Institutional Arsenals for Democracy? The Postcoup Effects of Conscript Militaries

• Author: Joseph Paul Vasquez,Jonathan Powell
• Published date: 01 April 2021
• Date: 01 April 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X19871982
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Institutional Arsenals

for Democracy?

The Postcoup Effects

of Conscript Militaries

Joseph Paul Vasquez, III

1

and Jonathan Powell

1

Abstract

Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally

emphasizes coups as a dependent variable, there is a growing debate as to how

coups influence a country’s long-term political trajectory. This literature includes a

handful of studies that claim coups against authoritarian regimes can act for the

public good and provide a boost to the state’s democratization prospects. Causal

mechanisms have included factors such as aid conditionality, economic inter-

dependence, and foreign pressure more generally. We argue that this growing body

of work can benefit from increased attention given to those who carry out coups:

the armed forces. Specifically, we argue that coups reflecting a larger societal

interest, be it the removal of a dictator or the desire for democracy after a dictator’s

ouster, are more likely undertaken by conscript armies. A cross-national explora-

tion of over 170 coups suggests that conscript militaries are in fact significantly more

likely to oversee democratic transitions following military coups. Beyond con-

tributing to a broader literature on civil–military relations, the article points to

important policy implications for developing nations.

Keywords

conscription, civil–military relations, democratization, military coups d’´

etat

1

University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jonathan Powell, University of Central Florida, 4297 Andromeda Loop N, Orlando, FL 32816, USA.

Email: jonathan.powell@ucf.edu

Armed Forces & Society

2021, Vol. 47(2) 298-318

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19871982

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Responding to important regional events such as the Color Revolutions and the Arab

Spring, scholars have sought to understand how the armed forces react when the

regimes they are meant to defend are challenged by different actors in society (e.g.,

Pion-Berlin, Esparza, & Grisham, 2014). Further, much research has sought to

explain the conditions under which militaries intervene in politics, specifically

investigating the coup d’´etat (Belkin & Schofer, 2003; Bell, 2016a). Explanations

for the phenomenon are varied but often coincide with the corporate interests of the

armed forces and/or the public displaying high levels of overt dissatisfaction with

the government (Johnson & Thyne, 2018; Leon, 2014). However, a review of this

literature on military coups reveals a few important gaps in need of further

investigation.

First, comparatively less research has been dedicated to investigating the after-

math of coups. Nordlinger’s (1977, pp. 109–110) work—completed over 40 years

ago—argued that “what the soldiers do after taking control of the government is of

greater importance than the takeover itself.” Despite considerable attention to other

aspects of military interventions, this specific suggestion has received limited atten-

tion. Second, though a few studies have assessed postcoup political trajectories ,

these investigations have done little to account for the qualities of the armed forces.

Third, literature has at times attempted to link political trajectories to the actions of

societal actors toward coups, but these studies have not assessed the relationship that

the military has with society (Pevehouse, 2005).

This article fills these gaps by assessing the role of conscription in postcoup

politics. We argue that militaries relying on conscripts, being drawn more broadly

from society, are the militaries most likely to have the broadest sociopolitical inter-

ests. Therefore, we expect that coups undertaken by conscript armies are likelier to

reflect the desires of the public and consequently anticipate that conscript armies

should be more likely to oversee democratic transitions than non-conscript forces.

Thus, we begin by discussing the literature on our dependent variable, postcoup

political trajectories. Next, we examine factors related to our independent variable,

military manpower policy and its relationship to societal interests that are likely to

shape postcoup political motives and influence. Relying on a global 60-year sample

(1950–2009) that encompasses over 170 successful coups, our study reveals that

coups are over twice as likely to lead to a democratic transition when undertaken by

militaries that include conscripts.

Coups and Democratization

Coups are frequently viewed as the largest threat to democracy. However, some

cases suggest that coups can act as catalysts for democratic transitions. Beyond

noteworthy historical examples during democracy’s “third wave,” in places as

diverse as Portugal (1974), Paraguay (1989), and Mali (1991), some scholars have

recently argued that coups are likelier harbingers of democratic transitions than we

would commonly assume (Huntington, 1991; Pevehouse, 2005). M. Miller (2012),

Vasquez and Powell 299