Institutional anomie and cross‐national differences in incarceration†

• Author: Mateus Rennó Santos,Douglas B. Weiss,Alexander Testa
• Date: 01 August 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12242
• Published date: 01 August 2020

Received: 22 January 2019 Revised: 22 January 2020 Accepted: 31 January 2020

DOI: 10.1111/1745-9125.12242

ARTICLE

Institutional anomie and cross-national differences

in incarceration*

Douglas B. Weiss1Alexander Testa2Mateus Rennó Santos3

1Department of Criminal Justice, California

State University, San Bernardino

2Department of Criminology and Criminal

Justice, The University of Texasat San

Antonio

3Department of Criminology, University of

South Florida

Correspondence

DouglasB. Weiss, Department of Criminal

Justice,5500 University Parkway,San

Bernardino, CA92407.

Email:dweiss@csusb.edu

∗Allaut hors contributed equallyto this ar ticle.

Theaut hors wouldlike to thank Dr. Andrea

Schoepferand the anonymous reviewers for

their feedback.

Abstract

Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2007) institutional anomie the-

ory (IAT) has mainly been applied by criminologists to

explain crime rates at various aggregate levels. However,

Messner and Rosenfeld also suggest that the same social

and cultural forces that lead to high crime may explain

differences in punishment, although this latter proposition

has yet to be subject to empirical testing. Using a variety

of data sources for 41 countries measuring various struc-

tural and cultural configurations, in this study we assess the

extent to which IAT can explain cross-national differences

in incarceration. Our results indicate that the strength of the

economic institution and the extent of institutional imbal-

ance reflecting a dominant economic institution are posi-

tively associated with incarceration rates when the national

culture is characterized by individualism, a competitive

achievement orientation, or both. A national culture char-

acterized by both collectivism and a cooperative achieve-

ment orientation, however, serves as a buffer against the

punitive effects of an institutional imbalance that favors the

economy. Our results are discussed in the context of the

extant IAT literature and future research on cross-national

incarceration.

KEYWORDS

cross-national criminology, incarceration rates, institutional anomie

Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) originally proposed institutional anomie theory (IAT) to explain

aggregate-level crime patterns and particularly high rates of crime in the United States compared with

454 © 2020 American Society of Criminology wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/crim Criminology.2020;58:454–484.

WEISSET A L.455

other countries. Since its introduction, IAT has generated a substantial amount of research on the dif-

ferences in violent crime across countries (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Hughes, Schaible, & Gibbs,

2015; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2008; Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000; Weld & Roche, 2017)

and various levels of aggregation within the United States (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Chamlin &

Cochran, 1995; Stucky, 2003; Stults & Baumer, 2008). Moreover, IAT has been applied to explain

a variety of criminal and deviant behaviors including property crime (Piquero & Piquero, 1998),

marketplace offending (Cullen, Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Karstedt & Farrall, 2006), white-collar

crime (Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006), and delinquency in schools (Groß, Hövermann, & Messner, 2018;

Muftić, 2006).

Despite this broad application of IAT, a key hypothesis in Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2007) Crime

and the American Dream has received no empirical attention. In addition to being a theory of crime,

Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 93) also proposed IAT to be a theory of punishment as “the U.S.

response [emphasis in original] to crime is also the result of many of the same cultural and social

conditions that give rise to high crime rates.” Moreover, Messner and Rosenfeld (2009) argued that

“the resort to formal social control generally and the adoption of a policy of mass incarceration in

particular are consistent with some of the core claims of IAT” (p. 222). Indeed, Messner and colleagues

(2008) suggested the ability to explain both crime and punishment is a particular strength of IAT in

noting: “[O]ne of the most promising aspects of the theory is the possibility of integrating explanations

of crime and punishment within a single conceptual framework” (p. 179).

In this study, we provide the first empirical investigation of the extent to which institutional anomie

theory can be used to explain cross-national differences in incarceration rates. In doing so, we draw on

novel data in which the cultural components of IAT are measured to assess the relationship between

cross-national incarceration rates, institutional structure, and national culture.

1LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Institutional anomie theory

Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2007) institutional anomie theory extends insights drawn from Merton’s

(1968) anomie theory. Specifically,Merton proposed crime would be greater in societies where there is

a disproportionate emphasis on achieving the dominant cultural goals (i.e., monetary success), yet there

is unequal access to the legitimate means necessary to achieve these goals (i.e., education and quality

employment). IAT diverges from Merton’s work by shifting focus from the differential distribution of

legitimate means to achieve cultural success within a social structure to the balance of power among

major social institutions. In particular, social institutions are viewed as “building blocks of society,”

which play a key role in orienting individual behavior in accordance with shared values and norms

(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 65).

According to IAT, societies with high levels of crime embody two primary features. First, their

social structure is characterized by an institutional imbalance of power in which one social institu-

tion (i.e., the economy) comes to dominate and diminish the ability of other social institutions (e.g.,

family, polity, and schools) to control behavior (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). The devaluing of these

noneconomic institutions inhibits their ability to instill moral values in citizens and therefore weakens

internal constraints against criminal activity. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) suggested the economic

institution comes to dominate through three interrelated processes. Foremost, the social functions of

noneconomic institutions are devalued in society relative to economic pursuits. For example,education

is viewed as a means to occupational attainment and economic success rather than as an achievement in