Bruinsma, 2012, 2014; Tankebe, 2009; Weisburd, 1988). This study seeks

to extend research on vigilantism by assessing the relationship between subjective and ob-

jective conditions of formal justice institutions and public support for vigilantism across

323 provinces in 18 Latin American countries by using the 2012 AmericasBarometer Sur-

vey (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2015a).

Specifically, this study is concerned with explaining support for lethal vigilantism or

extralegal capital punishment. Support for serious violent vigilantism is a particularly

∗Additional supporting information can be found in the listing for this article in the Wiley Online

Library at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2016.54.issue-1/issuetoc.

Direct correspondence to Amy E. Nivette, Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, Sjoerd

Groenmangebouw, Padualaan 14, 3584 CH Utrecht, the Netherlands (e-mail: A.E.Nivette@uu.nl)

C2016 American Society of Criminology doi: 10.1111/1745-9125.12099

CRIMINOLOGY Volume 54 Number 1 142–175 2016 142

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VIGILANTISM IN LATIN AMERICA 143

interesting puzzle. Although, generally speaking, the goals of vigilantism are comple-

mentary to those of formal institutions—that is, to provide security, justice, and order—

in the long run, violent vigilantism can contribute to insecurity, injustice, and disorder

(Schuberth, 2013). The exercise of punishment outside formal institutions lacks account-

ability, predictability, impartiality, and often proportionality. Accounts of violent vigi-

lante groups “turning bad” are numerous [e.g., the Bakassi Boys (Baker, 2002; Smith,

2004), gangs in Nicaragua (Rodgers, 2008), and People Against Gangsterism and Drugs

and Mapogo a Mathamaga in South Africa (Buur and Jensen, 2004)], whereas others are

motivated to use violence to protect a socially unjust or racist status quo (e.g., the Ku

Klux Klan; see Tolnay and Beck, 1995). Furthermore, if extralegal violence becomes the

norm, this can impede the development and reform of formal institutions (Helmke and

Levitsky, 2004).

Latin America is a particularly suitable setting for the study of state power and vig-

ilantism. According to the Fragile States Index, Latin America has some of the most

stable (e.g., Uruguay and Chile) and the most fragile (e.g., Guatemala and Colombia)

states in the world (Fund for Peace, 2015). In cases such as Colombia, Mexico, and

El Salvador, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, and youth gangs have actively chal-

lenged the sovereignty of the state (Mattaini, 2010; Pearce, 2010; Serres, 2000; Shirk, 2010;

Waldmann, 2007). Formal criminal justice in Latin America is typically characterized by

corruption, lack of professionalism, impunity, and violence (Ungar, 2009). Although there

are many causes and correlates of violence in the region (e.g., inequality, poverty, prolifer-

ation of weapons, and drug trafficking networks; see Imbusch, Misse, and Carri ´

on, 2011),

some of the most systemic seem to be political instability and the lack of legitimate crimi-

nal justice institutions (Huggins, 1991; Pearce, 2010). These widespread political problems

generate conditions of “statelessness” in which citizens are more likely to ignore legal

avenues of conflict resolution to engage in techniques of violent self-help (Black, 1983;

Nivette, 2014).

DEFINING VIGILANTISM

This study defines vigilantism as a form of self-help or private justice, which falls un-

der a broader category of informal norm enforcement (Black, 1983). Specifically, vigi-

lante acts are committed by private persons, usually in the form of corporal punishment

or violence, against a perceived perpetrator (Buur and Jensen, 2004; Haas, de Keijser,

and Bruinsma, 2014; Johnston, 1996). This study is concerned with what Rosenbaum and

Sederberg (1976) called “crime control vigilantism,” in which punishment is directed at

private citizens who have violated legal norms. Although vigilantism typically connotes

a degree of organization and premeditation (Johnston, 1996; Roche, 1996), some schol-

ars also have considered more “disorganized,” individual, and spontaneous reactions to

perceived criminality as forms of vigilantism (Eriksson, 2009; Huggins, 1991; see gener-

ally Haas, de Keijser, and Bruinsma, 2012). Huggins (1991: 4) pointed out that although

there are well-organized vigilante groups in Latin America, most vigilantism tends to

be “relatively spontaneous and clandestine” compared with historical manifestations in

the United States. Therefore, this study takes a broad approach to conceptualizing vig-

ilantism in regard to perpetration. For example, vigilante offenders may be part of an

organized extralegal crime control group, ad hoc participants in violent vigilantism, or

individuals.

144 NIVETTE

Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1976) identified two other types of vigilantism, “regime

control” and “social-group-control” vigilantism, in which punishment is directed against

government officials and groups that challenge the status quo (typically minorities), re-

spectively. Although this study is largely concerned with support for crime control vigi-

lantism, it is important to note that these types can overlap considerably. For example,

vigilante groups that patrol the U.S.–Mexico border, such as the American Border Pa-

trol, are targeting perpetrators of illegal border crossings and therefore are punishing (or

threatening to punish) criminal acts. However, some have noted the anti-immigrant mo-

tivation behind many of these vigilante groups, suggesting these vigilante acts are moti-

vated by social group control (e.g., Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Doty, 2007; Southern

Poverty Law Center, n.d.).

STATELESSNESS, SELF-HELP, AND VIGILANTISM

In modern states, the formal rules and procedures governing responses to law-breaking

behaviors generally proscribe the use of physical force by private citizens, with some ex-

ceptions (e.g., self-defense). Support for violent vigilantism entails support for the viola-

tion of these rules. To explain this social phenomenon, two important questions must be

answered. First, one must explain why people support the violation of the law to punish

perceived wrongdoers. Second, it is important to explain why people support the use of

lethal violence to punish perceived wrongdoers. A range of potential punishments and

degrees of violence may be used for extralegal crime control and justice. The question

here is under what circumstances do individuals support “unofficial” capital punishment?

Research on vigilantism has tended to focus on the first question, whereas the second has

typically been the domain of studies on punitive attitudes. However, studies on lynch-

ing in the United States have noted the close conceptual relationship between unofficial

(vigilante) and official (state) executions (Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent, 2005; Messner,

Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2006; Phillips, 1987; Zimring, 2003). As Phillips (1987: 363) ar-

gued, “these acts of social control differ only in the agent administering the response.”

Therefore, to understand support for extralegal lethal executions, we must consider de-

terminants of both vigilantism and punitiveness.

Under what conditions might individuals support vigilantism when other forms of con-

flict resolution (i.e., the police or courts) might be used instead? Black (1983) proposed

that vigilantism (“self-help”) is more likely to occur in “stateless locations” where law is

unavailable. In this context, “law” often is used as shorthand for the provision of a public

good (i.e., security) by state political, legal, and criminal justice institutions. This can in-

clude protection from violence or property theft, access to courts and other legal services,

law enforcement, and regulation of public space. Under conditions in which these public

goods are unavailable, individuals will support alternative, private means of social control

to fill the security “gap” (Nivette, 2014; Ungar, 2013). In quantitative terms, “law varies

inversely with other social control” (Black, 1976: 6).

CONDITIONS OF STATELESSNESS: INSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS

AND ILLEGITIMACY

Law can be “unavailable” in multiple ways. According to Rosenbaum and Sederberg

(1976), state (formal) institutions may lack the capability to police and punish violations

of the law. Formal institutions that cannot provide security are considered ineffective,