Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

• Date: 01 July 2019
• Published date: 01 July 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13007

538 Public Administration Review • July | A ugus t 201 9

Abstract: This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting

top-down and bottom-up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional

anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top-down approach works, but with substantial variation

across practices. More intense top-down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens’ dense networks,

and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens’ bribery experience and willingness. The bottom-up and

combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public

whistle-blowing deters citizens’ bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top-down

anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more

grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top-

down anticorruption, they deter citizens’ subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a

discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.

Evidence for Practice

• Top-down anticorruption works, but its effectiveness varies substantially across practices.

• More intense top-down anticorruption deters subsequent bribery incidence within citizens’ dense networks.

• More judicial convictions suppress citizens’ ensuing bribery experience and willingness.

• The bottom-up approach has both deterrence and signaling effects on citizens’ bribery experience and

willingness.

• The combined approach triggers conditional responses, contingent on institutional parameters.

Pervasive bribery incidence indicates a social

pathology that undermines economic

development and transgresses social norms

(Engel, Goerg, and Yu 2013, 2016; Randsley de

Moura and Abrams 2013; Wei and Kaufmann

1999). Combating bribery is a global crusade, yet

bribery incidence is largely context specific, subject

to cultural, economic, and institutional parameters

within state and even local confines (Treisman 2007).

Cross-national studies attest that bribery prevails

more in developing countries, particularly those with

weak institutional structures (Treisman 2007), and

that individual corruptibility may be well predicted in

lieu of their social norms and embedded institutional

settings (Barr and Serra 2010; Fisman and Miguel

2007). Therefore, localized institutional practices need

to be the focus of anticorruption reforms. Putting

more effort and resources into combating bribery

is often called for, yet, under the pressure of doing

more with less, it appears more critical to scrutinize

the dynamics of institutional endeavors and to assess

the extent to which different practices empower or

constrain the fight against bribery incidence. This

article is anchored in the context of China, where

bribery prevails and institutional anticorruption has

intensified (Wedeman 2004, 2005). It aims to present

a focused analysis of the effectiveness (or lack thereof)

of different institutional practices against bribery

incidence.

The importance of institutional anticorruption

is rarely underestimated, yet practical guidance

on specific interventions remains in short supply.

The literature tends to highlight the use of the

top-down approach, contending that hierarchical

monitoring and severe sanctions can hold bureaucrats

accountable (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2002;

Banuri and Eckel 2015; Huther and Shah 2000).

An alternative approach is to put citizens and public

service recipients at the center for monitoring, as

they are likely endowed with better information

and stronger incentives (Banerjee and Duflo 2006;

World Bank 2007). Not surprisingly, the combined

approach constitutes another option (Serra 2011).

Lab experiments (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner

2002; Barr and Serra 2010; Drugov, Hamman, and

Xing Ni

Wuhan University

Xuhong Su (Su Su)

University of South Carolina

Institutional Anticorruption in China:

Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

Research Article

Xuhong Su (Su Su) is associate

professor in the Department of Political

Science at the University of South Carolina,

Columbia. Her research interests have

focused on public administration, public

management, and science and technology

policy. Her current projects examine

corruption and anticorruption dynamics

across countries.

E-mail: xuhong.su@gmail.com

Xing Ni is professor in the School of

Political Science and Public Administration

at Wuhan University. He is also executive

director of the Center for Anticorruption

Studies at Sun Yat-sen University in China.

His research focuses on public organization

theories, human resource management,

performance management, and corruption

and anticorruption.

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 79, Iss. 4, pp. 538–551. © 2018 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13007.